The Transcendental Object, Experience, and the Thing in Itself

Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental object” has always puzzled interpreters. On the one hand, he says that the transcendental object is the object to which we relate our representations. On the other hand, he declares the transcendental object to be unknowable and identifies it with the thing in itself. I argue that this poses a problem that Kant only in the B edition of the Critique solves in a satisfactory manner. According to this solution, we ascribe sensible predicates to things in themselves, but only insofar as they appear. I conclude that this could motivate a phenomenalist account of Kant’s idealism, but one that gives due weight to the role of things in themselves

Kant on Essence and Nature

This paper investigates Kant’s account of “real essence” and of a thing’s “nature”. Notwithstanding their wide negligence in the literature, these concepts belong to the central ones of Kant’s metaphysics. I argue that, on the one hand, Kant is in continuity with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition of essence. But, on the other hand, he also follows Locke in distinguishing between “logical” and “real” essence. Contrary to recent attempts of aligning real essence with contemporary approaches to essence, I will defend the thesis that Kant equates real essence and (formal) nature, and that real essence has a causal, but no constitutive role. I shall also respond to potential objections and discuss some developments of Kant’s views

God, Powers, and Possibility in Kant’s _Beweisgrund_

This paper proposes a novel reading of Kant’s account of the dependence of possibility on God in the pre-Critical Beweisgrund. I argue that Kant has a theistic-potentialist conception of the way God grounds possibility, according to which God grounds possibility by his understanding and will. The reason is that Kant accepts what I call the Principle of Possible Existence: If something is possible, then it is possible that it exists. Furthermore, I explore the connection between causal powers and possibility, the influence of Crusius on Kant, and the significance of the distinction between internal and external possibility

Kant’s Account of Real Possibility and the German Philosophical Tradition

Kant’s postulate of possibility states that possible is whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience. As has often been noted, this is a definition of real possibility. However, little attention has been paid to the relation of Kantian real possibility to the German philosophical tradition before him. I discuss three kinds of possibility present in this tradition – internal, external, and (Crusian) real possibility – and argue that Kant endorses internal and external possibility. Furthermore, I show, specifically with respect to the concept of state (Zustand), that the three traditional conceptions are reminiscent of three conceptions of real possibility that Kant implicitly distinguishes. Lastly, I argue that, according to Kant, we need experience to prove real possibility (at least as regards the three conceptions of the real possibility of states) because otherwise we could not know whether the formal conditions of experience obtain

Kant, Epistemic Phenomenalism, and the Refutation of Idealism

This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.This paper takes issue with the widespread view that Kant rejects epistemic phenomenalism. According to epistemic phenomenalism, only cognition of states of one’s own mind can be certain, while cognition of outer objects is necessarily uncertain. I argue that Kant does not reject this view, but accepts a modified version of it. For, in contrast to traditional skeptics, he distinguishes between two kinds of outer objects and holds that we have direct access to outer appearances in our mind; but he still considers objects outside our mind unknowable. This sheds new light on Kant’s refutation of idealism.Peer Reviewe

Two Worlds and Two Aspects: on Kant’s Distinction between Things in Themselves and Appearances

This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.In the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, a textual stalemate between two camps has evolved: two-world interpretations regard things in themselves and appearances as two numerically distinct entities, whereas two-aspect interpretations take this distinction as one between two aspects of the same thing. I try to develop an account which can overcome this dispute. On the one hand, things in themselves are numerically distinct from appearances, but on the other hand, things in themselves can be regarded as they exist in themselves and as they appear. This reveals a mutual entailment of both accounts. Finally, I suggest that this approach most naturally leads to a kind of ‘phenomenalism’, but of a sort not normally attributed to Kant.Peer Reviewe

Auswirkungen der Finanz- und Schuldenkrise auf den deutschen Eigenheimsektor

Die Auswirkungen der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise auf den Markt für selbst-genutzte Wohnimmobilien in Deutschland sind bislang kaum untersucht. Die-ser Beitrag analysiert die in Folge der Krise auf dem deutschen Eigenheim-markt stattfindenden Anpassungsmechanismen innerhalb eines theoretischen Modells und leitete Aussagen darüber ab, wie die wichtigsten Marktgrößen durch die Krise beeinflusst werden. Um die Aussagekraft der auf Basis des Modells getroffenen qualitativen Erkenntnisse zu überprüfen, werden die Mo-dellaussagen der tatsächlichen aktuellen Entwicklung ausgewählter Woh-nungsmarktindikatoren gegenübergestellt. Wie sich zeigt, ist die Finanzkrise nicht notwendigerweise mit negativen Auswirkungen auf den deutschen Ei-genheimsektor verbunden. Von Seiten des Kredit-, des Immobilienkapital- und des Neubaumarkts gehen Impulse aus, die die durch sinkende Einkommen und steigende Arbeitslosigkeit bedingte negative Beeinflussung der Nachfrage nach selbstgenutztem Wohnraum zumindest teilweise kompensieren. --