Media Markets and Localism: Does Local News en Español Boost Hispanic Voter Turnout?

Since the dawn of broadcasting, and especially in the past decade, Americans have turned their attention from local to more distant sources of news and entertainment. While the integration of media markets will raise the private welfare of many consumers, a globalized information and entertainment industry can undermine civic engagement, transforming locally engaged citizens into viewers consuming programming from distant sources. In response to such concerns, many regulatory agencies, including the Federal Communication Commission in the United States, curtail the integration of media markets to promote %u201Clocalism.%u201D Determining the right balance between the private benefits of integrated markets and the public value of civic engagement requires evidence on the size of the positive spillovers from local media. In this paper, we exploit the rapid growth of Hispanic communities in the United States to test whether the presence of local television news affects local civic behavior. We find that Hispanic voter turnout increased by 5 to 10 percentage points, relative to non-Hispanic voter turnout, in markets where local Spanish-language television news became available. Thus, the tradeoff between integrated media markets and civic engagement is real, and our results provide a basis for the continued pursuit of regulatory policies that promote localism.

Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency

This study examines the financing choices of firms operating in a weak institutional environment. We argue that in relationship-based systems, global financing and strong political connections are alternative means to create firm value. Well-connected firms might be less inclined to access global capital markets because (state-owned) domestic banks provide capital at low cost. Moreover, the expanded disclosures and additional scrutiny that come with issuing foreign securities might be at odds with close political ties at home because these ties can best be exploited when little is disclosed about the firm. Using data from Indonesia, we provide strong support for the hypothesis that global financing and political connections are substitutes: Firms with close political ties to former President Soeharto are significantly less likely than nonconnected firms to have publicly traded foreign securities. To study performance effects, we examine how returns during the Asian financial crisis differ between firms with and without foreign securities. Consistent with prior work, we find that firms with foreign securities exhibit higher returns during the crisis. However, our data indicate that politically well-connected firms also received considerable support during this period. These results suggest that previous estimates of cross-listing benefits are considerably biased if domestic opportunities such as political connections are ignored.

Electoral Acceleration: The Effect of Minority Population on Minority Voter Turnout

Political outcomes are well understood to depend on the spatial distribution of citizen preferences. In this paper, we document that the same holds for the individual decision to be politically active. Using both cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence on turnout, we show that citizens are more likely to vote if they live in a jurisdiction with a larger number of persons sharing similar political preferences. As a result, changes in the identity of a district's median citizen lead to even larger changes in the identity of its median voter, a phenomenon we term electoral acceleration. We present evidence that electoral acceleration is in part due to the structure of media markets. Candidates find it easier to direct campaign efforts at larger groups because many existing media outlets cater to this audience.

Social Learning and Coordination in High-Stakes Games: Evidence from Friend or Foe

We analyze the behavior of game-show contestants who play a one-shot game called Friend or Foe. While it is a weakly dominant strategy not to cooperate, almost half the contestants on the show choose to play friend.' Remarkably, the behavior of contestants remains unchanged even when stakes are very high, ranging from $200 to more than$10,000. We conclude that the frequent cooperation observed in one-shot social dilemma games is not an artefact of the low stakes typically used in laboratory experiments. Strategic decisions on Friend or Foe change markedly if players can observe previous episodes. We show that these contestants play friend' if they have reason to expect their opponent to play friend,' and they play foe' otherwise. The observed decisions are consistent with recent fairness theories that characterize individuals as conditional cooperators. Using information about past play, some groups (e.g., pairs of women) manage to stabilize cooperation in this high-stakes environment. For most others, improved coordination implies a drastic decline in monetary winnings. Prior to playing the social dilemma game, contestants produce' their endowment by answering trivia questions. We find some evidence for reciprocal behavior: Players who produce fewer correct answers for their team are more likely to cooperate in the social dilemma game.

Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments

We test the robustness of behavior in dictator games by offering allocators the choice to play an unattractive lottery. With this lottery option, mean transfers from allocators to recipients substantially decline, partly because many allocators now keep the entire endowment for themselves (without playing the lottery). In our standard dictator game, the median transfer amounts to 41% of the dictators' endowment. Once the lottery option is present, the median transfer falls to zero. Introducing an additional unattractive choice thus leads subjects to violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP

The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis

For industries ranging from software to pharmaceuticals and entertainment, there is an intense debate about the appropriate level of protection for intellectual property. The Internet provides a natural crucible to assess the implications of reduced protection because it drastically lowers the cost of copying information. In this paper, we analyze whether file sharing has reduced the legal sales of music. While this question is receiving considerable attention in academia, industry, and Congress, we are the first to study the phenomenon employing data on actual downloads of music files.We match an extensive sample of downloads to U.S. sales data for a large number of albums. To establish causality, we instrument for downloads using data on international school holidays. Downloads have an effect on sales that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Our estimates are inconsistent We would like to thank Bharat Anand, Gary Becker, Bob Frank, Shane Greenstein, Austan Goolsbee, Alan Krueger, Steven Levitt, Tom Mroz, Alan Sorensen, Joel Waldfogel, Steven Wildman, Pai-Ling Yin, participants at numerous seminars, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This project would not have been possible without the assistance of several individuals and organizations. MixMasterFlame and the FlameNap network shared P2P data with us, and BigChampagne LLC, the CMJ Network, Nathaniel Leibowitz, and Nevil Brownlee generously provided auxiliary data. We thank Keith Ross and David Weekly for assistance in understanding the KaZaA, OpenNap, and WinMX search protocols and database indices. Sarah Woolverton and Christina Hsiung Chen provided superb research assistance. The financial support of the George F. Baker Foundation (Oberholzer-Gee) and the Kenan Faculty Fund (Strumpf) is gratefully acknowledged. We appreciated the aural support from Massive Attack, Sigur Ros, and the Mountain Goats

Endogenous Policy Decentralization Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism

This is the publisher's version, also found here: http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=00904d38-5ca6-40d9-a352-b9429ec2056d%40sessionmgr114&vid=1&hid=109&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&AN=5933965The economic theory of federalism is largely built around the premise that more heterogeneous preferences result in more decentralized policy making. Despite its prominence and importance, this central tenet of economic federalism has never been empirically evaluated. This paper presents the first formal test of the link between preference heterogeneity and endogenous policy decentralization using as a case study liquor control in the United States over the period 1934–70. The results are reassuring: States with more heterogeneous preferences are more likely to decentralize liquor control and allow for local government decision making

Corporate Diversification in China: Causes and Consequences

We examine the diversification patterns of almost all publicly listed non-financial companies in China during the 2001 to 2005 period. More than 70 percent of the firms in our sample are diversified. We document that patterns of diversification strongly depend on firms' political connections. Former local bureaucrats are more likely than other CEOs to enter multiple industries. This effect is particularly pronounced in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that operate in weak institutional environments. These companies are particularly prone to entering low-growth, low-profitability, and unrelated industries. Consequently, the performance effects of diversification differ sharply across SOEs and private firms. While the latter earn a premium from diversifying their operations, SOEs do not. Our results are consistent with the view that provincial and local governments push Chinese SOEs into unattractive sectors of the economy and that politically connected CEOs use their relationships to build corporate empires.Corporate Diversification, Institutions, China