Asset Bubbles and Their Consequences

In the past, the federal government has introduced moral hazard in the banking system through deposit insurance. Banks underpriced risk because of the federal guarantee that backed deposits. After banking crises in the 1980s and 1990s, deposit insurance was put on a sound basis and that source of moral hazard was mitigated. In its place, monetary policy has become a source of moral hazard. In acting to counter the economic effects of declining asset prices, the Federal Reserve has come to be viewed as underwriting risky investments. Policy pronouncements by senior Fed officials have reinforced that perception. These actions and pronouncements are mutually reinforcing and destructive to the operation of financial markets. The current financial crisis began in the subprime housing market and then spread throughout credit markets. The new Fed policy fueled the housing boom. Refusing to accept responsibility for the housing bubble, the Fed's recent actions will likely fuel a new asset bubble. The cumulative effects of recent monetary policy undermine the case for free markets

Banking reform

Bank failures ; Savings and loan associations ; Bank supervision ; Deposit insurance

Money, deregulation and the business cycle

Money ; Business cycles ; Monetary theory

Depository institution failures: the deposit insurance connection

Bank failures ; Deposit insurance ; Savings and loan associations

Learning from one another: the U.S. and European banking experience

Banking structure ; European Economic Community

Over-commitment to the job and the organisation: implications of excessive job involvement and organisational attachment

Research and managerial practice have both put emphasis on the development of high levels of job involvement and organisational attachment, stemming from the assumption that employee commitment benefits the organisation and the individual. However, there are indications that over-commitment may have negative consequences for employees and employers. This paper discusses potentially detrimental outcomes of excessive commitment to the job and the organisation and examines the implications of over-commitment for individuals, organisations and values within society. Future research and human resource management should be based upon a more balanced view of the interaction between job demands and the person's off-the-job interests, commitments and responsibilities

Geometric View of Measurement Errors

The slope of the best fit line from minimizing the sum of the squared oblique errors is the root of a polynomial of degree four. This geometric view of measurement errors is used to give insight into the performance of various slope estimators for the measurement error model including an adjusted fourth moment estimator introduced by Gillard and Iles (2005) to remove the jump discontinuity in the estimator of Copas (1972). The polynomial of degree four is associated with a minimun deviation estimator. A simulation study compares these estimators showing improvement in bias and mean squared error