Neural Substrates of Contingency Learning and Executive Control: Dissociating Physical, Valuative, and Behavioral Changes

Contingency learning is fundamental to cognition. Knowledge about environmental contingencies allows behavioral flexibility, as executive control processes accommodate the demands of novel or changing environments. Studies of experiential learning have focused on the relationship between actions and the values of associated outcomes. However, outcome values have often been confounded with the physical changes in the outcomes themselves. Here, we dissociated contingency learning into valuative and non-valuative forms, using a novel version of the two-alternative choice task, while measuring the neural effects of contingency changes using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Changes in value-relevant contingencies evoked activation in the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) consistent with prior results (e.g., reversal-learning paradigms). Changes in physical contingencies unrelated to value or to action produced similar activations within the LPFC, indicating that LPFC may engage in generalized contingency learning that is not specific to valuation. In contrast, contingency changes that required behavioral shifts evoked activation localized to the DMPFC, supplementary motor, and precentral cortices, suggesting that these regions play more specific roles within the executive control of behavior

Divergence and convergence of risky decision making across prospective gains and losses: preferences and strategies

People choose differently when facing potential gains than when facing potential losses. Clear gross differences in decision making between gains and losses have been empirically demonstrated in numerous studies (e.g. framing effect, risk preference, loss aversion). However, theories maintain that there are strong underlying connections (e.g. reflection effect). We investigated the relationship between gains and losses decision making, examining risk preferences and choice strategies (the reliance on option information) using a monetary gamble task with interleaved trials. For risk preferences, participants were on average risk averse in the gains domain and risk neutral/seeking in the losses domain. We specifically tested for a theoretically hypothesized correlation between individual risk preferences across the gains and losses domains (the reflection effect), but found no significant relationship in the predicted direction. Interestingly, despite the lack of reflected risk preferences, cross-domain risk preferences were still informative of individual choice behavior. For choice strategies, in both domains participants relied more heavily on the maximizing strategy than the satisficing strategy, with increased reliance on the maximizing strategy in the losses domain. Additionally, while there is no mathematical reliance between the risk preference and strategy metrics, within both domains there were significant relationships between risk preferences and strategies – the more participants relied upon the maximizing strategy the more risk neutral they were (equating value and utility maximization). These results demonstrate the complexity of gains and losses decision making, indicating the apparent contradiction that their underlying cognitive/neural processes are both dissociable and overlapping

Modulation of incentivized dishonesty by disgust facial expressions

Disgust modulates moral decisions involving harming others. We recently specified that this effect is bi-directionally modulated by individual sensitivity to disgust. Here, we show that this effect generalizes to the moral domain of honesty and extends to outcomes with real-world impact. We employed a dice-rolling task in which participants were incentivized to dishonestly report outcomes to increase their potential final monetary payoff. Disgust or control facial expressions were presented subliminally on each trial. Our results reveal that the disgust facial expressions altered honest reporting as a bi-directional function moderated by individual sensitivity. Combining these data with those from prior experiments revealed that the effect of disgust presentation on both harm judgments and honesty could be accounted for by the same bidirectional function, with no significant effect of domain. This clearly demonstrates that disgust facial expressions produce the same modulation of moral judgments across different moral foundations (harm and honesty). Our results suggest strong overlap in the cognitive/neural processes of moral judgments across moral foundations, and provide a framework for further studies to specify the integration of emotional information in moral decision making

Sleep Deprivation Alters Choice Strategy Without Altering Uncertainty or Loss Aversion Preferences

Sleep deprivation alters decision making; however, it is unclear what specific cognitive processes are modified to drive altered choices. In this manuscript, we examined how one night of total sleep deprivation (TSD) alters economic decision making. We specifically examined changes in uncertainty preferences dissociably from changes in the strategy with which participants engage with presented choice information. With high test-retest reliability, we show that TSD does not alter uncertainty preferences or loss aversion. Rather, TSD alters the information the participants rely upon to make their choices. Utilizing a choice strategy metric which contrasts the influence of maximizing and satisficing information on choice behavior, we find that TSD alters the relative reliance on maximizing information and satisficing information, in the gains domain. This alteration is the result of participants both decreasing their reliance on cognitively-complex maximizing information and a concomitant increase in the use of readily-available satisficing information. TSD did not result in a decrease in overall information use in either domain. These results show that sleep deprivation alters decision making by altering the informational strategies that participants employ, without altering their preferences

Aging and loss decision making: increased risk aversion and decreased use of maximizing information, with correlated rationality and value maximization

We investigated how adult aging specifically alters economic decision-making, focusing on examining alterations in uncertainty preferences (willingness to gamble) and choice strategies (what gamble information influences choices) within both the gains and losses domains. Within each domain, participants chose between certain monetary outcomes and gambles with uncertain outcomes. We examined preferences by quantifying how uncertainty modulates choice behavior as if altering the subjective valuation of gambles. We explored age-related preferences for two types of uncertainty, risk and ambiguity. Additionally, we explored how aging may alter what information participants utilize to make their choices by comparing the relative utilization of maximizing and satisficing information types through a choice strategy metric. Maximizing information was the ratio of the expected value of the two options, while satisficing information was the probability of winning.We found age-related alterations of economic preferences within the losses domain, but no alterations within the gains domain. Older adults (OA; 61 to 80 years old) were significantly more uncertainty averse for both risky and ambiguous choices. OA also exhibited choice strategies with decreased use of maximizing information. Within OA, we found a significant correlation between risk preferences and choice strategy. This linkage between preferences and strategy appears to derive from a convergence to risk neutrality driven by greater use of the effortful maximizing strategy. As utility maximization and value maximization intersect at risk neutrality, this result suggests that OA are exhibiting a relationship between enhanced rationality and enhanced value maximization. While there was variability in economic decision-making measures within OA, these individual differences were unrelated to variability within examined measures of cognitive ability. Our results demonstrate that aging alters economic decision-making..

Neural mechanisms of the transformation from objective value to subjective utility: Converting from count to worth

When deciding, we aim to choose the best possible outcome. This is not just selection of the option that is the most numerous or physically largest, as options are translated from objective value (count) to subjective value (worth or utility). We localized the neural instantiation of the value-to-utility transformation to the dorsal anterior midcingulate cortex (daMCC), with independent replication. The daMCC encodes the context-specific information necessary to convert from count to worth. This encoding is not simply a representation of utility or preference, but the interaction of the two. Specifically, the relationship of brain activation to value is dependent on individual preference, with both positive and negative slopes across the population depending on whether each individual’s preference results in enhancement or diminishment of the valuation. For a given value, across participants, enhanced daMCC activation corresponds to diminished subjective valuation, deactivation to enhanced subjective valuation, and non-modulated activation with non-modulated subjective valuation. Further, functional connectivity analyses identified brain regions (positive connectivity with the inferior frontal gyrus and negative connectivity with the nucleus accumbens) through which contextual information may be integrated into the daMCC and allow for outputs to modulate valuation signals. All analyses were replicated through an independent within-study replication, with initial testing in the gains domain and replication in the intermixed and mirrored losses trials. We also present and discuss an ancillary finding, we were unable to identify parametric value signals for losses through whole-brain analyses, and ROI analyses of the vmPFC presented non-modulation across loss value levels. These results identify the neural locus of the value-to-utility transformation, and provide a specific computational function for the daMCC in the production of subjective valuation through the integration of value, context, and preferences

Manipulation detection and preference alterations in a choice blindness paradigm.

It is commonly believed that individuals make choices based upon their preferences and have access to the reasons for their choices. Recent studies in several areas suggest that this is not always the case. In choice blindness paradigms, two-alternative forced-choice in which chosen-options are later replaced by the unselected option, individuals often fail to notice replacement of their chosen option, confabulate explanations for why they chose the unselected option, and even show increased preferences for the unselected-but-replaced options immediately after choice (seconds). Although choice blindness has been replicated across a variety of domains, there are numerous outstanding questions. Firstly, we sought to investigate how individual- or trial-factors modulated detection of the manipulations. Secondly, we examined the nature and temporal duration (minutes vs. days) of the preference alterations induced by these manipulations.Participants performed a computerized choice blindness task, selecting the more attractive face between presented pairs of female faces, and providing a typewritten explanation for their choice on half of the trials. Chosen-face cue manipulations were produced on a subset of trials by presenting the unselected face during the choice explanation as if it had been selected. Following all choice trials, participants rated the attractiveness of each face individually, and rated the similarity of each face pair. After approximately two weeks, participants re-rated the attractiveness of each individual face online.Participants detected manipulations on only a small proportion of trials, with detections by fewer than half of participants. Detection rates increased with the number of prior detections, and detection rates subsequent to first detection were modulated by the choice certainty. We show clear short-term modulation of preferences in both manipulated and non-manipulated explanation trials compared to choice-only trials (with opposite directions of effect). Preferences were altered in the direction that subjects were led to believe they selected

Beyond money: Risk preferences across both economic and non-economic contexts predict financial decisions.

Important decisions about risk occur in wide-ranging contexts, from investing to healthcare. While an underlying, domain-general risk attitude has been identified across contexts, it remains unclear what role it plays in shaping behavior relative to more domain-specific risk attitudes. Clarifying the relationship between domain-general and domain-specific risk attitudes would inform decision-making theories and the construction of decision aids. The present research assessed the relative contribution of domain-general and domain-specific risk attitudes to financial risk taking. We examined risk attitudes across different decision domains, as revealed through a well-validated measure, the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT). Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that a domain-general risk attitude shaped responses across multiple domains, and structural equation modeling showed that this domain-general risk attitude predicted observed behavioral risk premiums in a financial decision-making task better than domain-specific financial risk attitudes. Thus, assessments of risk attitudes that include both economic and non-economic domains improve predictions of financial risk taking due to the enhanced insight they provide into underlying, domain-general risk preferences

Preference alteration.

<p>Differences of rated attractiveness between selected and unselected faces for each trial type (C, NM and M trials) at each day (Day 1 and Day 2). Significant differences were found between all comparisons of trial types on day 1 (NM>M, MC), with no differences between trial types on day 2, and comparisons between days for all trial types (C and NM: Day 1>Day 2, M: Day 1</p

Choice blindness task.

<p>On each trial, participants choose which of two faces they found more attractive. Each trial began with presentation of the backside of two playing cards presented on the left and right sides of the screen. These two cards were flipped, replaced by a pair of faces for three seconds. Then, the playing card backsides were re-presented, and participants reported which face they found more attractive by pressing a corresponding key (free response time). Of note, while the figure utilizes cartoon face silhouettes (Pixabay, Inc.), the actual task utilized color photographs of human faces (see <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0108515#s2" target="_blank"><i>Methods</i></a>). Immediately after their choice, they rated their choice certainty by keyboard response, with a brief green highlight indicating the selected certainly level. On 10 out of 20 trials, participants only made their choice and rated their certainty (Choice-only condition; C trials). On the other half of the trials, they were asked to provide textual explanation for their choice after the certainty rating. On 5 of the trials, the face they had selected was shown (Non-manipulated condition; NM trials). On the other 5 trials, they were presented with the non-selected face as though they had selected it (Manipulated condition; M trials). Note, as requested, the specific faces shown were not the ones utilized in the study (these are from the Aberdeen face set (<a href="http://www.pics.stir.ac.uk" target="_blank">www.pics.stir.ac.uk</a>).</p