Introduction: Perceived Legitimacy and the State Judiciary

By and large, judicial authority is a product of perceived validity. Judges lack an independent means of enforcement; they wield no influence over either the sword or the purse, neither force nor will. Rather, the judicial branch operates under the auspices of its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people\u27s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation\u27s law means and to declare what it demands. When the public sees the judiciary as legitimate, it accepts and adheres to its rulings even when it may perceive certain decisions to be ideologically opposed or legally incorrect; public perception thus drives the power and prerogative of the courts. Where public perception sours, the rule of law itself is threatened, sap[ping] the foundations of public and private confidence, and ... introduc[ing] in its stead universal distrust and distress

The Living Rules of Evidence

The jurisprudential evolution of evidence law is dead. At least, that’s what we’re expected to believe. Ushered in on the wings of a growing positivist movement, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence purported to quell judicial authority over evidence law. Instead, committees, conferences, and members of Congress would regulate any change to our evidentiary regime, thereby capturing the evolution of evidence law in a single, transparent code.The codification of evidence law, though, has proven problematic. The arrival of the Federal Rules of Evidence has given rise to a historically anomalous era of relative stagnation in the doctrinal space. Although the last half-century has seen material developments in the empirical and normative literatures underlying our evidentiary regime, rulemakers have gone silent. As modern understandings increasingly render the Federal Rules of Evidence anachronistic—and even offensive—there has been no substantial effort by rulemakers to align evidence law with evolving scientific findings or cultural sentiments. Rather, in the words of a prominent judge, evidence law has entered a “dogmatic slumber.”This Article therefore seeks to awaken evidence law. In particular, it advances a novel jurisprudential framework for interpreting and applying the Federal Rules of Evidence. Drawing on prominent jurisprudential responses to other frozen positivist landscapes, the Article encourages judges to adopt a holistic, progressive perspective when interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, one that expresses fidelity to text but also appreciates significant developments in the empirical literature and evolving cultural norms. Where the world outside has evolved such that the underlying rationale for an evidentiary rule no longer holds water, “living evidentiary theory” calls on judges to reassume their historic role and craft an optimal evidentiary solution

The Incompatibility of Due Process and Naked Statistical Evidence

Qualitative evidence is a cornerstone of the modern trial system. Parties often invoke eyewitness testimony, character witnesses, or other forms of direct and circumstantial evidence when seeking to advance their case in the courtroom, enabling jurors to reach a verdict after weighing two competing narratives.\u27 But what if testimonial, experience-based evidence were removed from trials? In a legal system that draws its legitimacy from centuries of tradition-emphasizing notions of fairness even above absolute accuracy. Would a jury, not to mention the public at large, reject a verdict that imposes liability or guilt on a defendant in the complete absence of qualitative evidence? More specifically, does a judgment that rests solely on probabilities or other quantitative evidence offend deep-rooted notions of fairness, especially when that quantitative evidence fails to establish a coherent narrative for the plaintiffs case as a whole? In at least one situation, the answer appears to be yes

Derby city joint cultural needs analysis for the derby creative arts network and reimagine projects

Derby Theatre; Derby Creative Arts Network; The Arts Council for Englan

Very high temperature silicon on silicon pressure transducers

A silicon on silicon pressure sensor has been developed for use at very high temperatures (1000 F). The design principles used to fabricate the pressure sensor are outlined and results are presented of its high temperature performance

Beyond the Witness: Bringing a Process Perspective

For centuries, the foundation of the Anglo-American trial has been the witness.\u27 Witnesses report on their personal observations, provide opinions of character, offer scientific explanations, and in the case of parties, narrate their own story. Indeed, even for documentary and other physical evidence, witnesses often provide the conduit through which such evidence reaches the factfinder. Documentary or physical evidence rarely stands on its own. The law of evidence has thus unsurprisingly focused on-or perhaps obsessed over-witnesses. The hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause demand that declarants be available witnesses at trial so that they may be subject to cross-examination.\u27 Expert evidence rules emphasize an expert witness\u27s qualifications, bases, and methods.\u27 Even the framework for admitting photographs-evidence that is often self-explanatory-is witnesscentric. Trial practice commonly treats photographs as demonstrative evidence, reducing them to a mere illustration of the vouching witness\u27s testimony. Our contention is that this witness-centered perspective is antiquated and counterproductive. It is a deeply limited and ultimately distortive lens through which the legal system views the evidence available in the modem world

Settled Law

“Settled law” appears frequently in judicial opinions—sometimes to refer to binding precedent, sometimes to denote precedent that has acquired a more mystical permanence, and sometimes as a substantive part of legal doctrine. During judicial confirmation hearings, the term is bandied about as Senators, advocacy groups, and nominees discuss judicial philosophy and deeper ideological commitments. But its varying and often contradictory uses have given rise to a concern that settled law is simply a repository for hopelessly disparate ideas. Without definitional precision, it risks becoming nothing more than empty jargon. We contend that settled law is actually a meaningful concept, even though it does not embody any single, unified idea. First, we argue that controlling law, which essentially corresponds to binding precedent, is a fundamentally distinct concept that is neither synonymous with nor a subset of settled law. Second, we draw on seminal jurisprudential theories to build a taxonomy of five frameworks that capture how legal actors can invoke settled law, both rhetorically and doctrinally. Third, we demonstrate how a clearer understanding of settled law can make doctrine more coherent and administrable. Situating certain doctrines within the appropriate frameworks, and not conflating controlling law and settled law, would resolve myriad doctrinal anomalies. Moreover, greater conceptual precision can improve political rhetoric during the confirmation process by promoting clearer dialogue and discouraging legal actors from talking past one another

Grußformeln als Medium der Polemik in Augustins Briefen

Abstract: The analysis of salutations is often disregarded because they are said to be later additions of copyists or at least conventional phrases without any content. But the correspondence of Augustine suggests that the bishop himself composed the recorded salutations and that he even added a subtext in many cases. The survey sheds light on elements, development, and different functions of salutations in order to show that, at least in Augustine’s correspondence, an analysis of the salutations is a valuable resource to describe not only the social differences between sender and recipient, but also the atmosphere, the reason for writing, and the correspondents’ relationship to each other.</jats:p