112 research outputs found
Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?
In this paper, we defend a novel, multidimensional account of representational unification, which we distinguish from integration. The dimensions of unity are simplicity, generality and scope, non-monstrosity, and systematization. In our account, unification is a graded property. The account is used to investigate the issue of how research traditions contribute to representational unification, focusing on embodied cognition in cognitive science. Embodied cognition contributes to unification even if it fails to offer a grand unification of cognitive science. The study of this failure shows that unification, contrary to what defenders of mechanistic explanation claim, is an important mechanistic virtue of research traditions
Czy ciało nadal się ukrywa (a jeśli nie, to co dalej)?
W wywiadzie z Frederique de Vignemont (ten numer) skoncentrowaliśmy się na dwóch głównych tematach badawczych autorki, czyli świadomości ciała i poznaniu innych umysłów. Wstępem do tych pytań są uwagi dotyczące książki, nad którą aktualnie pracuje de Vignemont (Mind the Gap). Wywiad wzbogaciliśmy pytaniami o enaktywizm, interdyscyplinarność badań oraz o miejsce filozofa we współczesnej kognitywistyce. Prace de Vignemont można podzielić na teoretyczne i eksperymentalne (poza oczywiście różnicami tematycznymi). Z jednej strony jest autorką jednych z ciekawszych konceptualizacji roli ciała w poznaniu (tematu bardzo eksploatowanego eksperymentalnie, ale filozoficznie zaniedbanego). Z drugiej strony jest współautorką interesujących prac eksperymentalnych, będących często dopełnieniem i wsparciem dla jej dociekań
Bodily Processing: The Role of Morphological Computation
The integration of embodied and computational approaches to cognition requires that
non-neural body parts be described as parts of a computing system, which realizes cognitive
processing. In this paper, based on research about morphological computations and the ecology of
vision, I argue that nonneural body parts could be described as parts of a computational system, but
they do not realize computation autonomously, only in connection with some kind of—even in the
simplest form—central control system. Finally, I integrate the proposal defended in the paper with
the contemporary mechanistic approach to wide computation
Fantom ciała jako cielesna samoświadomość
According to Peter Halligan, […] it is important to consider that the experience of our body is largely the product of a continuously updated „phantom” generated by the brain. (Halligan 2002, 266). Next, he adds: I will argue (not withstanding pathology to the physical body) that the prevalent common sense assumption of phantom experience as pathological is wrongheaded and largely based on a long-standing and pernicious folk assumption that the physical body is necessary for experience of a body. (Halligan 2002, 252). These two remarks can serve as a backdrop for a discussion of the problem of bodily self-consciousness presented in the article. If experiencing a phantom of an amputated limb is indeed not pathological, and if normal bodily experience is de facto based on the body phantom constructed by the brain, then our conception of this very phantom should prove relevant when trying to explain bodily self-consciousness
Tracking the Objects of the Psychopathology On Interdisciplinarity of Psychopathology on the Margins of Historia polskiego szaleństwa
This paper is a loose commentary on Marcinów’s book (2017). The commentary is focused on the objects of psychopathological investigations and the role of psychology / psychiatry tension in the process of singling out, tracking, and describing them. As a consequence, there are limitations of collaborative and integrative efforts between psychologists and psychiatrists where questions of psychopathology are concerned
Embodied Cognition: Looking Inward
The body is a highly complex, coordinated system engaged in coping
with many environmental problems. It can be considered as some sort of
opportunity or obstacle, with which internal processing must deal.
Internal processing must take into account the possibilities and
limitations of the particular body. In other words, even if the body is not
involved in the realization of some cognitive explicit task, it is not a
neutral factor of our understanding of why a system solves a task in one
way or another. Therefore, when conducting research on embodiment
and the body’s cognitive system we should not neglect internal, cognitive
processing.
I appeal to Goldman’s research on embodied cognition to sketch
the broader framework for internal processing in embodied cognition. I
believe that even if we don’t accept Goldman’s approach as the viable
proposal for embodied cognition in general, it’s a quite natural starting
point for our analysis. Goldman (2012; 2014, and with de Vignemont
2009) argue for the essential role of the bodily formats or bodily codes
(respectively: B-formats and B-codes) in embodied cognition. B-codes
are here described as the processing of regions or sub-regions of the
central nervous system. They are primarily employed for body control or
monitoring, and reused for cognitive tasks. Beyond doubt, this
conception provides an excellent starting point for analyzing the internal
(mostly neural) processing in cases of embodied cognition.
At the end of this paper, I will argue that the embodiment of
cognition needs a conceptual twist. Following Keijzer’s (2015) interest in
the evolution of the nervous system, and the minimal forms of cognition,
I argue that in investigating embodied cognition, we should investigate
the role played by cognitive processing for specific kinds of organisms,
meaning organisms with a body of a particular morphology (size, shape,
kinds, and distribution of sensors and effectors). Doing that, I refer to
some conceptual and empirical considerations. I will also try to show
that research on embodied cognition is still not sufficiently anchored in
evolutionary and comparative studies on cognition, nor on the nervous
system and body morphology. Bigger reliance on these kinds of studies, will make it make possible to gain a deeper understanding of internal
processing in embodied cognition.Publikacja została sfinansowana ze środków Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego w ramach programu Narodowego Programu Rozwoju Humanistyki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji 0014/NPRH4/H3b/83/2016 - projekt „Przygotowanie i publikacja dwóch anglojęzycznych numerów monograficznych Internetowego Magazynu Filozoficznego HYBRIS” (3bH 15 0014 83)
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