94 research outputs found
ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)âs voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varianâs model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.Public Goods, Voluntary Contributions, Sequential Contributions, Endogenous Timing, Action Commitment, Observable Delay, Experiment
Employee incentives: bonuses or penalties?
Firms regularly use incentives to motivate their employees to be more productive. However, often little attention is paid to the language used in employment contracts to describe these incentives. It may be more effective to present incentives as entitlements that can be lost by failing to reach a performance target, rather than as additional rewards that can be gained by reaching that target. However, emphasizing the potential losses incurred as a result of failure may entail hidden costs for the employer, as it may damage the trust relationship between a firm and its employees
Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences?
We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-person gift-exchange game experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our baseline treatment we observe that the second agent's effort is influenced by the effort choice of the first agent, even though there are no material spillovers between agents. This peer effect is predicted by a model of distributional social preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms compliance. A conditional logit investigation of the explanatory power of payoff inequality and elicited norms finds that the second agent's effort can be best explained by the social preferences model. In further treatments with modified games we find that the presence/strength of peer effects changes as predicted by the social preferences model. As with the baseline treatment, a conditional logit analysis favors an explanation based on social preferences, rather than social norms following for these treatments. Our results suggest that, in our context, the social preferences model provides a parsimonious explanation for the observed peer effect.peer effects, social influence, gift-exchange, experiment, social preferences, inequity aversion, measuring social norms
Does consultation improve decision making?
This paper reports an experiment designed to test whether prior consultation within a group affects subsequent individual decision making in tasks where demonstrability of correct solutions is low. In our experiment subjects considered two paintings created by two different artists and were asked to guess which artist made each painting. We observed answers given by individuals under two treatments: in one, subjects were allowed the opportunity to consult with other participants before making their private decisions; in the other there was no such opportunity. Our primary findings are that subjects in the first treatment evaluate the opportunity to consult positively but they perform significantly worse and earn significantly less.Consultation; Decision making; Group decisions; Individual decisions
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity
We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what co-workers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay comparison information in isolation from effort comparison information does not appear to affect reciprocity toward employers: in this case own wage is a powerful determinant of own effort, but co-worker wages have no effect. By contrast, we find that exposure to both pieces of social information systematically influences employeesâ reciprocity. A generous wage offer is virtually ineffective if an employee is matched with a lazy co-worker who is also paid generously: in such circumstances the employee tends to expend low effort irrespective of her own wage. Reciprocity is more pronounced when the co-worker is hard-working, as effort is strongly and positively related to own wage in this case. Reciprocity is also pronounced when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees: in this case the co-workerâs effort decision is disregarded and effort decisions are again strongly and positively related to own wage. On average exposure to social information weakens reciprocity, though we find substantial heterogeneity in responses across individuals, and find that sometimes social information has beneficial effects. We suggest that group composition may be an important tool for harnessing the positive effects of social comparison processes.reciprocity, gift-exchange, social information, social comparisons, pay comparisons, peer effects
Promoting cooperation: the distribution of reward and punishment power
Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power to reward or punish in the hands of a subset of group members (âcentral monitorsâ). We review the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power is diffused across group members, as in most of the extant literature, and compare this with more recent work and new evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation
Promoting cooperation: the distribution of reward and punishment power
Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power to reward or punish in the hands of a subset of group members (âcentral monitorsâ). We review the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power is diffused across group members, as in most of the extant literature, and compare this with more recent work and new evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation
Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.public goods, voluntary contributions, sequential moves, experiment
Social preferences and social comparisons
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis providing an overview of the common themes and methods underlying this research.
Chapter 2 reports an experiment that examines the characteristics of effective leaders in a leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: leadersâ cooperativeness and their beliefs about followersâcooperativeness. We find that groups perform best when led by cooperatively inclined leaders, partly because they are intrinsically motivated to contribute more than non-cooperative leaders, partly because they are more optimistic about followersâ cooperativeness.
Chapter 3 reports an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. As predicted, we find that overall provision may be lower under sequential than simultaneous contributions. However, we also find that the distribution of contributions is more equitable than predicted when the first-mover is predicted to free-ride, but not when the second-mover is predicted to free-ride. These results can be explained by second-moversâ willingness to punish free-riders, and unwillingness to reward first-movers who contribute.
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of social comparisons on reciprocal relationships. Using a three-person gift- exchange game we study how employeesâ reciprocity towards an employer is affected by pay comparison information (information about what co-workers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform). We find that pay comparison information does not affect reciprocity, while effort comparison information can influence reciprocal relationships in important ways.
Chapter 5 also examines the impact of pay comparisons on effort behaviour. We compare effort in a treatment where co-workersâ wages are secret with effort in two âpublic wagesâ treatments differing in whether co-workersâ wages are chosen by an employer, or are fixed exogenously by the experimenter. We find that pay comparisons are detrimental for effort, particularly when coworkersâ wages are exogenous.
Chapter 6 summarises the findings of this research and concludes
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