Les électeurs du Front national (2012-2015)

Au premier tour des élections régionales de 2015, les scores du Front national (FN) ont frôlé les 28 % des suffrages exprimés. Au second, il a recueilli plus de 6,8 millions de voix et 15 % des inscrits. L’enquête « Régionales 2015 » réalisée au lendemain du scrutin permet de prendre la mesure de sa dynamique électorale, à un peu plus d’un an de l’échéance présidentielle de 2017. Il montre la relative stabilité des structures idéologiques et sociodémographiques des soutiens du Front national, à l’exception de deux changements majeurs par rapport à 2012. La précarité sociale qui favorisait le vote de gauche joue aujourd’hui en faveur du FN, tandis que l’électorat féminin conquis par Marine Le Pen en 2012 se montre de nouveau plus réticent que l’électorat masculin. (Premier paragraphe

Reply to John W. P. Veugelers

It is always instructive to learn what others see in your book, especially in the eyes of an expert of the European extreme Right such as Jack Veugelers. He reads Ces Français qui votent FN as a study in “the social basis of party politics,”relying on survey data and showing “a predilection for multivariate analysis” which he obviously does not share. Although he admits that my approach sheds light on problems such as the double nature of the FN’s constituency, the decisive influence of gender, or the relation between the votes for Le Pen’s party and the local presence of immigrants, he expresses some doubts about “the scope and precision” as well as “the reliability” of the book’s methodology. I should have gone “beyond data on the social background of voters” and given more attention to “the party’s organizational activity … partisan identification and voter flows.” The chapter he prefers is the last one, where “Mayer suddenly expands her framework to include the leadership, organization and the legitimacy of far Right parties” and “lends importance to both collective memories … and the way in which other parties have responded to the far Right.” On the whole, because they are not “integrated within a comprehensive view of the phenomenon,” my findings fail to answer the “big questions” one should ask about the FN, such as the reasons for its electoral breakthrough and endurance, its connections with the former nationalist Rights or its impact on the French party system and regime. I only partly agree with these remarks, and therefore gladly accept FPC&S’s proposal to answer them. [Article's first paragraph

What Remains of Class Voting?

According to the thesis put forward by the sociologist Seymour M. Lipset in his book, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, the electoral game is essentially a reflection of the class struggle: “In virtually every economically developed country, the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the Left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right.” However, almost thirty years later he is one of the first people, along with Terry Clark, to predict the disappearance of social classes and of the privileged link between left-wing parties and people from working-class backgrounds. [First paragraph]How We Analyze Immigration Policy and the Politics of Immigration Policy and the Politics of Immigration in France Policy and the Politics of Immigration in the UK Policy and the Politics of Immigration in the United States Conclusio

Reflection on the Methods of Political Science on Both Sides of the Atlantic

For its Ninth Congress in Toulouse (5-7 September 2007), the French Political Science Association (AFSP) invited the American Political Science Association (APSA) to hold a joint “table-ronde”, comparing methods on both sides of the Atlantic. It took the form of three consecutive panels, devoted to qualitative and quantitative approaches, to the dimension of time and to contextual and inference problems. During three days, 18 papers were presented, over 60 participants attended, contrasting ways to validate theories and models were discussed at length, illustrated by concrete research examples. The objective here is less to sum up all that was said than to outline the main differences and convergences of our methodologies. (...

Le mythe de la dédiabolisation du FN

Quoi qu’en dise sa présidente, le Front national n’a jamais cessé d’être raciste et xénophobe, à en juger par l’opinion de ses adhérents et sympathisants. C’est ce que montre le sondage annuel effectué pour la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme. Depuis que Marine Le Pen a été élue présidente du Front national, en janvier 2011, sa stratégie de conquête du pouvoir passe par la « dédiabolisation », visant à donner du FN l’image d’un parti « comme les autres ». Il s’agit notamment de montrer qu’il n’est ni raciste, ni xénophobe, ni surtout antisémite. Louis Aliot, vice-président du FN et député européen, le dit sans fard : « La dédiabolisation ne porte que sur l’antisémitisme. En distribuant des tracts dans la rue, le seul plafond de verre que je voyais, ce n’était pas l’immigration, ni l’islam… D’autres sont pires que nous sur ces sujets-là. C’est l’antisémitisme qui empêche les gens de voter pour nous. Il n’y a que cela… À partir du moment où vous faites sauter ce verrou idéologique, vous libérez le reste (..). » (Entretien du 6 décembre 2013, in Valérie Igounet, Le Front national de 1972 à nos jours, Paris, Seuil, p. 420)

Le vote FN : historique, sociologie et enjeux

Nonna Mayer analyse les caractéristiques du vote Front national. Dans cet entretien, elle revient sur les événements fondateurs du parti frontiste, sur sa sociologie électorale, ses thématiques de campagne et les raisons de la présence de son leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, au second tour de l'élection présidentielle de 2002

The Politics of Estrangement

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Comment Nicolas Sarkozy a rétréci l’électorat Le Pen

D’une élection présidentielle à l’autre Jean-Marie Le Pen recule de 6 points et perd un million d’électeurs. Le Panel Electoral Français (2007) montre que cet électorat se distingue toujours par son tropisme droitier, son attitude ethnocentrique autoritaire. Mais plus du quart des électeurs de Le Pen en 2002 lui ont préféré Nicolas Sarkozy en 2007, parce qu’il leur semblait avoir l’étoffe d’un président et plus de chances d’être élu. Le FN perd plus chez les indépendants et chez les employés que chez les ouvriers qui forment aujourd’hui près de la moitié de sa base électorale. Son recul montre que la progression des partis d’extrême droite n’est pas inéluctable et que les facteurs de l’offre politique sont déterminants.Between the first round of the 2002 and the 2007 French presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen lost 6 percentage points and a million voters. The French Electoral Panel (2007) shows that these voters still stand out by their rightist tropism, their ethnocentric-authoritarian attitudes. But over a quarter of the 2002 Le Pen voters turned to Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, because he appeared to have a presidential stature and far more chances to be elected. The FN lost more support among the self employed and office and sales clerks than among blue collars which form today almost half his constituency. Its decline shows that the progression of extreme right parties is not inescapable, and that the supply side of politics is decisive

Les opinions antisémites en France après la Seconde Intifada

À partir de données de sondage, cet article relativise la thèse d’un nouvel antisémitisme fondé sur la diabolisation d’Israël et du sionisme et porté par une extrême gauche radicale et tiers-mondiste. En France, les opinions antisémites déclarées sont plutôt en recul, la réprobation envers les actes antijuifs va croissant, et c’est toujours à l’extrême droite du champ politique que la proportion et la progression des opinions judéophobes sont le plus marquées.With help of information collected from surveys, this article puts into perspective the theory of a new anti-Semitism, based on the demonisation of Israel and Zionism, conveyed by the far extreme left and the supporters of the Third World. In France, expressed anti- Semite opinions are losing ground while the disapproval of acts against the Jews is growing. It is still in the far extreme right that the number and the progression of anti-Semite opinions are the most important

The Political Impact of Social Insecurity in France

Drawing on the case of France during the 2017 presidential election, which was marked by the victory of the centrist Emmanuel Macron and the surge of the populist radical right (Marine Le Pen) and left (Jean-Luc Mélenchon), this paper analyses the impact of social insecurity on voting, using a multidimensional indicator of "precariousness" that combines measures of economic hardship and social and cultural isolation. On the basis of the 2017 French Election Study, a series of logistic regressions estimate the impact of precariousness on individual vote choice (including abstention) in both rounds, controlling for socio-demographic and attitudinal variables. Precariousness mainly has a strong negative impact on turnout, silencing the most deprived. Among those who vote, it has a strong negative impact on support for Emmanuel Macron. It also has a positive impact on support for the populist radical right and, to a lesser extent, on support for the populist radical left when controlling for socio-demographic variables. But this effect practically disappears after controlling for attitudes. Social insecurity does not necessarily breed populism. Ideological divisions make the difference, especially attitudes towards the European Union, immigration, and the left-right divide