Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) )

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to individuals. The individuals form a group as a single agent and share their private signals in order to maximize their average payoff. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss due to risk aversion. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes.

"Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information"

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to individuals. The individuals form a group as a single agent and share their private signals in order to maximize their average payoff. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss due to risk aversion. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes.

"Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information"

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model.

Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model.

Fundamental Logic of Periodic Income Determination of Financial Accounting

Until now business income has been a most fundamental concept in accounting,where the principle of matching cost with revenue has been the central featureof double-entry book keeping system. It is, however, quite obvious that nowthere is little agreement among researchers and CPAs regarding (1) the nature ofincome, (2) the structure and mechanism of income determination and (3) the essentialelements of income determination. This study will focus on the importanceof “business activities” in an enterprise which generates income as well asthe transformation from original activities to artificial ones so as to theoreticallysolve these complex problems

Toward Mandatory Environmental Disclosure for Capital Markets: Discussion and Empirical Evidence from Japan

Increasing demand for environmental disclosure by capital markets hasamplified discussions calling for mandatory environmental disclosure. Towardmandating, capabilities and shortcomings of current voluntary environmentalreporting must be clarified from an investor’s perspective. The authors carriedout extensive empirical research in Japan, one of the most advanced countriesin the world in terms of environmental reporting. Global information vendorsare currently practicing a promising approach that enables investors to utiliseenvironmental data disclosed voluntarily. Relying on their approach, the authorsdeveloped an environmental database that covers 185 companies in the NikkeiIndex. This paper uses the information in this database to discuss the capabilitiesand shortcomings of voluntary environmental disclosure. The databaseenables investors to undertake simple analysis, but blanks and discrepanciesin boundaries damage the comparability and reliability of the data. Thesefundamental shortcomings stem largely from the adverse incentive: the morea company is engaged in environmental reporting, the worse it could appearin the database we developed. In contrast to the fact that an “invisible hand”could increase the number of sustainability reports published voluntarily, theadverse incentive faced by companies indicates that policy-making in the area ofenvironmental disclosure may become more vital in the future