Industrial Relations Experiments in China: Balancing Equity and Efficiency the Chinese Way

China should build socialism by "crossing the river by feeling for stones" (Deng Xiaoping). Chinese industrial relations are changing accordingly. Local union experiments have implemented local-level changes experimenting with institutional reforms that address efficiency and equity imbalances. Local union leaders have exercised autonomy to develop multi-employer “community unions” in Changchun’s Chaoyang District to represent peasant migrant workers employed by small firms by targeting small geographic zones and hiring union presidents as organizers, aggregating union members into amalgamated units. While the union’s role still includes social harmonization, unions have undertaken an additional representative role. Similar efforts elsewhere have given the union representation experience. Unions have organized multi-employer federations across industries. Unions also have collaborated with local governments on innovative structures to ensure that companies in some industries, such as construction, post a “bond” to guarantee end-of-year compensation. Finally, this paper discusses the role of the new Labor Contract Law in institutionalizing these changes. The LCL defines more precisely employment relationships and workers’ legal rights and seems to increase unions’ legal authority to ensure that employers respect individual workers’ rights, supports the extension of collective contracts to more enterprises, and appears to give unions greater authority to represent workers within the employment relationship and before legal authorities. These changes may provide a material basis for balancing efficiency with equity. We think these experiments have political foundations, whether it is “harmonious society” or simply to extend the union’s organizing maintain political status. Further research will determine whether these experiments are successful

The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information

In a series of studies, subjects were asked to make predictions about target individuals. Some subjects were given information about the target which pretest subjects had judged to be "diagnostic"--that is, had judged to be usefully predictive of the outcome. Other subjects were given a mix of information judged to be diagnostic and information judged to be "nondiagnostic" by pretest subjects--that is, judged to be of little value for predicting the outcome. Subjects given mixed information made much less extreme predictions than did subjects given only diagnostic information. It was argued that this "dilution effect" occurs because people make predictions by making simple similarity judgments. That is, they compare the information they have about the target with their conception of outcome categories. The presence of individuating but nondiagnostic information about the target reduces the similarity between the target and those outcomes that are suggested by the diagnostic information. One of the major implications is that stereotypes and other "social knowledge structures" may be applied primarily to abstract, undifferentiated individuals and groups and may be largely set aside when judgments are made about concrete, individuated people.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/24406/1/0000676.pd