On the Limits of Depth Reduction at Depth 3 Over Small Finite Fields

Recently, Gupta et.al. [GKKS2013] proved that over Q any $n^{O(1)}$-variate and $n$-degree polynomial in VP can also be computed by a depth three $\Sigma\Pi\Sigma$ circuit of size $2^{O(\sqrt{n}\log^{3/2}n)}$. Over fixed-size finite fields, Grigoriev and Karpinski proved that any $\Sigma\Pi\Sigma$ circuit that computes $Det_n$ (or $Perm_n$) must be of size $2^{\Omega(n)}$ [GK1998]. In this paper, we prove that over fixed-size finite fields, any $\Sigma\Pi\Sigma$ circuit for computing the iterated matrix multiplication polynomial of $n$ generic matrices of size $n\times n$, must be of size $2^{\Omega(n\log n)}$. The importance of this result is that over fixed-size fields there is no depth reduction technique that can be used to compute all the $n^{O(1)}$-variate and $n$-degree polynomials in VP by depth 3 circuits of size $2^{o(n\log n)}$. The result [GK1998] can only rule out such a possibility for depth 3 circuits of size $2^{o(n)}$. We also give an example of an explicit polynomial ($NW_{n,\epsilon}(X)$) in VNP (not known to be in VP), for which any $\Sigma\Pi\Sigma$ circuit computing it (over fixed-size fields) must be of size $2^{\Omega(n\log n)}$. The polynomial we consider is constructed from the combinatorial design. An interesting feature of this result is that we get the first examples of two polynomials (one in VP and one in VNP) such that they have provably stronger circuit size lower bounds than Permanent in a reasonably strong model of computation. Next, we prove that any depth 4 $\Sigma\Pi^{[O(\sqrt{n})]}\Sigma\Pi^{[\sqrt{n}]}$ circuit computing $NW_{n,\epsilon}(X)$ (over any field) must be of size $2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n}\log n)}$. To the best of our knowledge, the polynomial $NW_{n,\epsilon}(X)$ is the first example of an explicit polynomial in VNP such that it requires $2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n}\log n)}$ size depth four circuits, but no known matching upper bound

A Survey on Approximation Mechanism Design without Money for Facility Games

In a facility game one or more facilities are placed in a metric space to serve a set of selfish agents whose addresses are their private information. In a classical facility game, each agent wants to be as close to a facility as possible, and the cost of an agent can be defined as the distance between her location and the closest facility. In an obnoxious facility game, each agent wants to be far away from all facilities, and her utility is the distance from her location to the facility set. The objective of each agent is to minimize her cost or maximize her utility. An agent may lie if, by doing so, more benefit can be obtained. We are interested in social choice mechanisms that do not utilize payments. The game designer aims at a mechanism that is strategy-proof, in the sense that any agent cannot benefit by misreporting her address, or, even better, group strategy-proof, in the sense that any coalition of agents cannot all benefit by lying. Meanwhile, it is desirable to have the mechanism to be approximately optimal with respect to a chosen objective function. Several models for such approximation mechanism design without money for facility games have been proposed. In this paper we briefly review these models and related results for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and meanwhile we present a general framework for approximation mechanism design without money for facility games

Simple extractors via constructions of cryptographic pseudo-random generators

Trevisan has shown that constructions of pseudo-random generators from hard functions (the Nisan-Wigderson approach) also produce extractors. We show that constructions of pseudo-random generators from one-way permutations (the Blum-Micali-Yao approach) can be used for building extractors as well. Using this new technique we build extractors that do not use designs and polynomial-based error-correcting codes and that are very simple and efficient. For example, one extractor produces each output bit separately in $O(\log^2 n)$ time. These extractors work for weak sources with min entropy $\lambda n$, for arbitrary constant $\lambda > 0$, have seed length $O(\log^2 n)$, and their output length is $\approx n^{\lambda/3}$.Comment: 21 pages, an extended abstract will appear in Proc. ICALP 2005; small corrections, some comments and references adde

Regulating Highly Automated Robot Ecologies: Insights from Three User Studies

Highly automated robot ecologies (HARE), or societies of independent autonomous robots or agents, are rapidly becoming an important part of much of the world's critical infrastructure. As with human societies, regulation, wherein a governing body designs rules and processes for the society, plays an important role in ensuring that HARE meet societal objectives. However, to date, a careful study of interactions between a regulator and HARE is lacking. In this paper, we report on three user studies which give insights into how to design systems that allow people, acting as the regulatory authority, to effectively interact with HARE. As in the study of political systems in which governments regulate human societies, our studies analyze how interactions between HARE and regulators are impacted by regulatory power and individual (robot or agent) autonomy. Our results show that regulator power, decision support, and adaptive autonomy can each diminish the social welfare of HARE, and hint at how these seemingly desirable mechanisms can be designed so that they become part of successful HARE.Comment: 10 pages, 7 figures, to appear in the 5th International Conference on Human Agent Interaction (HAI-2017), Bielefeld, German

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium

We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes. Given the widespread use of bundling in real-life markets, we study its role as a stabilizing and coordinating device by considering the notion of \emph{competitive bundling equilibrium}: a competitive equilibrium over the market induced by partitioning the goods for sale into fixed bundles. Compared to other equilibrium concepts involving bundles, this notion has the advantage of simulatneous succinctness ($O(m)$ prices) and market clearance. Our first set of results concern welfare guarantees. We show that in markets where consumers care only about the number of goods they receive (known as multi-unit or homogeneous markets), even in the presence of complementarities, there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that guarantees a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare, and this guarantee is tight. We also establish non-trivial welfare guarantees for general markets, two-consumer markets, and markets where the consumer valuations are additive up to a fixed budget (budget-additive). Our second set of results concern revenue guarantees. Motivated by the fact that the revenue extracted in a standard competitive equilibrium may be zero (even with simple unit-demand consumers), we show that for natural subclasses of gross substitutes valuations, there always exists a competitive bundling equilibrium that extracts a logarithmic fraction of the optimal welfare, and this guarantee is tight. The notion of competitive bundling equilibrium can thus be useful even in markets which possess a standard competitive equilibrium

On Streaming and Communication Complexity of the Set Cover Problem

We develop the first streaming algorithm and the first two-party communication protocol that uses a constant number of passes/rounds and sublinear space/communication for logarithmic approximation to the classic Set Cover problem. Specifically, for n elements and m sets, our algorithm/protocol achieves a space bound of O(m ·n [superscript δ] log[superscript 2] n logm) using O(4[superscript 1/δ]) passes/rounds while achieving an approximation factor of O(4[superscript 1/δ]logn) in polynomial time (for δ = Ω(1/logn)). If we allow the algorithm/protocol to spend exponential time per pass/round, we achieve an approximation factor of O(4[superscript 1/δ]). Our approach uses randomization, which we show is necessary: no deterministic constant approximation is possible (even given exponential time) using o(m n) space. These results are some of the first on streaming algorithms and efficient two-party communication protocols for approximation algorithms. Moreover, we show that our algorithm can be applied to multi-party communication model.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CCF-1161626)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant CCF-1065125)United States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (United States. Air Force Office of Scientific Research Grant FA9550-12-1-0423)David & Lucile Packard FoundationSimons FoundationDanish National Research Foundation. Center for Massiave Data Algorithmics (MADALGO

Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains

Schummer (Journal of Economic Theory 2000) introduced the concept of bribeproof mechanism which, in a context where monetary transfer between agents is possible, requires that manipulations through bribes are ruled out. Unfortunately, in many domains, the only bribeproof mechanisms are the trivial ones which return a fixed outcome. This work presents one of the few constructions of non-trivial bribeproof mechanisms for these quasi-linear environments. Though the suggested construction applies to rather restricted domains, the results obtained are tight: For several natural problems, the method yields the only possible bribeproof mechanism and no such mechanism is possible on more general domains.Comment: Extended abstract accepted to SAGT 2016. This ArXiv version corrects typos in the proofs of Theorem 7 and Claims 28-29 of prior ArXiv versio

Randomisation and Derandomisation in Descriptive Complexity Theory

We study probabilistic complexity classes and questions of derandomisation from a logical point of view. For each logic L we introduce a new logic BPL, bounded error probabilistic L, which is defined from L in a similar way as the complexity class BPP, bounded error probabilistic polynomial time, is defined from PTIME. Our main focus lies on questions of derandomisation, and we prove that there is a query which is definable in BPFO, the probabilistic version of first-order logic, but not in Cinf, finite variable infinitary logic with counting. This implies that many of the standard logics of finite model theory, like transitive closure logic and fixed-point logic, both with and without counting, cannot be derandomised. Similarly, we present a query on ordered structures which is definable in BPFO but not in monadic second-order logic, and a query on additive structures which is definable in BPFO but not in FO. The latter of these queries shows that certain uniform variants of AC0 (bounded-depth polynomial sized circuits) cannot be derandomised. These results are in contrast to the general belief that most standard complexity classes can be derandomised. Finally, we note that BPIFP+C, the probabilistic version of fixed-point logic with counting, captures the complexity class BPP, even on unordered structures

Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local

We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (Fabrikant et al., PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game was first studied only recently (Bil\`o et al., SPAA'14), where a worst case locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria. Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy-changes. Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on the price of anarchy.Comment: An extended abstract of this paper has been accepted for publication in the proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Mathematical Foundations on Computer Scienc