The Evolution of Strategic Sophistication

This paper investigates the evolutionary foundation for our ability to attribute preferences to others, an ability that is central to conventional game theory. We argue here that learning others’ preferences allows individuals to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Agents with the ability to learn have a sharp, unambiguous advantage over those who are less sophisticated because the former agents extrapolate to novel circumstances information about opponents’ preferences that was learned previously. This advantage holds even with a suitably small cost to reflect the additional cognitive complexity involved

The Evolution of ‘Theory of Mind’: Theory and Experiments

This paper investigates the evolutionary foundation for our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a key component of “Theory of Mind,” perhaps the capstone of social cognition. We argue here that this component of theory of mind allows organisms to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Our notion of “Theory of Mind” ’ (ToM) yields a sharp, unambiguous advantage over less sophisticated approaches to strategic interaction because agents with ToM extrapolate to novel circumstances information about opponents’ preferences that was learned previously. We then report on experiments investigating ToM in a simpler version of the theoretical model. We find highly significant learning of opponents’ preferences, providing strong evidence for the presence of ToM as in our model in the subjects. Moreover, scores on standard measures of autism-spectrum behaviors are significant determinants of individual speeds of learning, so our notion of ToM is significantly correlated with theory of mind as in psychology

The Evolution of ‘Theory of Mind:’ Theory and Experiments

This paper provides an evolutionary foundation for our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a key component of “Theory of Mind,” perhaps the capstone of social cognition. We argue here that this component of theory of mind allows organisms to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Such environments are represented here by multistage games of perfect information with randomly chosen outcomes. “Theory of Mind” then yields a sharp, unambiguous advantage over less sophisticated, behavioral approaches to strategic interaction. In related experiments, we show the subscale for social skills in standard tests for autism is a highly significant determinant of the speed of learning in such games

The Evolution of “Theory of Mind”

Abstract. This paper provides an evolutionary foundation for our capacity to attribute mental states such as belief, desire, and intent to ourselves, and to others. This ability, referred to as “Theory of Mind”, is intrinsic to game theory and is viewed by many as the capstone of social cognition. We argue here that theory of mind allows organisms to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. We find that in such non-stationary environments it yields a sharp, unambiguous advantage over less sophisticated, behavioral approaches to strategic interaction. 1

The Evolution of 'Theory of Mind': Theory and Experiments

Abstract. This paper provides an evolutionary foundation for our capacity to attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a key component of “Theory of Mind”, perhaps the capstone of social cognition. We argue here that this component of theory of mind allows organisms to efficiently modify their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Such environments are represented here by multistage games of perfect information with randomly chosen outcomes. “Theory of Mind ” then yields a sharp, unambiguous advantage over less sophisticated, behavioral approaches to strategic interaction. In related experiments, we show the subscale for social skills in standard tests for autism is a highly significant determinant of the speed of learning in such games. We thank participants at a large number of departmental seminars for useful comments