Om positivisme og objektivisme i samfundsvidenskaberne

”Positivisme” hører til de mest kontroversielle og mangetydige termer i moderne debatter om samfundsvidenskabelig metode. Bredt anvendte lærebøger er på én gang ofte uklare og voldsomt indbyrdes uenige angående positivismens metafysiske, erkendelsmæssige og ideologiske forpligtelser. Denne artikel leverer en receptionshistorisk behandling af positivismen fra dens dobbelte udspring i det 19. århundredes franske og tyske filosofi frem til i dag. Hermed kortlægges en række væsentlige historiske omforståelser og misforståelser som baggrund for nutidens begrebsforvirring. Det påvises efterfølgende, at forskellige positivistiske retningers forhold til videnskabelig objektivisme er en temmelig kompleks og varieret affære. Det er således ufrugtbart at behandle samfundsvidenskabelig positivisme og objektivisme under ét, sådan som det ofte gøres. ENGELSK ABSTRACT: Nikolaj Nottelmann: On positivism and objectivism in thesocial sciences “Positivism” ranks among the most controversial and polysemous terms in modern social scientific methodological discourses. Widely used textbooks in the social sciences are often unclear and mutually inconsistent in their mapping of positivism’s metaphysical, epistemological, and ideological commitments. This article offers a reception history, tracing positivism from its dual roots in 19th century French and German philosophy of science to the present day. The article points out several eventful historical reinterpretations and misinterpretations responsible for the current conceptual confusion. Then the article explains how various positivistic currents have very different and complex relations to scientific objectivism. Thus, despite common practice, it is unfruitful to treat social scientific positivism and objectivism under one heading. Keywords: Positivism; Objectivism; Phenomenalism; Logical Empiricism; Critical Theor

Impermissible Self‑Rationalizing Pessimism:In Defence of a Pragmatic Ethics of Belief

We present an argument against a standard evidentialist position on the ethics of belief. We argue that sometimes a person merits criticism for holding a belief even when that belief is well supported by her evidence in any relevant sense. We show how our argument advances the case for anti-evidentialism (pragmatism) in the light of other arguments presented in the recent literature, and respond to a set of possible evidentialist rejoinders

Weighing the costs: the epistemic dilemma of no-platforming.

Funder: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (1040)'No-platforming'-the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view(s)-is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent epistemic arguments in favor of no-platforming fail to factor these considerations in and, as a result, offer neither a conclusive justification nor strong epistemic support for no-platforming in any of the relevant cases. Moreover, we argue that, taken together, our epistemic considerations against no-platforming and the three arguments for the policy suggest that no-platforming poses an epistemic dilemma (i.e., a difficult choice situation involving two equally undesirable options). While advocates and opponents of no-platforming alike have so far overlooked this dilemma, it should be addressed not only to prevent that actual no-platforming decisions create more epistemic harm than good, but also to put us into a better position to justify the policy when it is indeed warranted

All the (Many, Many) Things We Know: Extended Knowledge *

Abstract In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis-the thesis that the mind extends into the world-on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level

Are we pre-theoretically committed to doxastic voluntarism?

Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it must remain unsuccessful. However, despite this, ordinary language use of locutions like “chose to believe” are common. In this article, we present new experimental data that shows that the prevalence of ordinary language talk of “chosen beliefs” is no obstacle to doxastic involuntarism in a standard sense (pace Turri et al. 2018). While we employ the methods of experimental philosophy, our argument also concerns the fundamental question as to what those methods can achieve: as is typical of philosophical debates, the debate over doxastic voluntarism involves a refined theoretical concept, specifically a refined concept of voluntary belief. In such debates, we cannot determine our pre-theoretical position by conducting surveys on those who may not yet own the requisite theoretical concepts