Study on Applications of Supply and Demand Theory of Microeconomics and Physics Field Theory to Central Place Theory

This paper attempts to analyze “central place theory” of spatial economics based on “supply and demand theory” in microeconomics and “field theory” in physics, and also discuss their relationship. Three most important research findings are described below. Firstly, the concept of market equilibrium could be expressed in the mathematical form of physics field theory under proper hypothesis. That is because the most important aspect of field theory model is that complex analysis is taken as a key mathematical tool. If assuming that “imaginary part” is neglected in this model, it is found that this model has the same mathematical structure as supply and demand theory of microeconomics. Secondly, the mathematical model of field theory can be applied to express clearly many concepts of central place theory, or even introduce many new concepts. Thirdly, it could also be taken as a study of combining the Hotelling Model and Moses Model for the location theory in another mathematic approach.Mathematical Economics; Economic Geography; Microeconomics

Construct validity of multiple achievement goals: A multitrait-multimethod approach

The aim of this study was to examine three different instruments which have been used in research conducted in the physical domain to measure mastery, performance-approach, and performance-avoidance goals. The construct validity of the assessment tools, including a determination of their convergent and discriminant validity as well as a method effect, was tested via several confirmatory factor analyses. Four hundred and fifty athletes from different sport clubs were involved in the present study. Participants were asked to fill out three different multiple achievement goal instruments as well as two external criteria scales. The results based on CFA showed that all of the three instruments measured the same latent construct of multiple achievement goals. The convergent validity as well as the discriminant validity was supported. Evidence for a limited method effect in terms of the different measures was also provided

Towards the Jacquet conjecture on the local converse problem for p-adic GL(n)

The Local Converse Problem is to determine how the family of twisted local gamma factors characterizes the isomorphism class of an irreducible admissible generic representation of GL(n,F), with F a non-archimedean local field, where the twists run through all irreducible supercuspidal representations of GL(r,F) and r runs through positive integers. The Jacquet conjecture asserts that it is enough to take r = 1,2,...,[n/2]. Based on arguments in the work of Henniart and of Chen giving preliminary steps towards the Jacquet conjecture, we formulate a general approach to prove the Jacquet conjecture. With this approach, the Jacquet conjecture is proved under an assumption which is then verified in several cases, including the case of level zero representations

Does a Non-verifiable Imperfect Informative Binary Signal Always a Strictly Positive Value?

Owing to the difference between the status quo utility levels of a good agent and a bad agent, we find that a firm adopting a non-verifiable imperfect informative binary signal does not necessarily change its action (on trading off output efficiency against rent extraction). Hence, the signal does not always a strictly positive value for the firm.Ex Ante Non-verifiable Informative Signals Type-Dependent Status Quo Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off.

New Explanations for the Firm Size-Wage Premium

This paper contributes some new explanations for the firm size-wage premium. We find that if the difference between the two types¡¦ status quo utility levels is large enough, then the small firm will reject the good agent more often than the large firm. The reason behind this result is that the capital-like resource restriction interferes with the willingness of the small firm to mitigate the information rent caused by the countervailing incentive. Moreover, when the countervailing incentive exists and when both firms want to delegate the tasks to both types, the good agent produces more output in the large firm and therefore gets a higher payment. These findings support the labor quality explanation that larger firms employ higher-quality workers and the productivity hypothesis that workers are more productive in large firms and therefore ask for higher wages, but from a kind of markedly different reasoning.Firm size-wage premium Countervailing incentives Employment decisions.