Incentive Effects in Asymmetric Tournaments Empirical Evidence from the German Hockey League

Following tournament theory, incentives will be rather low if the contestants of a tournament are heterogeneous. We empirically test this prediction using a large dataset from the German Hockey League. Our results show that indeed the intensity of a game is lower if the teams are more heterogeneous. This effect can be observed for the game as a whole as well as for the ?rst and last third. When dividing the teams in the dataset into favorites and underdogs, we only observe a reduction of effort provision from favorite teams. As the number of games per team changes between different seasons, we can also investigate the effect of a changing spread between winner and loser prize. In line with theory, teams reduce effort if the spread declines. Interestingly, effort is also sensitive to the total number of teams in the league even if the price spread remains unchanged

Relative Performance Pay in the Shadow of Crisis

We analyze whether incentives from relative performance pay are reduced or enhanced if a department is possibly terminated due to a crisis. Our benchmark model shows that incentives decrease in a severe crisis, but are boosted given a minor crisis since efforts are strategic complements in the former case but strategic substitutes in the latter one. We tested our predictions in a laboratory experiment. The results confirm the effort ranking but show that in a severe crisis individuals deviate from equilibrium significantly stronger than in other situations. This behavior contradicts the benchmark model and leads to a five times higher survival probability of the department. We develop a new theoretical approach that may explain players’ behavior

Hidden Benefits of Reward: A Field Experiment on Motivation and Monetary Incentives

We conducted a field experiment in a controlled work environment to investigate the effect of motivational talk and its interaction with monetary incentives. We find that motivational talk significantly improves performance only when accompanied by performance pay. Moreover, performance pay slightly reduces performance unless it is accompanied by motivational talk. These effects also carry over to the quality of work. Performance pay alone leads to more mistakes. Adding motivational talk makes the difference. In treatments with performance pay, motivational talk increases output by about 20 percent and reduces the ratio of mistakes by more than 40 percent

Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when taking risk

Overconfidence and Managers’ Responsibility Hoarding

Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate the critical task to the agent more often than given by the efficient task allocation. In contrast, an overconfident manager is more likely to hoard responsibility, i.e. to delegate the critical task less often than a rational manager. In fact, a manager with a sufficiently high ability and a moderate degree of overconfidence increases the total welfare by hoarding responsibility and exerting more effort than a rational manager. Finally, we derive the conditions under which responsibility hoarding can persist in an organization, showing that the bias survives as long as the overconfident manager can rationalize the observed output by underestimating the ability of the agent

Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when takin risk.Tournaments; Competition; Risk-Taking; Experiment

Overconfidence and Managers’ Responsibility Hoarding

Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate the critical task to the agent more often than given by the efficient task allocation. In contrast, an overconfident manager is more likely to hoard responsibility, i.e. to delegate the critical task less often than a rational manager. In fact, a manager with a sufficiently high ability and a moderate degree of overconfidence increases the total welfare by hoarding responsibility and exerting more effort than a rational manager. Finally, we derive the conditions under which responsibility hoarding can persist in an organization, showing that the bias survives as long as the overconfident manager can rationalize the observed output by underestimating the ability of the agent.organizational behavior; management performance; bounded rationality; behavioral bias