Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when taking risk

Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when taking risk.Tournaments; Competition; Risk-Taking; Experiment

Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one - an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when takin risk.Tournaments; Competition; Risk-Taking; Experiment

Risk taking and investing in electoral competition

Abstract. We analyze a two-player electoral contest game between a challenger and an incumbent. First, the challenger decides whether to choose a high-risk campaign (e.g., risky platforms, negative campaigning, an interactive Web technology) or a less risky one. In a second stage, both the challenger and the incumbent raise funds and invest in the electoral contest. The politicians differ in their fund-raising costs. According to theory, a high-cost challenger should choose high risk (gambling for resurrection). If the benefit of winning is sufficiently large, a low-cost challenger should take high risk either to discourage the incumbent or to prevent intense campaigning. Both effects are based on the fact that high risk campaigning reduces incentives to invest in the contest. In case of a rather small benefit of winning, a low-cost challenger should prefer low risk to avoid jeopardizing his competitive advantage. Our experimental findings show that gambling for resurrection plays a role. Taking low risk to preserve a competitive advantage is strongly supported by the data. However, reactions of low-cost challengers when facing high benefits of winning are heterogeneous

A Service of zbw Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition Risk Taking in Winner-Take-All Competition *

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in March, 2008 Abstract We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players. At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stage two, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneously invest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoretically and then tested by using laboratory experiments. We find three effects that determine risk taking at stage one -an effort effect, a likelihood effect and a reversed likelihood effect. For the likelihood effect, risk taking and investments are clearly in line with theory. Pairwise comparison shows that the effort effect seems to be more relevant than the reversed likelihood effect when taking risk

An Extraosseous Ewing Sarcoma of the Index Finger Masquerading as a Benign Tumor

Ewing sarcoma is a malignant, small, round, blue cell tumor that often affects the long bones and pelvis. It is rarely seen in the bones of the hand. A minority of Ewing sarcoma cases arise in soft tissue. This case report details the clinical and radiological presentation of an extraosseous Ewing sarcoma of the index finger in a 22-year-old woman. Treatment consisted of an index ray amputation followed by adjuvant chemotherapy. After 1 year, the left hand had excellent function with an acceptable cosmetic appearance and no evidence of metastasis or local recurrence

The modulatory impact of recombinant human interleukin-6 on the immune system of cancer patients

To investigate the immunomodulatory impact of low-dose recombinant human interleukin-6 (rhIL-6), we examined 15 patients with metastatic renal cell carcinoma or malignant melanoma receiving rhIL-6 as an antitumor agent in a phase II trial. RhIL-6 (150 mu g) was administered subcutaneously (s.c.) once daily for 42 consecutive days. Immunologic parameters were measured throughout therapy and at follow-up. No changes in white blood cell counts were noted. Lymphocyte subsets did not alter, nor did their expression of CD25 and HLA-DR. Immunoglobulins were unaffected. Levels of granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor, tumor necrosis factor-alpha and IL-1 beta remained below detection limits. Theoretically, subtle immunologic alterations might have been masked by increases in plasma volume, known tc occur after start of therapy. Using previously published data concerning plasma volume changes in these patients, part of immunologic data were corrected for concurrent hemodilution, showing a 39% +/- 17% increase in monocytes (mean change +/- SEM [standard error of mean]; p <0.03) within 1 week of therapy, while lymphocytes tended to increase. However, the absence of appreciable increases in cell activation markers and in monokine levels indicates insufficient immune activation, probably underlying the lack of objective antitumor responses (6 x stable, 9 x progressive disease) in these patients. In conclusion, the immunomodulatory impact of rhIL-6, if present at all, remains very limited