Multinationals Revisited

A Review of Storm over the Multinationals--The Real Issues by Raymond Verno

Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause - Local Smoke Control Ordinance Not an Undue Burden on Interstate Commerce

In accordance with a scheme of federal ship inspection, appellant possessed certificates which permitted its ships to operate on the Great Lakes and which specified the type of boiler which might be used. While two of its ships were docked in Detroit, smoke was emitted from their boilers in violation of the minimum density and duration requirements of the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code. The equipment which appellant was then using made compliance with the ordinance impossible. When criminal proceedings were instituted against appellant, it brought an action to enjoin the City of Detroit from enforcing the ordinance on the theory that the regulation placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The lower court denied the injunction and was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two Justices dissenting. A state police power regulation which neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor disrupts a national policy of uniform regulation is constitutional. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)

Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause - Local Smoke Control Ordinance Not an Undue Burden on Interstate Commerce

In accordance with a scheme of federal ship inspection, appellant possessed certificates which permitted its ships to operate on the Great Lakes and which specified the type of boiler which might be used. While two of its ships were docked in Detroit, smoke was emitted from their boilers in violation of the minimum density and duration requirements of the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code. The equipment which appellant was then using made compliance with the ordinance impossible. When criminal proceedings were instituted against appellant, it brought an action to enjoin the City of Detroit from enforcing the ordinance on the theory that the regulation placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The lower court denied the injunction and was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two Justices dissenting. A state police power regulation which neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor disrupts a national policy of uniform regulation is constitutional. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)

International Law-Soverign Immunity-The First Decade of the Tate Letter Policy

On May 19, 1952, the State Department announced in the Tate Letter a new policy with regard to the filing of suggestions of immunity in suits against foreign sovereigns. The letter indicated that the Department would begin to follow a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. This meant that it would file a suggestion of immunity if the case arose from acts of the foreign government or its agents which were of a purely governmental character (jure imperii), but would deny immunity in instances where the acts engaged in were of a commercial or proprietary nature which could be carried on by any individual or corporation (jure gestionis). It is the limited purpose of this comment to summarize executive and judicial treatment of this policy, to point out some of the problems involved in implementation of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and to suggest changes which might help to alleviate some of these difficulties

Multinationals Revisited

A Review of Storm over the Multinationals--The Real Issues by Raymond Verno

International Law-Soverign Immunity-The First Decade of the Tate Letter Policy

On May 19, 1952, the State Department announced in the Tate Letter a new policy with regard to the filing of suggestions of immunity in suits against foreign sovereigns. The letter indicated that the Department would begin to follow a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. This meant that it would file a suggestion of immunity if the case arose from acts of the foreign government or its agents which were of a purely governmental character (jure imperii), but would deny immunity in instances where the acts engaged in were of a commercial or proprietary nature which could be carried on by any individual or corporation (jure gestionis). It is the limited purpose of this comment to summarize executive and judicial treatment of this policy, to point out some of the problems involved in implementation of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and to suggest changes which might help to alleviate some of these difficulties