12 research outputs found

    Management economics in a large UK retailer

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    We study the link between middle-management ability and shop labour productivity using data from 245 shops of a UK nationwide retailer. The company scores six broad areas of management practice, the most important of which turns out to be "commercial awareness", where able managers achieve 17% higher labour productivity in their shops compared to less able ones. We further show that the managers’ incentive pay scheme, required to encourage them to exert their ability in full, is implicitly an insurance one, with managers taking a share in deviations of actual sales from expected. At the same time, abler managers do not receive higher pay all else equal, which implies that middle management ability is not fully tradeable.

    Is Economic Recovery a Myth? Robust Estimation of Impulse Responses

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    There is a lively debate on the persistence of the current banking crisis' impact on GDP. Impulse Response Functions (IRF) estimated by Cerra and Saxena (2008) suggest that the effects of earlier crises were long-lasting. We show that standard estimates of IRFs are highly sensitive to misspecification of the underlying data generation process. Direct estimation of IRFs by a methodology similar to Jorda's (2005) local projection method is robust to misspecifications of the data generation process but yields biased estimates when country fixed effects are added. We propose a simple method to deal with this bias, which we apply to panel data from 99 countries for the period 1974-2001. Our estimates suggest that an average banking crisis leads to an output loss of around 10 percent with little sign of recovery. GDP losses from banking crises are more severe for African countries and economies in transition.banking crisis, impulse response, panel data

    Risk Aversion and Effort in an Incentive Pay Scheme with Multiplicative Noise: Theory and Experimental Evidence

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    The application of the classical "linear" model of incentive pay to the case when the noise is multiplicative to effort generates two predictions for a given strength of incentives: 1) more risk-averse workers will put in less effort, and 2) setting a performance target will weaken the negative risk aversion--effort link. The data from a real-effort laboratory experiment involving 85 student participants support both these predictions. Implications of the model and empirical findings to the literature on, and practice of, personnel management are discussed

    Productivity Gains from Worker Mobility and their Distribution between Workers and Firms

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    Using data from the universe of Danish manufacturing firms and workers over the period 1995-2007, we estimate output gains linked to productivity spillovers through worker mobility, and calculate the shares in these gains accrued to firms, to the workers who bring spillovers, and to the rest of the workers. Applying our results to the manufacturing sector as a whole, the total output gains average at 0.16% per year, of which 80% is retained by the firms, 15% by the rest of the workers, and only 5% goes to the workers who bring spillovers. We therefore conclude that output gains through worker mobility are largely a positive externality for hiring firms

    Relation entry, exit and productivity: an overview of recent theoretical and empirical literature

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    This document provides a review of recent theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between entry, exit and productivity. Decomposition methods show that entry and exit considerably contribute to productivity growth, but are unable to shed any light on the ultimate sources of productivity growth. However, the theories discussed do provide options for effective policy instruments. We argue that productivity or welfare should be the aim of policy and not the number of entrants, the intensity of competition or the amount of innovation expenditures. Taking a welfare approach, we address market failures with respect to entry. The most eminent market failure is market power of dominant incumbents. Lowering institutional entry barriers economy-wide is a promising policy option for further consideration. Whether such a policy measure actually improves social welfare depends also on the extent of other failures. Therefore, an ex ante cost-benefit analysis needs to precede intervention.

    Is Economic Recovery a Myth? Robust Estimation of Impulse Responses

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    There is a lively debate on the persistence of the current banking crisis' impact on GDP. Impulse Response Functions (IRF) estimated by Cerra and Saxena (2008) suggest that the effects of earlier crises were long-lasting. We show that standard estimates of IRFs are highly sensitive to misspecification of the underlying data generation process. Direct estimation of IRFs by a methodology similar to Jorda's (2005) local projection method is robust to misspecifications of the data generation process but yields biased estimates when country fixed effects are added. We propose a simple method to deal with this bias, which we apply to panel data from 99 countries for the period 1974-2001. Our estimates suggest that an average banking crisis leads to an output loss of around 10 percent with little sign of recovery. GDP losses from banking crises are more severe for African countries and economies in transition.banking crisis; impulse response; panel data

    The "Sales Agent" Problem : Effort/Leisure Allocation under Performance Pay as Behavior towards Risk

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    The choice between safe and risky assets represents behavior towards risk: more risk‐averse investors buy more safe assets. We develop and test a general model that applies this intuition to the time allocation between risky effort and risk‐free leisure under linear incentives. When risk increases with effort, risk‐averse agents choose less effort, but when risk is independent of effort, effort choice is unaffected by risk preferences. In many incentive contracts, income risk is multiplicative with, rather than additive to effort, sales commissions being one example. In such cases, lower effort by the risk‐averse is a hitherto undocumented behavior towards risk.publishe

    Market Competition and the Effectiveness of Performance Pay

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    It is well established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and organization-specific factors. However, less is known about the moderating role of external forces such as market competition. Our theory posits that competition generates two counteracting effects-the residual market and competitor response effects-that vary with competition and jointly generate a curvilinear relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition discourages effort response to PfP because there is little residual market to gain from rivals, whereas strong competition weakens incentives because an offsetting response from competitors becomes more likely. PfP hence has the strongest effect under moderate competition. Field data from a bakery chain and its competitive environment confirm our theory and let us refute several alternative interpretations
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