First steps of laparoscopic surgery in Lubumbashi: problems encountered and preliminary results

For many reasons, laparoscopic surgery has been performed worldwide. Due to logistical constraints its first steps occurred in Lubumbashi only in 2008. The aim of this presentation was to report authors' ten-month experience of laparoscopic surgery at Lubumbashi Don Bosco Missionary Hospital (LDBMH): problems encountered and preliminary results. The study was a transsectional descriptive work with a convenient sampling. It only took in account patients with abdominal surgical condition who consented to undergo laparoscopic surgery and when logistical constraints of the procedure were found. Independent variables were patients' demographic parameters, staff, equipments and consumable. Dependent parameters included surgical abdominal diseases, intra-operative circumstances and postoperative short term mortality and morbidity. Between 1st April 2009 and 28th February 2010, 75 patients underwent laparoscopic surgery at the LDBMH making 1.5% of all abdominal surgical activities performed at this institution. The most performed procedure was appendicectomy for acute appendicitis (64%) followed by exploratory laparoscopy for various abdominal chronic pain (9.3%), adhesiolysis for repeated periods of subacute intestinal obstruction in previously laparotomised patients (9.3%), laparoscopic cholecystectomy for post acute cholecystitis on gall stone (5.3%) and partial colectomy for symptomatic redundant sigmoid colon (2.7%). There were 4% of conversion to laparotomy. Laparoscopic surgery consumed more time than laparotomy, mostly when dealing with appendicitis. However, postoperatively, patients did quite well. There was no death in this series. Nursing care was minimal with early discharge. These results are encouraging to pursue laparoscopic surgery with DRC Government and NGO's supports

Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting system

Choix social et préférence collective : analyse a posteriori de l’élection présidentielle de 2011 en République Démocratique du Congo

The official results analysis of the Congolese presidential elections in 2011 aims at studying behavior displayed by voters towards the selected mode of poll. This reveals that most of them carry out a strategic vote because feeling, in an intuitive way, weaknesses of a single member voting system. This paper characterizes congolese voters’ behavior by province and reveals, in addition, that there would be a mechanism making it possible to pass from a preferences profile to another which would facilitate inductions. New concepts were brought there, in particular the preferences transformation function (PTF) and the Pseudo-Condorcet Winner of (PCW)

On analysis and characterization of the mean-median compromise method

Most important results in Social Choice Theory concern impossibility theorems. They claim that no function, as complex as it might be, can satisfy simultaneously a restricted number of fair properties describing a democratic system. However, adopting new voting ideas can push back those limits. Some years ago, such a work was boosted by Balinski and Laraki on the basis of evaluations cast by voters to competitors; this is an alternative to arrovian framework which is based on ranking candidates by voters. Recently, Ngoie and Ulungu have proposed a new voting function – defined in both Balinski and Laraki’s spirit – which hybridizes Majority Judgment (MJ) and Borda Majority Count (BMC): the so-called Mean-Median Compromise Method (MMCM). The method puts at its credit the desired properties of MJ and BMC as well; indeed, it reduces their insufficiencies. The purpose of this paper is double: analyse and characterize MMCM features in comparison to other valuable voting functions

Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean and median advantages. The so-called Mean-Median Comprise Method (MMCM) has fulfilled criteria such as unanimity, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting system

New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking

The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can fulfill requirements of an ideal democracy. We then work out an original voting function obtained by hydrizing Borda Majority Count (mean-based) and Majority Judgment (median-based). The so-called “Mean-Median Compromise Method” slices between mean and average values. It proposes, moreover, a new tiebreaking method computing intermedian grades mean

Median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking: new prospects

Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki proposed a new voting theory called Majority Judgment which tries to circumvent this limitation. In Majority Judgment, voters are invited to evaluate candidates in terms taken in a well-known common language. The winner is then the one that obtains the highest median. Since the Majority Judgment proposal was made, authors have detected insufficiencies with this new voting system. This article aims at reducing these insufficiencies by proposing a voting system to decide between the median-based voting and the mean-based one. It proposes, moreover, a new tie-breaking method computing intermedian ranks mean

Median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking: new prospects

Impossibility theorems expose inconsistencies and paradoxes related to voting systems. Recently, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki proposed a new voting theory called Majority Judgment which tries to circumvent this limitation. In Majority Judgment, voters are invited to evaluate candidates in terms taken in a well-known common language. The winner is then the one that obtains the highest median. Since the Majority Judgment proposal was made, authors have detected insufficiencies with this new voting system. This article aims at reducing these insufficiencies by proposing a voting system to decide between the median-based voting and the mean-based one. It proposes, moreover, a new tie-breaking method computing intermedian ranks mean

New prospects in social choice theory: median and average as tools for measuring, electing and ranking

The goal of this paper is to show that neither mean-based voting systems nor median-based ones can fulfill requirements of an ideal democracy. We then work out an original voting function obtained by hydrizing Borda Majority Count (mean-based) and Majority Judgment (median-based). The so-called “Mean-Median Compromise Method” slices between mean and average values. It proposes, moreover, a new tiebreaking method computing intermedian grades mean