Victories are Not Enough

Since the early stages of World War II, militaries in general, and the U.S. Army in particular, have studied the German way of war, specifically as practiced in the 20th century. While acknowledging that Germany—and before that nation came into existence, Prussia—produced some excellent armies, major problems with the German way of war must not be ignored. Despite the military prowess of Germany, it lost both of the major wars of the 20th century. The author explores the reasons why a nation with such a strong military reputation was unable to win its wars and achieve its goals. He emphasizes that military power, tactical and operational brilliance, and victories in the field can easily be squandered if a nation has failed to set achievable goals and develop strategies to reach them. This failure should not be lost on modern nations as they proceed into the 21st century.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1369/thumbnail.jp

The European Campaign: Its Origins and Conduct

The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of “Germany first” in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation’s military forces. However during the campaign’s execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1574/thumbnail.jp

The European campaign : its origins and conduct /

Given the significance of World War II and the interest in the European Campaign, the authors offer a fresh look at the operations involved in winning the war in Europe. The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s."June 2011."Includes bibliographical references (p. 389-406).Introduction -- Chapter 1. The European campaign : origins -- Chapter 2. Was Europe first? -- Chapter 3. 1943 : Frustrations and successes -- Chapter 4. D-Day : Planning and execution -- Chapter 5. Toward the German border : Operations COBRA, the Falaise Pocket, and Operation ANVIL -- Chapter 6. Operation MARKET GARDEN -- Chapter 7. The Hürtgen Campaign -- Chapter 8. The Ardennes Offensive -- Chapter 9. The Ruhr or Berlin -- Chapter 10. Conclusions and observations -- Appendix I. Developing strategy : a look at the other side -- Appendix II. To Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.Given the significance of World War II and the interest in the European Campaign, the authors offer a fresh look at the operations involved in winning the war in Europe. The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s.Mode of access: Internet

ITS ORIGINS AND CONDUCT

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Identifying critically ill children at high risk of acute kidney injury and renal replacement therapy

Acute kidney injury (AKI), a common complication in paediatric intensive care units (PICU), is associated with increased morbidity and mortality. In this single centre, prospective, observational cohort study, neutrophil gelatinase-associated lipocalin in urine (uNGAL) and plasma (pNGAL) and renal angina index (RAI), and combinations of these markers, were assessed for their ability to predict severe (stage 2 or 3) AKI in children and young people admitted to PICU. In PICU children and young people had initial and serial uNGAL and pNGAL measurements, RAI calculation on day 1, and collection of clinical data, including serum creatinine measurements. Primary outcomes were severe AKI and renal replacement therapy (RRT). Secondary outcomes were length of stay, hospital acquired infection and mortality. The area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves and Youden index was used to determine biomarker performance and identify optimum cut-off values. Of 657 children recruited, 104 met criteria for severe AKI (15∙8%) and 47 (7∙2%) required RRT. Severe AKI was associated with increased length of stay, hospital acquired infection, and mortality. The area under the curve (AUC) for severe AKI prediction for Day 1 uNGAL, Day 1 pNGAL and RAI were 0.75 (95% Confidence Interval [CI] 0∙69, 0∙81), 0∙64 (95% CI 0∙56, 0∙72), and 0.73 (95% CI 0∙65, 0∙80) respectively. The optimal combination of measures was RAI and day 1 uNGAL, giving an AUC of 0∙80 for severe AKI prediction (95% CI 0∙71, 0∙88). In this heterogenous PICU cohort, urine or plasma NGAL in isolation had poorer prediction accuracy for severe AKI than in previously reported homogeneous populations. However, when combined together with RAI, they produced good prediction for severe AKI