A retail price index including the shadow price of owner occupied housing

How do house price changes affect the cost of living? The retail price index in the UK does not directly incorporate house price changes. In- stead it uses mortgage interest to capture the cost of owning a home. This is a useful method from many perspectives. However, from a con- sumer welfare perspective, while mortgage interest does capture the cost of a particular service, it does not capture the cost of housing services. The shadow price of housing captures the welfare cost to a household of changes in housing prices. In this paper we create a new shadow price index using RPI data and the shadow price of housing and investigate how replacing the mortgage interest with the shadow price of housing affects measures of the cost of living

Dynamic housing expenditures and household welfare

In this paper we develop a measure of current "expenditures" on housing services for owner-occupiers. Having such a measure is important for measuring the relative welfare of households, especially when comparing renters and owners and for measuring inflation. From a theoretical perspective expenditures equal the "shadow price" of housing services (the marginal rate of substitution between housing services and non-durable consumption) multiplied by the quantity of housing services consumed. In an idealised world, two simple measures of the shadow price are available; the user cost of housing capital and the rental price of an equivalent rental house. However, imperfect capital markets, risk aversion, the tax system, moving costs and systematic differences between houses available in the rental and owner-occupied sectors drive a wedge between the shadow price of housing and these other two measures. This paper contributes to previous research by calibrating a lifecycle model of housing investment and consumption to data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey and by developing measures of the shadow price of housing that take into account uncertainty in house prices, interest rates and incomes, dynamic life cycle choices, and liquidity constraints that depend on both income and house value

Estimating households' willingness to pay

The recent literature has brought together the characteristics model of utility and classic revealed preference arguments to learn about consumers' willingness to pay. We incorporate market pricing equilibrium conditions into this setting. This allows us to use observed purchase prices and quantities on a large basket of products to learn about individual household's willingness to pay for characteristics, while maintaining a high degree of flexibility and also avoiding the biases that arise from inappropriate aggregation. We illustrate the approach using scanner data on food purchases to estimate bounds on willingness to pay for the organic characteristic. We combine these estimates with information on households' stated preferences and beliefs to show that on average quality is the most important factor affecting bounds on household willingness to pay for organic, with health concerns coming second, and environmental concerns lagging far behind.

Household willingness to pay for organic products

We use hedonic prices and purchase quantities to consider what can be learned about household willingness to pay for baskets of organic products and how this varies across households. We use rich scanner data on food purchases by a large number of households to compute household specific lower and upper bounds on willingness to pay for various baskets of organic products. These bounds provide information about willingness to pay for organic without imposing restrictive assumptions on preferences. We show that the reasons households are willing to pay vary, with quality being the most important, health concerns coming second, and environmental concerns lagging far behind. We also show how these methods can be used for example by stores to provide robust upper bounds on the revenue implication of introducing a new line of organic products.

A retail price index including the shadow price of owner occupied housing

How do house price changes affect the cost of living? The retail price index in the UK does not directly incorporate house price changes. Instead it uses mortgage interest to capture the cost of owning a home. This is a useful method from many perspectives. However, from a consumer welfare perspective, while mortgage interest does capture the cost of a particular service, it does not capture the cost of housing services. The shadow price of housing captures the welfare cost to a household of changes in housing prices. In this paper we create a new shadow price index using RPI data and the shadow price of housing and investigate how replacing the mortgage interest with the shadow price of housing affects measures of the cost of living.

Identifying hedonic models

Economic models for hedonic markets characterize the pricing of bundles of attributes and the demand and supply of these attributes under different assumptions about market structure, preferences and technology. (See Jan Tinbergen, 1956, Sherwin Rosen, 1974 and Dennis Epple, 1987, for contributions to this literature). While the theory is well formulated, and delivers some elegant analytical results, the empirical content of the model is under debate. It is widely believed that hedonic models fit in a single market are fundamentally underidentified and that any empirical content obtained from them is a consequence of arbitrary functional form assumptions. The problem of identification in hedonic models is a prototype for the identification problem in a variety of economic models in which agents sort on unobservable (to the economist) characteristics: models of monopoly pricing (Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen, 1978; Robert Wilson, 1993) and models for taxes and labor supply (James Heckman, 1974). Sorting is an essential feature of econometric models of social interactions. (See William Brock and Steven Durlauf, 2001). In this paper we address the sorting problem in hedonic models. Nesheim (2001) extends this analysis to a model with peer effects. In this paper we note that commonly used linearization strategies made to simplify estimation and justify the application of instrumental variables methods, produce identification problems. The hedonic model is generically nonlinear. It is the linearization of a fundamentally nonlinear model that produces the form of the identification problem that dominates discussion in the applied literature. Linearity is an arbitrary and misleading functional form when applied to empirical hedonic models. Our research establishes that even though sorting equilibrium in a single market implies no exclusion restrictions, the hedonic model is generically nonparametrically identified. Instrumental variables and transformation model methods identify economically relevant parameters even 1 without exclusion restrictions. Multimarket data, widely viewed as the most powerful source of identification, achieves this result only under implausible assumptions about why hedonic functions vary across markets

Identification and estimation of hedonic models

This paper considers the identification and estimation of hedonic models. We establish that in an additive version of the hedonic model, technology and preferences are generically nonparametrically identified from data on demand and supply in a single hedonic market. The empirical literature that claims that hedonic models estimated on data from a single market are fundamentally underidentified is based on arbitrary linearizations that do not use all the information in the model. The exact economic model that justifies linear approximations is unappealing. Nonlinearities are generic features of equilibrium in hedonic models and a fundamental and economically motivated source of identification

Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness

Hedonic pricing with quasi-linear preferences is shown to be equivalent to stable matching with transferable utilities and a participation constraint, and to an optimal transportation (Monge-Kantorovich) linear programming problem. Optimal assignments in the latter correspond to stable matchings, and to hedonic equilibria. These assignments are shown to exist in great generality; their marginal indirect payoffs with respect to agent type are shown to be unique whenever direct payoffs vary smoothly with type. Under a generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition (also known as a twist condition) the assignments are shown to be unique and to be pure, meaning the matching is one-to-one outside a negligible set. For smooth problems set on compact, connected type spaces such as the circle, there is a topological obstruction to purity, but we give a weaker condition still guaranteeing uniqueness of the stable match

Reserve price effects in auctions: estimates from multiple RD designs

We present evidence from 260,000 online auctions of second-hand cars to identify the impact of public reserve prices on auction outcomes. To establish causality, we exploit multiple discontinuities in the relationship between reserve prices and vehicle characteristics to present RD estimates of reserve price effects on auction outcomes. Our first set of results show that, in line with the robust predictions of auction theory, an increase in reserve price decreases the number of bidders, increases the likelihood the object remains unsold, and increases expected revenue conditional on sale. Reserve price effects are found to be larger when there are more entrants, and when the reserve price is lower to begin with. Our second set of results then combine these estimates to calibrate the reserve price effect on the auctioneer's expected revenue. This reveals the auctioneer's reserve price policy to be locally optimal. Our final set of results provide novel evidence on reserve price effects on the composition of bidders. We find that an increase in reserve price: (i) decreases the number of potential bidders as identified through individual web browsing histories; (ii) leads to only more experienced and historically successful bidders still entering the auction; (iii) the characteristics of actual winners are less sensitive to the reserve price than those of the average bidder, suggesting auction winners are not the marginal entrant.