Relative Disagreement-Point Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions

Prominent bargaining solutions are disagreement-point monotonic. These solutions’ disagreement-point monotonicity ranking, on the other hand, is impossible to establish. In a large class of bargaining problems, however, a ranking of the relative disagreement-point monotonicity of these prominent bargaining solutions can be obtained. Using the ‘Constant Elasticity of Substitution’ class of bargaining problems, and regardless of the concavity of the Pareto frontier and of the increase in the disagreement point, we find that the Egalitarian solution is most monotonic with respect to changes in disagreement payoffs, followed by the Nash solution. The Equal Sacrifice solution turns out to be the least monotonic, followed by the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution.The Nash solution, the Kalai/Smorodinsky solution, the Egalitarian solution, the Equal Sacrifice solution, Relative Disagreement-Point Monotonicity.

Dualisation of the principal sigma model

The first-order formulation of the principal sigma model with a Lie group target space is performed. By using the dualisation of the algebra and the field content of the theory the field equations which are solely written in terms of the field strengths are realized through an extended symmetry algebra parametrization. The structure of this symmetry algebra is derived so that it generates the realization of the field equations in a Bianchi identity of the current derived from the extended parametrization.Comment: 12 page

Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution

We start by considering the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, a real-life arbitration scheme where two parties select an arbitrator by alternately crossing off at each round one name from a given panel of arbitrators. We find out that the AS scheme is not invariant to “bad” alternatives. We then consider another alternating-move scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, which is invariant to bad alternatives. We fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome sets of these above two schemes in terms of the rankings of the parties over the alternatives only. We also identify some of the typical equilibria of these above two schemes. We then analyze two additional alternating-move schemes in which players’ current proposals have to either honor or enhance their previous proposals. We show that the first scheme’s equilibrium outcome set coincides with that of the AS scheme, and the equilibrium outcome set of the second scheme coincides with that of the VAOV scheme. Finally, it turns out that all schemes’ equilibrium outcome sets converge to the Equal Area solution’s outcome of cooperative bargaining problem, if the alternatives are distributed uniformly over the comprehensive utility possibility set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity.The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), the Alternate Strike (AS) scheme, the Voting by Alternating Offers and Vetoes (VAOV) scheme, the Enhancing Past Concessions scheme, the Honoring Past Concessions scheme, the Equal Area solution.