And now for something completely different : inattentional blindness during a Monty Python's Flying Circus sketch

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access page (http://www.uk.sagepub.com/aboutus/openaccess.htm)Perceptual science has frequently benefited from studying illusions created outside of academia. Here, we describe a striking, but little-known, example of inattentional blindness from the British comedy series “Monty Python's Flying Circus.” Viewers fail to attend to several highly incongruous characters in the sketch, despite these characters being clearly visible onscreen. The sketch has the potential to be a valuable research and teaching resource, as well as providing a vivid illustration of how people often fail to see something completely differentPeer reviewedFinal Published versio

Strategic Resource Allocation in the Human Brain Supports Cognitive Coordination of Object and Spatial Working Memory

The ability to integrate different types of information (e.g., object identity and spatial orientation) and maintain or manipulate them concurrently in working memory (WM) facilitates the flow of ongoing tasks and is essential for normal human cognition. Research shows that object and spatial information is maintained and manipulated in WM via separate pathways in the brain (object/ventral versus spatial/dorsal). How does the human brain coordinate the activity of different specialized systems to conjoin different types of information? Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate conjunction- versus single-task manipulation of object (compute average color blend) and spatial (compute intermediate angle) information in WM. Object WM was associated with ventral (inferior frontal gyrus, occipital cortex), and spatial WM with dorsal (parietal cortex, superior frontal, and temporal sulci) regions. Conjoined object/spatial WM resulted in intermediate activity in these specialized areas, but greater activity in different prefrontal and parietal areas. Unique to our study, we found lower temporo-occipital activity and greater deactivation in temporal and medial prefrontal cortices for conjunction- versus single-tasks. Using structural equation modeling, we derived a conjunction-task connectivity model that comprises a frontoparietal network with a bidirectional DLPFC-VLPFC connection, and a direct parietal-extrastriate pathway. We suggest that these activation/deactivation patterns reflect efficient resource allocation throughout the brain and propose a new extended version of the biased competition model of WM. Hum Brain Mapp, 2011. © 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc

A pattern-recognition theory of search in expert problem solving

Understanding how look-ahead search and pattern recognition interact is one of the important research questions in the study of expert problem-solving. This paper examines the implications of the template theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), a recent theory of expert memory, on the theory of problem solving in chess. Templates are "chunks" (Chase & Simon, 1973) that have evolved into more complex data structures and that possess slots allowing values to be encoded rapidly. Templates may facilitate search in three ways: (a) by allowing information to be stored into LTM rapidly; (b) by allowing a search in the template space in addition to a search in the move space; and (c) by compensating loss in the "mind's eye" due to interference and decay. A computer model implementing the main ideas of the theory is presented, and simulations of its search behaviour are discussed. The template theory accounts for the slight skill difference in average depth of search found in chess players, as well as for other empirical data

Opening a conceptual space for metamemory experience

The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing, exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance

Childhood IQ and marriage by mid-life: the Scottish Mental Survey 1932 and the Midspan Studies

The study examined the influence of IQ at age 11 years on marital status by mid-adulthood. The combined databases of the Scottish Mental Survey 1932 and the Midspan studies provided data from 883 subjects. With regard to IQ at age 11, there was an interaction between sex and marital status by mid-adulthood (p = 0.0001). Women who had ever-married achieved mean lower childhood IQ scores than women who had never-married (p < 0.001). Conversely, there was a trend for men who had ever-married to achieve higher childhood IQ scores than men who had never-married (p = 0.07). In men, the odds ratio of ever marrying was 1.35 (95% CI 0.98–1.86&#59; p = 0.07) for each standard deviation increase in childhood IQ. Among women, the odds ratio of ever marrying by mid-life was 0.42 (95% CI 0.27–0.64; p = 0.0001) for each standard deviation increase in childhood IQ. Mid-life social class had a similar association with marriage, with women in more professional jobs and men in more manual jobs being less likely to have ever-married by mid-life. Adjustment for the effects of mid-life social class and height on the association between childhood IQ and later marriage, and vice versa, attenuated the effects somewhat, but suggested that IQ, height and social class acted partly independently

The Disunity of Consciousness

It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis

Attention mechanisms in the CHREST cognitive architecture

In this paper, we describe the attention mechanisms in CHREST, a computational architecture of human visual expertise. CHREST organises information acquired by direct experience from the world in the form of chunks. These chunks are searched for, and verified, by a unique set of heuristics, comprising the attention mechanism. We explain how the attention mechanism combines bottom-up and top-down heuristics from internal and external sources of information. We describe some experimental evidence demonstrating the correspondence of CHREST’s perceptual mechanisms with those of human subjects. Finally, we discuss how visual attention can play an important role in actions carried out by human experts in domains such as chess

Subjective distinguishability of seizure and non-seizure Déjà Vu: A case report, brief literature review, and research prospects

Roughly two-thirds of all people report having experienced déjà vu-the odd feeling that a current experience is both novel and a repeat or replay of a previous, unrecalled experience. Reports of an association between déjà vu and seizure aura symptomatology have accumulated for over a century, and frequent déjà vu is also now known to be associated with focal seizures, particularly those of a medial temporal lobe (MTL) origin. A longstanding question is whether seizure-related déjà vu has the same basis and is the same subjective experience as non-seizure déjà vu. Survey research suggests that people who experience both seizure-related and non-seizure déjà vu can often subjectively distinguish between the two. We present a case of a person with a history of focal MTL seizures who reports having experienced both seizure-related and non-seizure common déjà vu, though the non-seizure type was more frequent during this person's youth than it is currently. The patient was studied with a virtual tour paradigm that has previously been shown to elicit déjà vu among non-clinical, young adult participants. The patient reported experiencing déjà vu of the common non-seizure type during the virtual tour paradigm, without associated abnormalities of the intracranial EEG. We situate this work in the context of broader ongoing projects examining the subjective correlates of seizures. The importance for memory research of virtual scenes, spatial tasks, virtual reality (VR), and this paradigm for isolating familiarity in the context of recall failure are discussed

Perceptual Pluralism

Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary and some shared with cognition. The argument for perceptual pluralism marshals a wide array of empirical evidence in favor of iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations in perception as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) perceptual object representations

Intergenerational social mobility and mid-life status attainment: influences of childhood intelligence, childhood social factors, and education

We examined the influences of childhood social background, childhood cognitive ability, and education on intergenerational social mobility and social status attainment at midlife. The subjects were men born in 1921 and who participated in the Scottish Mental Survey of 1932 and thereafter in the Midspan Collaborative study in Scotland between 1970 and 1973. In logistic regression analyses, childhood cognitive ability and height were associated with upward and downward change from father's social class to participant's social class at mid-life. Education significantly influenced upward social mobility. Number of siblings had no significant effect on social mobility. These effects were also examined after adjusting for the other variables. In structural equation modelling analyses, father's social class and childhood cognitive ability influenced social status attainment at midlife, with education and occupational status in young adulthood as partially mediating factors. It was noteworthy that childhood cognitive ability related more strongly to occupation in midlife than to first occupation. These data add to the relatively few studies that track the process of status attainment in adulthood, they provide information from a new geographical setting, and they contain information from a greater proportion of the lifecourse than do most existing studies