Making Mothers Stay at Home? Analyzing the Impact of Partisan Cueing on Attitudes Toward Maternal Employment

After decades of value change toward more favorable views of maternal employment, the trend has slowed down and even reversed in some Western countries. This article argues that political parties play a crucial yet neglected role in shaping the trajectories of value change: the dynamics resulting from interparty competition place parties in a position to provide cues to the electorate and to actively shape attitudes toward maternal employment. Partisan cueing should become particularly relevant with a declining relevance of party competition on economic issues. The results from multilevel regression models provide empirical support for this perspective.Introduction Determinants and Political Relevance of Attitudes toward Maternal Employment Role of Partisan Cueing for Attitudes toward Maternal Employment Empirical Analysis Conclusion Funding Supplementary Data Footnotes Acknowledgements Reference

Preferences, Vote Choice, and the Politics of Social Investment: Addressing the Puzzle of Unequal Benefits of Childcare Provision

Research on the politics of social investment finds public opinion to be highly supportive of expansive reforms and expects this support to matter for the politics of expanding social investment. Expanding social investment, it is argued, should be particularly attractive to left-wing voters and parties because of the egalitarian potential of such policies. However, few studies have examined to what extent individual preferences concerning social investment really matter politically. In this paper, I address this research gap for the crucial policy field of childcare by examining how individual-level preferences for expanding childcare provision translate into voting behavior. Based on original survey data from eight European countries, I find that preferences to expand public childcare spending indeed translate into electoral support for the left. However, this link from preferences to votes turns out to be socially biased. Childcare preferences are much more decisive for voting the further up individuals are in the income distribution. This imperfect transmission from preferences to voting behavior implies that political parties could have incentives to target the benefits of childcare reforms to their more affluent voters. My findings help to explain why governments frequently fail to reduce social inequality of access to seemingly egalitarian childcare provision.Introduction The politics of social investment: Individual-level preferences and voting behavior Empirics Conclusion Competing interests Supplementary material Footnotes Reference

From Media-Party Linkages to Ownership Concentration: Causes of Cross-National Variation in Media Outlets’ Economic Positioning

A sizable literature on media bias suggests that media coverage is frequently biased towards certain political and economic positions. However, we know little about what drives variation in political and ideological bias in news coverage across countries. In this paper, we argue that increasingly commercialized and concentrated media markets are likely to be associated with media coverage leaning more favorably towards economically more right-wing positions. Media bias should reflect the preferences of media owners and should be a result of a reduced diversity of news media content. In contrast, where media outlets continue to be oriented more closely along partisan lines, often referred to as political parallelism, bias on economic issues should be more likely to cancel out at the aggregate level. To test these claims, we combine expert survey data on partisan attachments of media outlets, party ideologies, and media ownership concentration for twenty-four European countries. Results from multilevel regression models support our theoretical expectations. With media framing potentially affecting individual-level preferences and perceptions, high and rising levels of media ownership concentration may help to explain why governments in the affluent Western democracies often do remarkably little to counter trends of rising income inequality.Zahlreiche Untersuchungen zu Medienberichterstattung legen nahe, dass Medien in ihrer Berichterstattung oftmals bestimmte politische und wirtschaftliche Positionen unterstützen. Bislang gibt es allerdings kaum Befunde dazu, warum diese Positionierungen über Länder variieren können. In diesem Beitrag argumentieren wir, dass zunehmend konzentrierte Medienmärkten dazu beitragen, dass Medien stärker wirtschaftsliberale Positionen befürworten. Gründe hierfür können in den Positionen der Eigentümer in Kombination mit einer gesunkenen Vielfalt der Berichterstattung liegen. Richten sich Medien dagegen weiterhin enger an politischen Parteien aus, oftmals als politischer Parallelismus bezeichnet, sollten sich Verzerrungen in der Berichterstattung zu ökonomischen Themen in der Summe eher ausgleichen. Um unsere Erwartungen zu testen, analysieren wir Daten aus Expertenumfragen für vierundzwanzig europäische Länder zu parteipolitischer Ausrichtung von Medien, Parteipositionen und Eigentümerkonzentration. Die Ergebnisse von Mehrebenenregressionsmodellen stützen unsere theoretischen Erwartungen. Über die Medienberichterstattung vermittelte Framingeffekte haben ein großes Potenzial, individuelle Wahrnehmung und Präferenzen zu beeinflussen. Eine hohe und steigende Medieneigentümerkonzentration kann entsprechend helfen zu erklären, warum Regierungen in den wohlhabenden westlichen Demokratien oftmals nicht mehr tun, um einer steigenden Einkommensungleichheit zu begegnen.1 Introduction 2 Literature discussion and theory Media bias as the result of the alignment of media outlets, parties, and voters From party influence to owner influence From party influence to the influence of economic ideas How party and owner influence should matter for media bias 3 Empirical analysis Data and methods Results 4 Conclusion Reference

Determinants of Wage (Dis-)Satisfaction: Trade Exposure, Export-Led Growth, and the Irrelevance of Bargaining Structure

Although the determinants of wage militancy and moderation have been studied extensively by comparative political economists, so far the literature has focused on the macro level of analysis. As a result, there has been no attempt to analyze the determinants of individual-level attitudes towards wages. Based on two waves of the International Social Survey Programme, in this paper we fill this gap. We examine to what extent workers internalize the imperatives of competitiveness, and whether wage bargaining institutions facilitate this internalization, as suggested by a large literature on neocorporatism. Surprisingly, we find that the structure of wage bargaining (more or less coordinated or centralized) has no relationship with wage satisfaction or dissatisfaction at the individual level. Instead, wage dissatisfaction decreases strongly when workers are individually exposed to trade and countries rely heavily on export-led growth. Our results point to the need to rethink the determinants of wage moderation.In der Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie wurden die Bestimmungsfaktoren von Lohnzurückhaltung und Arbeitskämpfen für die Durchsetzung von Lohnforderungen umfassend untersucht. Diese Forschung bewegte sich jedoch bislang auf der Makroebene, sodass es keine Versuche gab, Einstellungen zu Löhnen auf der individuellen Ebene zu untersuchen. Unter Verwendung von zwei Erhebungen des International Social Survey Programme adressieren wir in diesem Beitrag diese bestehende Forschungslücke. Wir untersuchen, in welchem Maße Arbeitnehmende die Erfordernisse von internationaler Wettbewerbsfähigkeit internalisieren und ob, wie die umfassende neokorporatistische Forschung suggeriert, stärker koordinierte und zentralisierte Institutionen von Lohnverhandlungen diese Internalisierung befördern. Überraschenderweise zeigen sich keine Zusammenhänge zwischen der Struktur der Lohnverhandlungen und individueller Lohnzufriedenheit und -unzufriedenheit. Stattdessen zeigt sich jedoch eine geringe Unzufriedenheit mit dem eigenen Lohn, wenn die eigene Beschäftigung vom Außenhandel abhängt und wenn Exporte ein starker Wachstumstreiber des jeweiligen Landes sind. Unsere Ergebnisse weisen auf die Notwendigkeit hin, die Bestimmungsfaktoren von Lohnzurückhaltung neu zu überdenken.Contents 1 Introduction 2 Determinants of wage moderation 3 Data and models Dependent variable Main independent variables Estimating equation and estimators used 4 Results 5 Concluding discussion Reference

Class Politics in the Sandbox? An Analysis of the Socio‐Economic Determinants of Preferences Towards Public Spending and Parental Fees for Childcare

This article analyses the socio‐economic determinants of public preferences towards public spending and parental fees for childcare and how they are conditioned by institutional contexts. Previous studies of childcare policy preferences have focused on attitudes regarding the provision of care. However, when it comes to questions of financing, we know astonishingly little about how supportive individuals actually are of expanding pre‐school early childhood education and care, and how support varies across different socio‐economic groups in society. This is an important research gap because childcare provision and how it is financed have redistributive implications, which vary depending on the institutional design of childcare policy. Using novel and unique survey data on childcare preferences from eight European countries, we argue and show that preferences towards expanding childcare are more contested than it is often assumed. The institutional structure of childcare shapes how income matters for preferences towards how much should be spent and how provision should be financed. Where access to childcare is socially stratified, the poor and the rich develop different preferences towards either increasing public spending or reducing parental fees in order to improve their access to childcare. The findings in this article suggest that expanding childcare in systems characterised by unequal access can be politically contested due to diverging policy priorities of individuals from different social backgrounds

Till Austerity Do Us Part? A Survey Experiment on Support for the Euro in Italy

The COVID-19 pandemic worsened Italy’s fiscal outlook by increasing public debt. If interest rates were to rise, it would become more likely that Italy experiences a financial crisis and requires a European bailout. How does making EU funds conditional on austerity and structural reforms affect Italians’ support for the euro? Based on a novel survey experiment, this article shows that a majority of voters chooses to remain in the euro if a bailout does not involve conditionality, but the pro-euro majority turns into a relative majority for ‘Italexit’ if the bailout is contingent on austerity policies. Blaming different actors for the fiscal crisis has little effect on support. These results suggest that conditionality may turn Italian voters against the euro.Introduction Preferences for eurozone membership and exit during the euro crisis Framing effects on support for the euro Data and methods Results Conclusion Acknowledgements Notes Reference

Opposition to Austerity Outweighs Support for the Euro in Italy

Could a new financial crisis, brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic, lead to Italy’s exit from the eurozone? Lucio Baccaro, Björn Bremer and Erik Neimanns present evidence from a new survey experiment on Italian attitudes toward a European bailout and exit from the euro. They find that a majority of voters would opt to stay in the euro if a bailout did not involve conditionality, but that there would be a majority for leaving if a bailout were contingent on austerity policies

Is the Euro up for Grabs? Evidence from a Survey Experiment

The COVID-19 pandemic may lead to a resurgence of the euro crisis. In this context, Italy seems particularly vulnerable: support for the euro is lower than in most other eurozone countries, and a possible exit could have serious consequences for the common currency. Based on a novel survey experiment, this paper shows that the pro-euro coalition is fragile in Italy and preferences are malleable. They are heavily dependent on the perceived costs of continued membership, as a majority of Italians would opt for Italexit rather than accepting a bailout plan requiring the implementation of austerity policies. Individuals who feel they have not benefited from the euro are most likely to support exit when faced with the prospect of austerity. This suggests that, differently from Greece, where voters were determined to remain in the euro at all costs, the pro-euro coalition may crumble if Italy is exposed to harsh conditionality.Die COVID-19-Pandemie hat das Potenzial, zu einem Wiederaufleben der Eurokrise beizutragen. Italien erscheint unter diesen Umständen besonders verwundbar: Die Unterstützung für den Euro ist geringer als in den meisten anderen Ländern der Eurozone und ein möglicher Ausstieg Italiens aus dem Euro könnte schwerwiegende Folgen für die gesamte Währungsunion haben. Anhand eines neuen Umfrageexperiments zeigt dieses Papier, dass das den Euro unterstützende gesellschaftliche Bündnis in Italien brüchig ist und die Präferenzen in der italienischen Wählerschaft in hohem Maße veränderlich sind. Individuelle Präferenzen zum Euro hängen stark von den wahrgenommenen Kosten einer fortwährenden Mitgliedschaft im Euro ab. Eine Mehrheit der Italienerinnen und Italiener würde eher für einen Italexit stimmen, als ein Rettungspaket zu akzeptieren, welches die Umsetzung von Austeritätspolitik erfordern würde. Sind die Befragten mit der Aussicht auf Austeritätspolitik konfrontiert, stimmen insbesondere diejenigen für einen Ausstieg Italiens aus dem Euro, die glauben, dass der Euro ihnen nicht genutzt habe. Im Gegensatz zu Griechenland, wo Wählerinnen und Wähler entschlossen waren, zu jedem Preis im Euro zu verbleiben, zeigt dieser Befund, dass das Pro-Euro-Bündnis in Italien auseinanderfallen könnte, sollte Italien mit einer harten Austeritätspolitik konfrontiert sein.Contents 1 Introduction 2 Individual-level preferences for eurozone membership and exit 3 Framing effects on support for the euro 4 Data and methods Experiment design and dependent variable Independent variables Empirical strategy 5 Results The social support base of eurozone membership and exit Multivariate analysis of support for the euro Results from the survey experiment Heterogeneous framing effects 6 Conclusion Reference

Public Opinion towards Welfare State Reform: The Role of Political Trust and Government Satisfaction

The traditional welfare state, which emerged as a response to industrialization, is not well equipped toaddress the challenges of today’s post-industrial knowledge economies. Experts and policymakers have thereforecalled for welfare state readjustment towards a ‘social investment’ model (focusing on human skills and capabilities).Under what conditions are citizens willing to accept such future-oriented reforms? We point at the crucialbut hitherto neglected role of citizens’ trust in and satisfaction with government. Trust and satisfaction matterbecause future-oriented reforms generate uncertainties, risks and costs, which trust and government satisfactioncan attenuate. We offer micro-level causal evidence using experiments in a representative survey covering eightEuropean countries and confirm these findings with European Social Survey data for 22 countries. We find thattrust and government satisfaction increase reform support and moderate the effects of self-interest and ideologicalstandpoints. These findings have crucial implications not least because they help explain why some countriesmanage – but others fail – to enact important reforms.Introduction Under what conditions do citizens accept reforms? Why governmental trust and satisfaction affect support for future-oriented welfare state reforms Research design Study 1: Three survey experiments in eight countries Findings Study 2: ESS survey Findings Concluding discussion Acknowledgements Supporting information Reference