"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation

We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these ?Third Party Contingency? (TPC) contracts. Signing a TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only of mutual benefit to the plaintiff and the third party when the case settles out of court. We also find that the mere availability of TPCs may generate the above strategic effect. -- Das Paper enthält die erste Analyse einer neuen Institution zur Prozeßkostenfinanzierungs im Bereich der "britischen" Regel: Verträge, bei denen eine dritte Partei dem Kläger zusagt, im Falle der Klageabweisung die gesamten Prozeßkosten zu tragen. Im Gegenzug erhält diese dritte Partei einen Teil der durch Vergleich oder Urteil vom Beklagten erlangten Summe. Solche "TPC Verträge" (third party contingency contracts) überwinden die finanziellen Hürden bei der gerichtlichen Verfolgung von Ansprüchen. Sie machen die Drohung mit einer Klage auch dann glaubwürdig, wenn (ohne TPC Vertrag) der erwartete Wert des Prozesses für den Kläger negativ wäre. Dadurch erhöhen sie die Vergleichsbereitschaft des Beklagten und die Vergleichszahlungen. Wir zeigen, daß schon die reine Verfügbarkeit von TPC Verträgen diesen strategischen Effekt erzeugen könnte.Contingent fees,British cost allocation rule,Legal Cost Insurance,strategic moves

Channel Trading and Imperfect Competition: Good Trades and Bad Trades

We investigate the potential economic effects of spectrum trading amongst firms who require spectrum licences as part of their activities. Trading takes place within the technical interference constraints enforced by a regulator. The model accommodates a variety of markets and firms, as well as both chan- nel exchange and channel re-use (i.e. sharing across different markets). Our most detailed analytical results have focused on trade amongst oligopolists in a given (geographical) market. In this context, our results suggest that trade can enhance productive efficiency by placing licences in the hands of firms who value them most (i.e. low-cost firms). These are the ‘good trades’. However, there is a danger that this process may cause higher consumer prices which, in turn, could offset the welfare effects of lower cost production, the ‘bad trades’. An important outcome of our modelling is to make clear a role played by licences: they provide credible commitment mechanisms to restrict output.radio spectrum, spectrum trading, imperfect competition

Optimal Administered Incentive Pricing of Spectrum

Administered Incentive Pricing (AIP) of radio spectrum as advocated by Smith/NERA (1996) and recently assessed by Indepen (2003) envisages an incremental path towards e±cient pricing, with revealed and stated prefer- ence methods being used to reveal opportunity costs. We build on the latter to develop and optimal pricing scheme that allows for consumer surplus, in- terference constraints and their implications for productive e±ciency, revenue implications and market structure. We demonstrate the subtle relationship between the interference constraints and the pricing and channel use decisions of network operators. We proceed to show that the optimal AIP is higher in sectors where spectrum can be shared and that it acts as Ramsey tax across sectors of the economy, i.e., is inversely related to the elasticity of demand. As a special case of our model we examine optimal pricing where the regula- tor is constrained to ignore the revenue implications. Then optimal spectrum prices are lower and the relationship between prices and the ability to share spectrum is reversed.radio spectrum, spectrum pricing, administered incentive pricing

Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation

We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these “Third Party Contingency” (TPC) contracts. Signing a TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only of mutual benefit to the plaintiff and the third party when the case settles out of court. We also find that the mere availability of TPCs may generate the above strategic effect.Contingent fees, British cost allocation rule, Legal Cost Insurance, strategic moves.,

Price Regulation, Investment and the Commitment Problem

We consider a dynamic model of price regulation with asymmetric information where strategic delegation is available to the regulator. Firms can sink non-contractible, cost-reducing investment but regulators cannot commit to future price levels. We fully characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and show that, with incentive contracts and no delegation, under-investment occurs. We then show that delegation to a suitable regulator can both improve investment incentives and ameliorate the ratchet effect by credibly offering the firm future rent. Simulations indicate significant welfare gains from these two effects and that a wide range of regulatory preferences can achieve this result.under-investment, commitment, price regulation

"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation

We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these ?Third Party Contingency? (TPC) contracts. Signing a TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only of mutual benefit to the plaintiff and the third party when the case settles out of court. We also find that the mere availability of TPCs may generate the above strategic effect. --Contingent fees,British cost allocation rule,Legal Cost Insurance,strategic moves

The determinants of employee crime in the UK

For the first time, we present evidence on employee theft in the UK using data on actual recorded crime. We present a model where employees are rational cheaters with consciences to produce hypotheses about the role of labour market (wages, unemployment) and social (age, education) influences on employee theft. We then examine the role of these influences using regional crime data supplemented by data from the LFS. Our results provide information on two competing views of motivations for crime and on policy to combat employee crime.Employee crime, Labour markets

FORIS contracts: Litigation Cost Shifting and Contingent Fees in Germany

This paper analyzes the impact of FORIS contracts on litigation and settlement decisions using a simple divergent-expectations model. A FORIS contract introduces contingent fee arrangements under the British legal cost allocation rule: the plaintiff pays a percentage of his settlement or trial returns to FORIS and obtains coverage for trial costs in case he loses in court; the plaintiff?s attorney receives the standard fee. We take into account the sequential nature of the settlement and trial decisions. Without FORIS contracts, only cases with positive expected value provide credible threats for the plaintiff and thereby motivate the defendant to agree to a settlement. A FORIS contract has two important effects: cases with negative expected value are turned into credible threats, hence a settlement is triggered. Even in positive expected value cases, the settlement result for the plaintiff is increased. According to our results, FORIS should prohibit settlement negotiations before a contract with the plaintiff has been made. The paper argues that FORIS should abolish the non-disclosure clause which prohibits the plaintiff to reveal the existence of the FORIS contract to a third party. -- Das Paper analysiert die Wirkung eines FORIS-Vertrages auf die Bereitschaft zu klagen und zum außergerichtlichen Vergleich. Dabei wird ein einfaches Optimismus-Modell angewendet. Der FORIS-Vetrag erlaubt es dem Kläger, trotz Geltung der Europäischen Prozeßkostenregel (Velierer zahlt) mit den (in Amerika üblichen) "contingent fees" kalkulieren zu können: Der Kläger zahlt einen Teil seiner Erträge aus Prozeß oder Vergleich an FORIS; diese Firma wiederum zahlt die gesetzlichen Gebühren an den Anwalt des Klägers und trägt die Prozeßkosten, wenn der Kunde unterliegt. Das Modell zieht die sequentielle Struktur von Vergleichs- und Prozeßentscheidungen in Betracht. Ohne FORIS-Vertrag wäre eine Klagedrohung nur dann glaubwürdig, wenn der Prozeß dem Kläger einen positiven Erwartungswert verspricht. Nur in diesem Fall wäre der Beklagte zu einem Vergleich bereit. Der FORIS-Vertrag hat nun zwei Auswirkungen: Auch Fälle mit negativem Erwartungswert bieten nun glaubwürdige Klagedrohungen (motivieren also den Beklagten zum Vergleich); in Fällen mit positivem Erwartungswert wird das Vergleichsergebnis gesteigert. Unser Modell ergibt, daß FORIS keine Kunden akzeptieren sollte, die bereits in Vergleichsverhandlungen mit ihrem Prozeßgegner stehen. Wir argumentieren, daß das vertragliche Verbot, die Existenz des FORIS-Vertrages gegenüber Dritten zu offenbaren, kontraproduktiv ist.Contingent fees,British cost allocation rule,Legal Cost Insurance,strategic moves

Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment

Principals who exercise favouritism towards certain agents may harm those who are not so favoured. Other papers have produced evidence consistent with the presence of such favouritism but have been unable to consider methods for controlling it. We address this issue in the context of a natural experiment from English soccer, where one particular league introduced professional referees in 2001-02, thereby changing the financial incentives and monitoring regime faced by these referees. Because the change was not effected in all leagues, the ‘experiment’ has both cross-sectional and intertemporal dimensions. We study the effects of professional referees on an established measure of referee bias: length of injury time in close matches. We find that referees exercised favouritism prior to professionalism but not afterwards, having controlled for selection and soccer-wide effects. The results are consistent with a financial incentive effect as a result of professional referees and indicate that subtle aspects of principal-agent relationships (such as favouritism) are amenable to contractual influence.Favouritism, financial incentives, soccer, referee

The reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales

Legal aid expenditure has risen dramatically in recent years, prompting attention from successive governments. A prominent theme of past and present government reform proposals has been the shifting of risk away from the taxpayer towards lawyers, clients and insurers by altering the means by which legal aid lawyers are paid. This paper explores this theme by presenting information on legal aid expenditure trends over the last two decades and then considering whether payment mechanisms have contributed to this performance. Finally, it reviews previous and current reform proposals in this area. It concludes that, because risk-shifting also alters incentives, it is essential that reform recognises and monitors these.