Kuwait's foreign policy (1961-1977): Non-alignment, ideology and the pursuit of security

Kuwait's leaders from 1961-77 maintained a foreign policy that reflected the country's territorial vulnerabilities. They sought to discretely cultivate an Anglo-American defence relationship without fatally compromising an ideological fealty to at least the slogans of Arabism. The thesis emphasises Kuwait's essential need to offset its international "hard" security component with, as far as practicable, a regional non-alignment posture and adherence to Arab policy norrns. In the process neo-realist and constructivist theory are used to bring out the duality at the heart of the amirate's foreign policy. Differences between key Al-Sabah over foreign policy were differences of emphasis, while domestic security concerns did not so much determine policy as emphasise Kuwait's regional challenges, against which the amirate chose to deploy ideology. Arabism inevitably had contradictions as a tool of Kuwait foreign policy, and was often more about the cash subventions that accompanied policy stances, than the value of the stances themselves. However deploying ideology was indicative of the ruling Al-Sabah's desire to strike the right tone for external and domestic consumption; a desire to accommodate or befriend key regional players without, it hoped, alienating others. The inherent contradictions of Kuwait's foreign policy were born of the country's relative weakness, save its one precious asset, oil. In the 1980s Kuwait's strategically vital location and key resource would see the amirate forced to abandon its sometimes illusory regional nonalignment; after 1990 it maintained an overt US alliance. Events post- 1977 therefore emphasised what had been the fragility of Kuwait's foreign policy since independence. The country's limited ability to act to prevent these crises only underscored what had been the limits of the amirate's policy options

The GCC: Gulf state integration or leadership cooperation?

The GCC was forged as an alliance of politically like-minded states which sought to cooperate in the face of perceptibly increasing security threats. The conflict between Iraq and Iran presented security threats to the different Gulf Arab regimes. Saudi Arabia was concerned that the war could encourage some of the smaller states to bandwagon with one of the two adversaries. The smaller Gulf states were prepared to work with Saudi Arabia in preference to the greater threat of Iraq and Iran. The Gulf Arab hereditary regimes formed an association whose launch reflected Arab and national norms by not defining itself in opposition to others and by emphasizing economic operation, not common security interests. The ideational construct of Gulf cooperation proved insufficient to overcome the statecentric rationale of maximizing national sovereignty through loose regional political cooperation and bilateral defence pacts with Washington. The increased economic weight of some of the GCC states has seen a competitive search for international prestige that has sometimes been expressed through the construct of ‘regional’ interests but is fundamentally state-leadership focused. These leaderships remain pivotal in polities largely defined by a ruling family where there is little tradition or practical capacity for devolving authority. As such a major transfer of political authority to supra-state GCC institutions also remains a far-off prospect

Saudi Arabia and Jordan: friends in adversity

Saudi–Jordanian relations are a mismatch between broadly identical interests and differing means and capacities to realize them. Saudi Arabia has the potential to advance its interests, but is hamstrung by leadership structure, habit and political culture. Jordan has some advantages in terms of leadership structure, habit and political culture, but has only limited ability to affect its interests. Saudi Arabia’s historic sensitivities concerning its one-time Hashemite rival in Arabia are largely that; they do not directly affect Saudi policy towards Jordan. Tribal mobilization could be used by either side in the unexpected event of its neighbour’s collapse, but it is not a key means of realizing state objectives. Saudi Arabia’s internal political sensitivities do not drive its attitude towards Jordan. However, Jordan’s internal political situation makes it sensitive to Saudi Islamists, but its political problems are largely a domestic affair. These in turn affect Jordan’s foreign policy orientation. A mutual concern about domestic security vulnerabilities has long made both kingdoms relatively dependent on the US. The extent to which they cannot now wholly rely on the US, however, is one reason why they are drawn closer together. There are limits, though, to the importance of the relationship for either country. Neither side’s internal or external problems can be resolved by the actions or inactions of the other. Neither regime can guarantee the survival of the other or can even be expected to do much if the other were under threat. However, the two countries are trying to work more closely together. In a more threatening regional environment, this is important

Nationalism in the Gulf states

The relatively new states of the Arabian Gulf do not have a ‘nationalist’ history as understood elsewhere in the Middle East. Not born out of a struggle for national self determination, nor, for much of the modern state era, seeking territorial aggrandizement, Gulf Arab leaders have tended to use tribal and religious identities to reinforce their domestic legitimacy. However, these other identities weaken national coherence. In the current context of internal disquiet about foreign population numbers, Iran’s rising regional prominence and sectarian sensitivities within some GCC states, national identity is increasingly being employed as a state-building tool. However, steps to boost national identity do not necessarily create coherent national communities. As the state-led invention of national tradition is stepped up, usually without reference to disparate and sometimes disputatious groups, inclusion is not being felt across the national communities. While progress has arguably been made in some GCC states in at least addressing the limitations to national coherence, nationalism in the Gulf remains a highly contested notion, liable to promote as much as conceal national division