Sexual Orientation and Household Savings: Do Homosexual Couples Save More?

We analyze how sexual orientation is related to household savings using 2000 US Census data, and find that gay and lesbian couples own significantly more retirement income than heterosexuals, while cohabiting heterosexuals save more than their married counterparts. In a household savings model, we interpret this homosexual-specific differential as due to the extremely low fertility of same-sex couples, in addition to the precautionary motives driving cohabiting households to save more than married ones. Evidence from homeowners' ratio of mortgage payments to house value exhibits the same pattern of savings differentials by sexual orientation and cohabiting status.sexual orientation, household savings, retirement, housing

Sexual orientation and household savings: Do homosexual couples save more?

We analyze how sexual orientation is related to household savings using 2000 US Census data, and find that gay and lesbian couples own significantly more retirement income than heterosexuals, while cohabiting heterosexuals save more than their married counterparts. In a household savings model, we interpret this homosexual-specific differential as due to the extremely low fertility of same-sex couples, in addition to the precautionary motives driving cohabiting households to save more than married ones. Evidence from homeowners' ratio of mortgage payments to house value exhibits the same pattern of savings differentials by sexual orientation and cohabiting status

Quality of Available Mates, Education and Intra-Household Bargaining Power

This paper further explores the role of sex ratios on spouses bargaining power, by focusing on educational attainment in order to capture the qualitative aspect of mate availability. Using Census and Current Population Survey data for U.S. metropolitan areas in year 2000, a quality sex ratio is constructed by education brackets to test the effect on the intra-household bargaining power of couples in the corresponding education bracket. We argue that a relative shortage of suitably educated women in the spouses potential marriage market increases wives bargaining power in the household while it lowers their husbands. Additionally, we test the prediction that this bargaining power effect is greater as the assortative mating order by education increases. We consider a collective labor supply household model, in which each spouses labor supply is negatively related to their level of bargaining power. We find that higher relative shortage of comparably educated women in the couples metropolitan area reduces wives labor supply and increases their husbands. Also, the labor supply impact is stronger for couples in higher education groups. No such effects are found for unmarried individuals, which is consistent with bargaining theory

QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF MATE AVAILABILITY AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INTRA-HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING POWER

This dissertation studies the impact of changes in outside marriage market opportunities on intra-household bargaining power. In the first chapter, I analyze the impact of the availability of healthy mates on intra-household bargaining power. I specify a marriage market matching model and test the main prediction that in marriage markets in which both healthy and frail men marry, an increase in the relative scarcity of healthy women enhances wives\u27 bargaining power. This effect is estimated in a collective labor supply framework in which spousal bargaining power and labor supply are inversely related. I use CPS data and Census data on disability and construct a sex ratio by health status at the metropolitan level. I estimate labor supplies for white married couples and find that a higher relative scarcity of healthy women in the couple\u27s metropolitan area reduces wives\u27 labor supply and increases their husbands\u27. The role of sex ratios on spouses\u27 bargaining power is further explored in the second chapter. Using Census and CPS data for U.S. metropolitan areas in years 2000, 1990 and 1980, we construct a quality sex ratio by education brackets. We argue that a relative shortage of suitably educated women in the spouse\u27s potential marriage market increases wives\u27 bargaining power and it lowers their husbands\u27. We further check the prediction that this effect is greater as the assortative rank of couples by education increases. We find that higher relative shortage of comparably educated women in the couple\u27s metropolitan area reduces wives\u27 labor supply and increases their husbands\u27. The impact is stronger for couples in higher education groups. Consistent with bargaining theory, no such effects are found for unmarried individuals

Gone to war: have deployments increased divorces

Abstract Owing to the armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, members of the USmilitary have experienced very high rates of deployment overseas. Because militarypersonnel have little to no control over their deployments, the military setting offersa unique opportunity to study the causal effect of major disruptions on marital dissolution.In this paper, we use longitudinal individual-level administrative data from1999 to 2008 and find that an additional month in deployment increases the divorcehazard of military families, with females being more affected. A standard conceptualframework of marital formation and dissolution predicts a differential effect of thesetypes of shocks depending on the degree to which they are anticipated when a couplegets married. Consistent with this prediction, we find a larger effect for couplesmarried before 9/11, who clearly expected a lower risk of deployment than what theyfaced post 9/11.24 Halama