Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data

In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both threats and imposed sanctions. Second, to lessen model dependency of empirical findings, we employ a methodology that permits us to check systematically the robustness of the empirical results under various model specifications. Using the newly released Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data, our analyses of both threats and imposed sanctions show that two factors—involvement of international institutions and severe costs on target states—are positively and robustly related to sanctions success at every stage in sanctions episodes. Our analyses also identify a number of other variables that are systematically related to sanctions success, but the significance of these relationships depends on the specific model estimated. Finally, our results point to a number of differences at the threat and imposition stages, which suggests specific selection effects that should be explored in future work

Non-state actors and political conflict

In the vast majority of international relations literature, states are assumed to have a monopoly on the use of force throughout their territory. However, states are increasingly facing considerable security challenges from militant non-state actors. In the vast majority of these cases, state/non-state actor conflict is terminated through violent conflict, often with devastating consequences. Given this empirical pattern, a disturbing trend is the internationalization of conflicts between states and non-state actors. Increasingly, non-state actors move their base of operations to foreign host states in order to increase the target's cost of retaliation. This behavior holds the potential to escalate conflicts from civil war to interstate or regional wars. Due to the devastation associated with such conflicts, this project examines the possibilities for the peaceful conflict resolution of state/non-state political violence. Specifically, this project attempts to identify the conditions under which peaceful conflict resolution can succeed as an alternative to the use of force. This project addresses three puzzles. First, at what point do states and non-state actors agree to negotiate? Second, what factors promote successful negotiation to conflicts involving a target state and non-state actors? Finally, what are the consequences of failing to achieve negotiated settlements? This project addresses each of these questions by constructing game theoretic models. The models examine the strategic interaction between non-state actors, host states, and targets of non-state violence. The models are empirically tested using several data sources, including the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events, State Failure data, and source date from the RAND corporation

Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

This study proposes a strategic explanation for the USA's continued provision of military aid to host states with problems of terrorism, despite its poor empirical record. Using a game theoretic model, I demonstrate that US military aid creates a moral hazard problem. If host states are provided with the tools to pacify their territory only if terrorist campaigns are ongoing, but will lose this aid once the problem of terrorism ceases, host states have little incentive to accelerate the demise of terrorist groups. However, the model demonstrates that while military aid does not accomplish the US goal of disarming terrorists, military aid is effective at preventing host states from negotiating with terrorist organizations. The provision of military aid provides a disincentive for host states to reach a negotiated settlement with terrorist groups, and therefore prevents terrorist organizations from altering the status quo that is favorable to the USA. This suggests that while military aid may not be effective at actually disarming terrorist groups, it can be effective at keeping terrorist groups out of power. These hypotheses are tested using the Jones & Libicki (2008) data on terrorism from 1997 to 2006. The empirical results support the conclusions of the theoretical model.conflict, military aid, terrorism

Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data

Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions “work” more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testing utilizing the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data. Somewhat surprisingly, the analyses using these new data support the intuition of policymakers; that is, multilateral sanctions do appear to work more frequently than do unilateral sanctions. Our results do support one theoretical argument, based on spatial models, that we test. This explanation holds that whether multilateral or unilateral sanctions are more effective depends on the number of issues at stake and on whether an international institution is involved. Our analyses provide support for these hypotheses

BapatCilizogluCMPS_Replication – Supplemental material for Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing

<p>Supplemental material, BapatCilizogluCMPS_Replication for Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing by Menevis Cilizoglu and Navin A Bapat in Conflict Management and Peace Science</p

Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data

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