Reinventing a broken wheel: what the EU-Tunisia Deal reveals over Europe’s migration cooperation

Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

The il/liberal paradox: conceptualising immigration policy trade-offs across the democracy/autocracy divide

Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Autocratic immigration policymaking: the illiberal paradox hypothesis

Open immigration policy changes are often cast as a feature of democracy and restrictive immigration policy changes as a feature of autocracy. This paper shows that the relationship between political regime type and immigration policy change is not as clear cut. Empirical evidence suggests that the substance of immigration policy change — in terms of openness or restrictiveness — does not significantly differ between democracies and autocracies. However, political regimes shape immigration policy dynamics, with autocracies having more leeway than democracies to open (or restrict) immigration according to their economic, geopolitical, or domestic priorities. Autocracies can more easily enact open immigration policy reforms compared to democracies if they wish to do so, a dynamic I call the ‘illiberal paradox’ and illustrate with empirical examples from across the globe. I also outline the limits of the autocratic openings on immigration, related to policy implementation, sudden policy backlashes and migrants’ integration rights. To move towards more global immigration policy theories, this paper suggests combining analyses that identify ideal types of democratic or autocratic immigration policymaking with studies of the nuances of real-life political practices. This would allow scholars to conceptualise immigration policy dynamics across the entire democracy-autocracy spectrum, for instance by capturing authoritarian practices within formal democracies and democratic practices within formal autocracies.FSW – Publicaties zonder aanstelling Universiteit Leide

Fifty years of Maghreb emigration: how states shaped Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian emigration

This paper analyses emigration from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to main European and North American destinations since the 1960s. It explores the role of states, post-colonial ties and migration policies in emigration dynamics. By adopting a historical-comparative approach and an origin country perspective, this paper shows that Maghreb emigration was continuously shaped not only by government strategies in Europe but also by those of Maghreb states. Drawing on new bilateral migration flow data compiled in the DEMIG C2C database, the paper reveals three distinct phases in which Maghreb emigration patterns converge and diverge: the post-independence period in which Maghreb emigration boomed; the period from the mid-1970s until the early 1990s when Algerian emigration levelled off while emigration from neighbouring countries’ remained high; and the period from the early 1990s when Moroccan emigration increased exponentially while Tunisian and Algerian only grew moderately. Similarities in Maghreb emigration patterns can be explained by the countries’ comparable geopolitical and socio-economic features and that European states apply the same immigration policies to all Maghreb countries. To understand the divergences however, a closer look at origin country factors is required. The paper finds that Algeria’s departure from regional emigration patterns in the 1970s can be traced back to the emigration stop implemented by the Algerian government in 1973. Conversely, the active promotion of emigration by the Moroccan state facilitated emigration by making access to passport easier and fostering a culture of emigration that together with high unemployment partly explains Morocco’s emigration boom after the 1990s. Finally, recent diversification of Maghreb emigration to divergent South European countries, can be attributed to specific historical linkages, with Moroccans and Algerians mainly migrating to Spain and Tunisians to Italy.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Almost home? Morocco’s incomplete migration reforms

Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou