305 research outputs found
How to Measure the Standard Metre
Nathan Salmon; XII*âHow to Measure the Standard Metre, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 193â21
Semantically Empty Gestures
Frege held that the bare demonstrative âthatâ is incomplete, and that it is the word together with a gesture that serves as the designating expression, and likewise that it is the word âyesterdayâ together with the time of utterance that designates the relevant day. David Kaplanâs original theory of indexicals holds that Fregeâs supplementation thesis is correct about demonstratives but incorrect about âyesterdayâ. Kaplanâs account of demonstratives deviates from Fregeâs in treating supplemented demonstratives as directly referential, hence rigid. It is argued here that the gesture or other demonstration that accompanies an utterance of âthatâ is not part of the designating expression but instead part of the utterance context
From Time to Time
The topic is time travel of the sort depicted in H. G. Wellsâ classic novel, The Time MachineâWellsian time travel. The range of proper applicability of the concept of Wellsian time travel is investigated. The results of this investigation are applied to provide a new argument against the metaphysical possibility of time travel in absolute time. Alternatively, the argument is against the possibility of Wellsian time travel relative to a single temporal frame of reference. The argument leaves open the prospect that an object nontrivially moves relative to one temporal reference frame from one time to another relative to another temporal reference frame. The argument does not turn on closed timelike curves or âcausal loopsâ of any kind. It does however invoke the prospect of backward causationâa consequence of backward time travel in conjunction with common senseâbut it invokes this possibility only in the weak sense of mere logical consistency
Cognition and Recognition
Expressions are synonymous if they have the same semantic content.
Complex expressions are synonymously isomorphic in Alonzo Churchâs sense if
one is obtainable from the other by a sequence of alphabetic changes of bound
variables or replacements of component expressions by syntactically simple
synonyms. Synonymous isomorphism provides a very strict criterion for synonymy
of sentences. Several eminent philosophers of language hold that synonymous
isomorphism is not strict enough. These philosophers hold that âGreeks
prefer Greeksâ and âGreeks prefer Hellenesâ express different propositions even
if they are synonymously isomorphic. They hold that the very recurrence
(multiple occurrence) of âGreeksâ contributes to the proposition expressed
something that indicates the very recurrence in question. Kit Fine argues that
this thesis, which he labels semantic relationism calls for a radically new
conception of semantics. I have argued that the relevant phenomenon is
wholly pragmatic, entirely non-semantic. Here I supplement the case with a
new argument. No cognition without recognitionâor almost none. With this
observation, standard Millianism has sufficient resources to confront Fregeâs
puzzle and related problems without injecting pragmatic phenomena where
they do not belong
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