Expressions are synonymous if they have the same semantic content.
Complex expressions are synonymously isomorphic in Alonzo Church’s sense if
one is obtainable from the other by a sequence of alphabetic changes of bound
variables or replacements of component expressions by syntactically simple
synonyms. Synonymous isomorphism provides a very strict criterion for synonymy
of sentences. Several eminent philosophers of language hold that synonymous
isomorphism is not strict enough. These philosophers hold that ‘Greeks
prefer Greeks’ and ‘Greeks prefer Hellenes’ express different propositions even
if they are synonymously isomorphic. They hold that the very recurrence
(multiple occurrence) of ‘Greeks’ contributes to the proposition expressed
something that indicates the very recurrence in question. Kit Fine argues that
this thesis, which he labels semantic relationism calls for a radically new
conception of semantics. I have argued that the relevant phenomenon is
wholly pragmatic, entirely non-semantic. Here I supplement the case with a
new argument. No cognition without recognition—or almost none. With this
observation, standard Millianism has sufficient resources to confront Frege’s
puzzle and related problems without injecting pragmatic phenomena where
they do not belong