Crime timing

This note develops a dynamic model of crime that determines the conditions under which it is optimal for a criminal to delay commission of a crime rather than committing it immediately. It also examines the optimal enforcement strategy in this context. We derive two results. The first is that it might be optimal to postpone a crime that is profitable now if its benefit increase quickly enough in the future and that a crime that is not yet optimal might become so in the future. The second is that it is optimal to underdeter crime.

The Lawyer as a Portfolio Manager: How Does the Fee System Influence on the Lawyer\u27s Decision of Handling Legal Claim?

We use the portfolio theory to analyze the lawyer\u27s decision regarding the type of case the lawyer will handle. We offer some insights into the widespread idea that contingency lawyers are providing a risk sharing service. We demonstrate that a contingent fee lawyer diversifies his portfolio. We show that reputation induces more, but not fully, concentration, since a lawyer with greater reputation or expertise selects more risky cases. The size of the law firm has the same result

L'analyse économique d'un mode de résolution des litiges : l'arbitrage

[eng] Arbitration is a procedure whereby the disputing parties present their cases to a third party who makes a binding decision. In France, it is not largely used, whereas in the United States arbitration has been just routine for several decades. So, the economics literature on arbitration is significant. We focus on the analysis on the arbitration process. Two major procedures of arbitration exist. In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator can make the decision he wants. He can not do so in final offer arbitration. He is constrained to make a decision that is equal to the defendant offer or to the plaintiff offer. In each procedure, we study first the arbitrator behavior, then the parties one's. [fre] L'arbitrage est une procédure de résolution des conflits qui consiste à faire trancher un litige par un tiers dont la sentence a la même autorité que celle d'un juge. Ce procédé qui émerge en France est une véritable institution outre-Atlantique. Nous présentons les principaux résultats des analyses sur la procédure d'arbitrage en elle-même et éludons les questions liées à la comparaison des modes de résolutions alternatifs des litiges. Aux Etats-Unis, il existe différentes formes d'arbitrage qui se dif- férencient par la liberté accordée à l'arbitre dans le choix de sa sentence. Dans l'arbitrage conventionnel, le choix de l'arbitre n'est pas contraint, alors que dans l'arbitrage entre offres finales il est limité aux seules propositions des parties. Ces deux procédures sont présentées d'abord en étudiant le comportement de l'arbitre, puis celui des parties.

Arbitration and Incentives: How to Preclude the Chilling Effect?

arbitration, incentives,

The Informational Role of the Arbitration Clause

arbitration, signalling, law and economics, product quality,

The impact of the number of courts on the demand for trials

International audienceThe recent reforms of the "judicial map" in Europe have drastically reduced the number of courts, raising fears of a decline in access to justice. This paper addresses this issue through a litigation model within a Salop (1979) framework. We assume that victims of accidents differ both in terms of compensatory damages expected and in terms of distance from court. Due to distance costs, it might be too expensive to file cases for some victims with low expected awards. We show that the link between the number of courts and the demand for trials is not clear cut when the probability of an accident occurring is determined by the defendant through his level of care. Reducing the number of courts can, under certain conditions, increases the amount of care taken by the defendant

The Influence of Lawyers and Fee Arrangements on Arbitration

International audienceThis paper proposes a theoretical analysis of final-offer arbitration in which disputants may be represented by lawyers who can be paid by flat, contingent, or conditional fees. We derive the equilibrium lawyers' efforts to defend their clients and the equilibrium parties' proposals made to the arbitrator, and evaluate each payment mechanism's performance according to its ability to enhance effort and to promote convergence between the disputants' claims. Following these criteria, the contingent payment structure is shown to be the best regime, since it improves the client–lawyer relationship by enhancing the lawyer's incentives to provide effort, without altering the gap between the parties' positions in arbitration