Monopole télévisuel et publiphobie

L'analyse contenue dans cet article envisage une chaîne publique et une chaîne privée en monopole comme deux hypothèses alternatives concernant la structure du marché télévisuel. Nous comparons les tarifs et les valeurs publicitaires émergeants de ces hypothèses alternatives en supposant les téléspectatrices ont une aversion pour la publicité. Nous montrons que le tarif, sous l'hypothèse d'un monopole public excède le tarif qu'imposerait un monopole privé quel que soit le niveau des coûts fixes de production de la chaîne.Monopole télévisuel, Publiphobie

Advertising and the rise of the free daily newspapers

We analyze the competition between two newspapers in a vertical differentiation model where the qualities of the journals are determined endogenously in the first stage of the game. We show that when the advertising revenues per reader increase there is a critical value above which the quality of the low quality newspaper discontinuously falls while it become similtaneously a free newspaper. This is beneficial to the high quality journal and detrimental to the readers.Advertising, Newspaper quality

The TV news scheduling game when the newscaster’s face matters

The present note first provides an alternative formulation of the Cancian, Bills and Bergström (1995) - problem which discards the non-existence difficulty and consequently allows to consider some extensions of the TV-newscast scheduling game. The extension we consider consists in assuming that viewers’ preferences between the competing channels do not depend only on the timing of their broadcast, but also on some other characteristics, like the content of the show or the identity of the newscaster. Then we identify a sufficient condition on the dispersion of these preferences over the viewers’ population guaranteeing the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. It turns out that, at this equilibrium, both networks broadcast their news at the same instant.advertising; newspaper quality

Les médias : une industrie à part entière et entièrement à part

L’article met en évidence la nature de la concurrence que se livrent les firmes médiatiques et les questions qui y affèrent. En premier lieu, seront exposées les principales caractéristiques économiques des produits médiatiques : coûts de production des médias, double financement et le caractère public et tutélaire des produits médiatiques. Celles-ci établissent que les médias constituent une industrie à part entière. Cependant, une fois prises en considération, elles montrent que les médias constituent des industries entièrement à part dès lors que l’on cherche à étudier et à comprendre la nature de la concurrence au sein de cette industrie. Ensuite, seront soulevées des questions propres aux industries médiatiques, telles les conséquences du financement publicitaire sur la structure du marché (concentration vs concurrence), ou encore la diversité et la nature des produits médiatiques offerts.This article proposes to give evidence of the nature of the competition that the media firms engage with each other and the questions it raises. First we will expose the principal economical characteristics of the media products: production costs of the media, double financing and the public and tutelary characters of the media products. These characteristics make obvious that the media constitute an entire, proper industry. Nevertheless, once taken in consideration, these characteristics show us that the media constitute industries entire-ly separated from others – except when one tries to study and to understand the nature of the competition within this industry. In consequence of what we will then attempt to raise a series of questions proper to the media industries, and we will deal with the consequences of the financing of advertisements, the structure of the market (concentration vs. competition), and finally the variety and the nature of the presented media products

Subscription as a price descrimination device

We propose a model representing a newspaper producer supplying a product which can be acquired by the readers either every day per one unit at a time, or by subscription. The population of potential buyers is differentiated according to the frequency at which they want to read the newspaper. First we identify the optimal pricing policy, namely, the optimal price for issues sold per unit at the newsstand, as well as the optimal subscription fee. Then we show that it is always more profitable to supply the market with both possibilites - free sale purchase and subscription - than to concentrate the sales on either of these alternatives.

La production journalistique et Google (chercher à ce que l'information soit trouvée)

Nous cherchons dans ce travail à détricoter la relation à la fois compétitive et coopérative, indifféremment technique, économique, juridique, sociale, politique et résolument communicationnelle de Google et des éditeurs de presse. Pour cela, après avoir historicisé la rencontre de deux univers singuliers, nous décrivons ce que les éditeurs peuvent faire pour franchir le prisme du moteur de recherche et y optimiser la visibilité de leur production. Nous tâchons ensuite de décrypter ce que la firme Google peut faire faire aux éditeurs en analysant leurs relations de pouvoir, leurs incitations, leurs projets et leurs environnements informationnels respectifs. Enfin, nous rendons compte de ce que les éditeurs français issus de la presse imprimée font effectivement : ce qu ils communiquent à Google, par quels moyens et à quel prix, pour quels résultats espérés, à l issue de quelles concessions, quels détours, quelles contestations. Nous expliquons comment les conditions et les modalités de captation du trafic sont susceptibles d influencer la valorisation du contenu, l organisation e sa production, la structure du site, les pratiques journalistiques et les lignes éditoriales. Nous montrons qu un aller-retour performatif se crée entre énoncés et conditions d énonciation, agissant par et sur les textes, les architextes et les hypertextes. En somme, c est à la compréhension de ce que deviennent l actualité et eux qui la mettent en récit, dès lors qu ils cherchent à ce que l information qu ils produisent soit trouvée par les utilisateurs de Google, que notre thèse est consacrée.In this thesis, we aim to disentangle the cooperative but also competitive relationship between Google and news publishers, which is at the same time technical, economic, legal, social, political and certainly communicational. In order to do so, we trace the historical development of two singular universes, describing what publishers can do to overcome the search engine and optimize their ranking. We then analyse how Google can influence publishers conduct, by studying power relations, respective incentives, aims, and informational and socio-economic backgrounds. Finally, we report on actual practices of French traditional news publishers: what they communicate to Google, by which means and at what price, for which expected results, after which concessions, detours and controversies. Thus, we explain how search engine optimization is likely to affect the way content is valued, its production organisation, the website s structure, journalists prac tice an editorial policy. We show a back and forth movement between performative utterances and performed circumstances, having an effect on and by texts, architexts and hypertexts. To sum up, this thesis is dedicated to understanding what happens to news and publishers once they strive for their information to be found by Google's users.PARIS2-BU Panthéon Assas (751062111) / SudocPARIS-CUJAS-BU Droit (751052119) / SudocSudocFranceF

the newscaster’s face matters

The present note first provides an alternative formulation of the Cancian, Bills and Bergström (1995)-problem which discards the non-existence difficulty and consequently allows to consider some extensions of the TV-newscast scheduling game.The extension we consider consists in assuming that viewers’preferences between the competing channels do not depend only on the timing of their broadcast, but also on some other characteristics, like the content of the show or the identity of the newscaster. Then we identify a sufficient condition on the dispersion of these preferences over the viewers’population guaranteeing the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. It turns out that, at this equilibrium, In an interesting contribution, Cancian, Bills and Bergström (1995) (henceforth CBB) have exhibited some technical difficulties which may occur when TV-broadcasters compete in program scheduling. These authors consider the problem of scheduling evening television newscasts: two TV-networks hav

L’écosystème des médias

Through a literature review, the author analyzes the evolution of the media ecosystem, its main transformations and their socio-economic implications. Her starting point is twofold : information as a common good and the business model of the media conceived as a multi-platform of exchange. Through a series of socio-political questioning, she studies the impact on media content of dual financing, in terms of pluralism, diversity, quality and the role of the State within media industries

Readers' Attitudes Toward Press Advertising: Are They Ad-Lovers or Ad-Averse?

This article raises the question of whether press readers are ad- lovers or ad-averse. If readers are ad-lovers, a positive circulation spiral should be expected, through mutual reinforcement between circulation and advertising. On the contrary, advertising aversion may eventually lead to a decrease in circulation when newspapers' advertising space increases. The empirical section of the article concludes that attitudes toward press advertising are country specific. The theoretical section develops some implication of advertising aversion hypothesis.