16 research outputs found
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Internet Filtering in the United Arab Emirates in 2004-2005: A Country Study
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Internet Filtering in China 2004-2005
China's Internet filtering regime is the most sophisticated effort of its kind in the world. Compared to similar efforts in other states, China's filtering regime is pervasive, sophisticated, and effective. It comprises multiple levels of legal regulation and technical control. It involves numerous state agencies and thousands of public and private personnel. It censors content transmitted through multiple methods, including Web pages, Web logs, on-line discussion forums, university bulletin board systems, and e-mail messages. Our testing found efforts to prevent access to a wide range of sensitive materials, from pornography to religious material to political dissent. We sought to determine the degree to which China filters sites on topics that the Chinese government finds sensitive, and found that the state does so extensively. Chinese citizens seeking access to Web sites containing content related to Taiwanese and Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, the Dalai Lama, the Tiananmen Square incident, opposition political parties, or a variety of anti-Communist movements will frequently find themselves blocked. Contrary to anecdote, we found that most major American media sites, such as CNN, MSNBC, and ABC, are generally available in China (though the BBC remains blocked). Moreover, most sites we tested in our global list's human rights and anonymizer categories are accessible as well. While it is difficult to describe this widespread filtering with precision, our research documents a system that imposes strong controls on its citizens' ability to view and to publish Internet content. This report was produced by the OpenNet Initiative, a partnership among the Advanced Network Research Group, Cambridge Security Programme at Cambridge University, the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, and the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School
The filtering matrix: Integrated mechanisms of information control and the demarcation of borders in cyberspace
Increasingly, states are adopting practices aimed at regulating and controlling the Internet as it passes through their borders. Seeking to assert information sovereignty over their cyber–territory, governments are implementing Internet content filtering technology at the national level. The implementation of national filtering is most often conducted in secrecy and lacks openness, transparency, and accountability. Policy–makers are seemingly unaware of significant unintended consequences, such as the blocking of content that was never intended to be blocked. Once a national filtering system is in place, governments may be tempted to use it as a tool of political censorship or as a technological “quick fix” to problems that stem from larger social and political issues. As non–transparent filtering practices meld into forms of censorship the effect on democratic practices and the open character of the Internet are discernible. States are increasingly using Internet filtering to control the environment of political speech in fundamental opposition to civil liberties, freedom of speech, and free expression. The consequences of political filtering directly impact democratic practices and can be considered a violation of human rights
Information Warfare Monitor/ONI Asia joint report
Our investigation reveals troubling security and privacy breaches affecting TOM-Skype—the Chinese version of the popular voice and text chat software Skype, marketed by the domestic Chinese company TOM Online. TOM-Skype routinely collects, logs and captures millions of records that include personal information and contact details for any text chat and/or voice calls placed to TOM-Skype users, including those from the Skype platform. These records are kept on publicly-accessible servers, along with the information required to decrypt these log files. These files contain the full text of chat messages sent and/or received by TOM-Skype users that contain particular keywords that trigger TOM-Skype’s content-filtering capability. Our investigation revealed eight servers that are part of the TOM-Skype surveillance network. In addition, we found one server hosting a special version of TOM-Skype designed for use in “net bars” or cybercafés. This server contained log files and information that revealed the list of the words that the system censored. Another server captured data from TOM Online’s wireless services, and contained logs of SMS messages and other sensitive information. The log files obtained during the course of the investigation reveal information such as the IP addresses, usernames (and land line phone numbers) used to place or receive TOM-Skype calls, as well as the full content of filtered messages and the time and date of each message. The collected data affects all TOM-Skype users and also captures the personal information of any Skype users that interacted with registered TOM-Skype users. This represents a severe security and privacy breach. It also raises troubling questions regarding how these practices are related to the Government of China’s censorship and surveillance policies. The captured messages contain keywords relating to sensitive topics such as Taiwan independence, the Falun Gong, and political opposition to the Communist Party of China..