Book Review: Number One Realist: Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare

Author: Nathaniel L. Moir Reviewed by John A. Nagl, professor of warfighting studies, US Army War College Counterinsurgency expert John A. Nagl reviews the “long-overdue” biography of the American political scientist Bernard Fall who, as Nagl writes, was “always a couple years ahead of informed US public opinion” about the Vietnam War. Author Nathaniel L. Moir’s experience as an Afghanistan War veteran informs this examination of one of the most “contentious” topics in American history, and the intersection here of Dr. Nagl’s, Moir’s, and Fall’s expertise provides powerful insights about the persistent question of how best to approach counterinsurgency.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1034/thumbnail.jp

Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars

Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States military has a less than enviable combat record in irregular warfare. Through a detailed historical analysis, this article provides perspective on where past decisions and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given more time or executed differently. In doing so, it provides lessons for future Army engagements and argues that until America becomes proficient in irregular warfare, our enemies will continue to fight us at the lower levels of the spectrum of conflict, where they have a good chance of exhausting our will to fight

A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force

Fifty years ago, the US Army faced a strategic inflection point after a failed counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. In response to lessons learned from the Yom Kippur War, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command was created to reorient thinking and doctrine around the conventional Soviet threat. Today’s Army must embrace the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an opportunity to reorient the force into one as forward-thinking and formidable as the Army that won Operation Desert Storm. This article suggests changes the Army should make to enable success in multidomain large-scale combat operations at today’s strategic inflection point

Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” (part 2)

This commentary responds to John A. Nagl’s article, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters (vol. 52, no. 3)

A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023

This special commentary summarizes the major findings and lessons taken from the Russia-Ukraine War integrated research project conducted by members of the US Army War College class of 2024—all subject matter experts on their topics. It outlines seven lessons covering doctrinal, operational, technological, strategic, and political issues related to the second year of the war, including Russia’s use of mercenaries, the need to create a culture of mission command, ways to deal with a transparent battlefield because of persistent, ubiquitous surveillance, air superiority as a prerequisite for successful combined arms ground offensives, and changes to the intelligence and information domains

Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” (part 1)

This commentary responds to John A. Nagl’s article, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters (vol. 52, no. 3)

Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century

The authors address what they—and many others—perceived to be a decline in military professionalism in the Army officer corps. The authors first describe the ethical, technical, and political components of military professionalism and then address the causes for the decline. They conclude by proposing a set of principles which, if adhered to, will reinvigorate the vision of the officer corps and motivate the corps to selfless service.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1145/thumbnail.jp

Liberal warriors and the violent colonial logics of “partnering and advising"

Building on the feminist literature that traces the (re)production of militarized masculinities in and through military interventions, this article details some of the ways British soldiering subjects are being shaped in today's counterinsurgency context. Required now to be both nation builders and war fighters, contemporary soldiers are a “softer,” less masculinized subjectivity, and what Alison Howell has termed “liberal warriors.” British troops with their long history of colonialism and frequent overseas military campaigns are understood to be particularly suited to this role. Taking the British military's involvement in the “partnering and advising” of the Afghan National Army (ANA), this article pays attention to the interlocking gendered, raced, and sexualized discourses through which the British/Afghan encounter is experienced. Exploring first British troops' preoccupation with the perceived femininity and homosexuality of their Afghan counterparts, and second, Afghan hypermasculinity as demonstrated by the characterizations of their violent and chaotic fighting tactics, colonial logics are revealed. While British liberal warriors come to know “who they are” through these logics, (mis)represented Afghan soldiers are rendered increasingly vulnerable to the very “real,” very material violences of war

Military maladaptation : counterinsurgency and the politics of failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.PostprintPeer reviewe