4 research outputs found
A non-cooperative approach to meta-bargaining theory
In meta-bargaining theory we consider (two-person) bargaining games and we assume that the agents want to apply two different bargaining situations. A mechanism is a function which assigns to every meta-bargaining game an allocation depending on the two bargaining solutions supported by the agents. In the literature van Damme (cf. [16]) and Chun (cf. [2]) propose two mechanisms. Under both mechanisms there is only one bargaining solution which constitutes a Nash-equilibrium in every non-cooperative game in which agents can choose bargaining solutions as strategies and the outcome is determined by the mechanism. We point out some undesirable properties of the mechanisms. By modifying each mechanism we propose new mechanisms yielding the same conclusions as the original mechanisms but avoiding these properties. Furthermore, we offer another modification of Chun's mechanisms for which only the Egalitarian solution constitutes a Nash-equilibrium in every non-cooperative game.Meta bargaining, Nash bargaining solution, non-cooperative approach
The averaging mechanism
Naeve-Steinweg E. The averaging mechanism. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 277. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 1997
Lexicographic measurement of the information contained in opportunity sets
An individual who has to choose one item from an opportunity set or menu may lack complete information about the final consequences attached to her choice. This problem has been modeled by Bossert (2000) who introduces an axiomatic approach to the ranking of menus according to their informational content. We propose a different ranking based on the lexicographic ordering on the vectors of numbers of consequences for each item and characterize it axiomatically.
A note on van Damme's mechanism
We consider (two-person) bargaining games and we assume that the agents want to apply two possibly different bargaining solutions. A mechanism is a function which assigns an allocation to every bargaining game and every pair of bargaining solutions. Examining van Damme's mechanism (1986) from a cooperative point of view we see that it fails to satisfy Pareto-optimality. By modifying it we propose a new mechanism yielding the same conclusions as the original while enjoying some additional desirable properties.Meta-bargaining, Nash bargaining solution, non-cooperative approach, cooperative approach, mechanism