A Strategic Thinking of the Issues in Cost Management of FB Real Estate Company

摘要 论文结合FB房地产公司开发项目遇到的主要问题：如何选择项目开发的成本管理战略以获取成本竞争优势？成本管理效果不佳的问题：如成本核算数据不准确不能及时反映项目产品的成本状况、项目开发预算与实际支出差异大、产品的成本与利润不清楚、项目间成本不可比、成本管理不能及时对市场变化进行调整和企业利润被侵蚀的成本失控问题如何解决？怎么对异地项目开发进行成本控制及风险管理？怎样创新管理针对房地产成本管理的疑难问题展开战略分析研究，通过对解决问题的相关因素分析得出解决方案，在某项目开发中进行应用取得成功以验证其可行性。 论文以某项目开发针对成本管理中存在的疑难问题，以企业成本战略管理方法的“五力分析法...Abstract This article is mainly focused on the following topics of FB Real Estate Company: how to obtain the competitive advantage of project management by carrying on effective cost management strategies? How to change the situation of ineffective cost management, such as the data can't reflect the cost of the project accurately and there is a huge gap between the project's budget and actual...学位：工商管理硕士院系专业：管理学院高级经理教育中心（EMBA项目）_高级管理人员工商管理硕士(EMBA)学号：X200715612

Before Stalinism: The Defence Industry of Soviet Russia in the 1920s1

Competition and profit-seeking were never strong features of the Russian defence industry before the Revolution. World War I and the Russian Civil War profoundly influenced interwar perspectives on the Soviet defence industry and accentuated this characteristic in the process. The defence industry failed to adapt to market conditions under the New Economic Policy: it produced at a loss, depended heavily on budgetary subsidies, and still failed to meet the demands of the armed forces in virtually every field of armament. The blame, at first laid on those in charge of the defence industry, was directed more and more specifically against its ‘bourgeois’ specialists. In the process, the Red Army staff became enthusiastic advocates of forced industrialisation under a command system through which they hoped to gain direct influence over defence industry personnel and allocations. Comparative Economic Studies (2005) 47, 437–455. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100100

The Fundamental Problem of Command: Plan and Compliance in a Partially Centralised Economy

When a principal gives an order to an agent and advances resources for its implementation, the temptations for the agent to shirk or steal from the principal rather than comply constitute the fundamental problem of command. Historically, partially centralised command economies enforced compliance in various ways, assisted by nesting the fundamental problem of exchange within that of command. The Soviet economy provides some relevant data. The Soviet command system combined several enforcement mechanisms in an equilibrium that shifted as agents learned and each mechanism's comparative costs and benefits changed. When the conditions for an equilibrium disappeared, the system collapsed. Comparative Economic Studies (2005) 47, 296–314. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100110