“Singapore Case” and the Soviet Banking Sector Abroad (Late 1960s — 1970s)

Поступила в редакцию: 04.10.2023. Принята к печати: 11.12.2023.Submitted: 04.10.2023. Accepted: 11.12.2023.В статье проанализирована история «Сингапурского дела» Московского народного банка (МНБ) — одного из наиболее громких советских финансовых дел второй половины 1970-х гг. На основе документов Российского государственного архива экономики автор описывает причины, по которым был открыт банк в этой юго-восточной стране, останавливаясь на феномене советского банковского сектора за рубежом в конце 1960-х — 1970-е гг. В статье показано, что если в странах Запада СССР открывал свои банки, исходя из экономических интересов (снижение валютных расходов, помощь в кредитовании социалистических стран), то в странах Глобального Юга превалировали политические обстоятельства. Сингапур играл важную роль в продвижении дипломатических интересов Москвы. Вместе с тем экономическим взаимоотношениям с этим островным государством Советский Союз уделял гораздо меньше внимания, хотя в 1971 г. здесь было открыто отделение МНБ. На основе документов в публикации показано, как путем предоставления большого объема услуг по кредитованию частных фирм советский банк в течение нескольких лет стал ведущим в Сингапуре. Одновременно с этим в статье раскрыто, что большинство кредитов были предоставлены без соблюдения элементарных финансовых правил и выданы на рискованные операции с недвижимостью. Это обстоятельство, наряду с глобальным финансовым и сырьевым кризисом, стало ключевым в формировании задолженности на сумму почти в 450 млн долларов США. Причинами этого казуса были как субъективные (некомпетентность советского руководства отделения и криминализация действий со стороны представителей местных банковских структур), так и объективные факторы — отсутствие внятной внешней политики СССР в Юго-Восточной Азии.This article analyses the history of the “Singapore case” of Moscow Narodny Bank (MNB), one of the most prominent Soviet financial cases of the second half of the 1970s. Using documents from the Russian State Archive of the Economy, the author describes the reasons for opening a bank in this south-eastern country, focusing on the phenomenon of the Soviet banking sector abroad in the late 1960s and 1970s. The article shows that while the USSR’s decision to open banks in Western countries was based on economic interests (reducing foreign exchange costs, supporting lending to socialist countries), in the countries of the Global South political circumstances prevailed. Singapore played an important role in promoting Moscow’s diplomatic interests. At the same time, the Soviet Union paid far less attention to economic relations with the island state, although a branch of Moscow Narodny Bank was opened there in 1971. Drawing on documents, the article shows how the Soviet bank became a leading bank in Singapore within a few years, providing a large volume of loans to private companies. At the same time, the article reveals that most loans were granted without observing basic financial rules and for risky real estate transactions. This, together with the global financial and commodity crisis, was a key factor in the creation of a debt of almost US $450 million. The reasons for this incident were both subjective (the incompetence of the Soviet management of the branch and the criminalisation of the actions of representatives of local banking structures) and objective — the lack of a coherent foreign policy of the USSR in Southeast Asia.Статья подготовлена в рамках проекта «“Мировая система социализма” и глобальная холодная война: технополитика, экономика, образы будущего (1970-е — 1980-е гг.)», реализуемого Институтом всеобщей истории РАН при финансовой поддержке Российского научного фонда, проект № 23-18-00621.The article was prepared within the framework of the project ‘ “The World System of Socialism” and the Global Cold War: Technopolitics, Economics, Images of the Future (1970s–1980s)’, implemented by the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences with the financial support of the Russian Science Foundation, project 23-18-00621

Bulk Nanocrystalline Thermoelectrics Based on Bi-Sb-Te Solid Solution

A nanopowder from p-Bi-Sb-Te with particles ~ 10 nm were fabricated by the ball milling using different technological modes. Cold and hot pressing at different conditions and also SPS process were used for consolidation of the powder into a bulk nanostructure and nanocomposites. The main factors allowing slowing-down of the growth of nanograins as a result of recrystallization are the reduction of the temperature and of the duration of the pressing, the increase of the pressure, as well as addition of small value additives (like MoS2, thermally expanded graphite or fullerenes). It was reached the thermoelectric figure of merit ZT=1.22 (at 360 K) in the bulk nanostructure Bi0,4Sb1,6Te3 fabricated by SPS method. Some mechanisms of the improvement of the thermoelectric efficiency in bulk nanocrystalline semiconductors based on BixSb2-xTe3 are studied theoretically. The reduction of nanograin size can lead to improvement of the thermoelectric figure of merit. The theoretical dependence of the electric and heat conductivities and the thermoelectric power as the function of nanograins size in BixSb2-xTe3 bulk nanostructure are quite accurately correlates with the experimental data.Comment: 35 pages, 24 figures, 4 tables, 52 reference

Forms and Practices of Interbudgetary Relations in USSR in 1950s — First Half of 1960s

The forms and practices of interbudgetary relations in the USSR in the 1950s and early 1960s are considered. It is noted that the term interbudgetary relations in its broad interpretation can be used to describe the processes that took place in the budgetary system of the USSR. But, with one amendment: interbudgetary relations in the period under review should be understood as relations between the levels of the unified budgetary system of the Soviet Union, and not relations between equal subjects, as is interpreted in modern scientific literature. Record keeping materials of organizations, institutions and departments involved at different levels in the regulation of interbudgetary relations were used as sources. It is shown that interbudgetary relations took place in several forms: 1) the formation of th regulatory part of the revenues of lower budgets from tax deductions and revenues received by higher budgets; 2) implementation of interbudgetary transfers in the form of grants, subsidies and subventions; 3) implementation of the mechanism for settling budget disagreements. The authors come to the conclusion that each of these forms contributed to the achievement of a balance between the incomes of individual levels of the budget system and the expenditure obligations assigned to them

Economic Reforms in Hungary and Bulgaria and the Reaction to them in the USSR (Late 1950s — First Half of the 1970s)

Поступила в редакцию: 29.07.2021. Принята к печати: 12.10.2021.Submitted: 29.07.2021. Accepted: 12.10.2021.В статье проанализированы экономические реформы в Венгрии и Болгарии в конце 1950-х — начале 1970-х гг., а также реакция СССР на происходившие изменения в этих странах. Источниками для исследования стали документы посольств СССР в Венгерской Народной Республике (ВНР) и Народной Республике Болгария (НРБ), информационные записки советских экономистов, донесения спецслужб и материалы встреч и переговоров на высшем партийном и государственном уровне. Делается вывод, что значительная роль в запуске и сворачивании реформ принадлежала политическим лидерам Венгрии и Болгарии, что, на уровне принятия решений, отличало эти реформы от аналогичных в других странах социалистического лагеря. Авторы показывают, что переход на хозрасчетные отношения в ВНР и НРБ не решил целого ряда экономических проблем, а, напротив, спровоцировал отход от социалистических принципов и усиление рыночных элементов. Это привело к росту объема внешнего долга Венгрии и Болгарии, главным образом капиталистическим странам, что вызвало беспокойство со стороны советского руководства. Кремль, до того проводивший политику отстраненного наблюдения, фактически заставил Т. Живкова и Я. Кадара свернуть экономические реформы. В каждом случае Москва предложила индивидуальные решения: в Болгарии хозяйственная самостоятельность предприятий завершилась после того, как СССР погасил внутренний долг страны, а в Венгрии — после беседы Л. И. Брежнева с Я. Кадаром. Авторы считают, что непосредственным инициатором сворачивания реформ в ВНР и НРБ был узкий круг советских руководителей, которые осознали бесперспективность внедрения рыночных механизмов в социалистическую экономику и запустили в начале 1970-х гг. масштабный пересмотр концепции развития мировой системы социализма.This article analyses economic reforms in Hungary and Bulgaria between the late 1950s and early 1970s, as well as the reaction of official Moscow to the changes in these countries. The main sources for this article were documents of the Soviet embassies in the HPR and the PRB, briefing notes of Soviet economists, reports of special services and materials of meetings and negotiations at the highest party and state level. The authors conclude that a significant role in the launch and curtailment of reforms belonged to the political leaders of Hungary and Bulgaria — Ya. Kadar, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP, and T. Zhivkov, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PRB. Therefore, at the level of decision-making, these reforms differed from similar ones in other countries of the socialist camp. The authors demonstrate that the transition to self-supporting relations in the HPR and PRB did not solve a number of economic problems, but, on the contrary, provoked a departure from socialist principles and the strengthening of market elements. This circumstance led to an increase in the volume of external debt of Hungary and Bulgaria, mainly to capitalist countries, which caused concern on the part of the Soviet leadership. Therefore, the Kremlin, which had previously pursued a policy of detached observation, forced Zhivkov and Kadar to curtail economic reforms. At the same time, Moscow offered individual solutions in each case. In Bulgaria, for example, the economic independence of enterprises ended after the USSR repaid the country’s internal debt, and in Hungary after Brezhnev’s conversation with Kadar. The authors believe that the direct initiator of the curtailment of reforms in the HPR and the PRB was a rather narrow circle of Soviet leaders who realised the futility of introducing market mechanisms into the socialist economy and launched a large-scale revision of the concept of the development of the world system of socialism in the early 1970s.Статья подготовлена при финансовой поддержке РНФ, проект № 17-18-01728-П в рамках проекта «“Мировая система социализма” и глобальная экономика в середине 1950-х — середине 1970-х гг.: эволюция теории и практики экономического и технологического лидерства СССР».The article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian Science Foundation, project 17-18-01728-P within the framework of the project “The World System of Socialism and the Global Economy between the mid-1950s and mid-1970s: Evolution of the Theory and Practice of Economic and Technological Leadership of the USSR”

Study of the process e+e−→ppˉe^+e^-\to p\bar{p} in the c.m. energy range from threshold to 2 GeV with the CMD-3 detector

Using a data sample of 6.8 pb$^{-1}$ collected with the CMD-3 detector at the VEPP-2000 $e^+e^-$ collider we select about 2700 events of the $e^+e^- \to p\bar{p}$ process and measure its cross section at 12 energy ponts with about 6\% systematic uncertainty. From the angular distribution of produced nucleons we obtain the ratio $|G_{E}/G_{M}| = 1.49 \pm 0.23 \pm 0.30$

Measurement of J/ψ→γηcJ/\psi\to\gamma\eta_{\rm c} decay rate and ηc\eta_{\rm c} parameters at KEDR

Using the inclusive photon spectrum based on a data sample collected at the $J/\psi$ peak with the KEDR detector at the VEPP-4M $e^+e^-$ collider, we measured the rate of the radiative decay $J/\psi\to\gamma\eta_{\rm c}$ as well as $\eta_{\rm c}$ mass and width. Taking into account an asymmetric photon lineshape we obtained $\Gamma^0_{\gamma\eta_{\rm c}}=2.98\pm0.18 \phantom{|}^{+0.15}_{-0.33}$ keV, $M_{\eta_{\rm c}} = 2983.5 \pm 1.4 \phantom{|}^{+1.6}_{-3.6}$ MeV/$c^2$, $\Gamma_{\eta_{\rm c}} = 27.2 \pm 3.1 \phantom{|}^{+5.4}_{-2.6}$ MeV.Comment: 6 pages, 3 figure

Measurement of B(J/psi->eta_c gamma) at KEDR

We present a study of the inclusive photon spectrum from 6.3 million J/psi decays collected with the KEDR detector at the VEPP-4M e+e- collider. We measure the branching fraction of the radiative decay J/psi -> eta_c gamma, eta_c width and mass. Taking into account an asymmetric photon line shape we obtain: M(eta_c) = (2978.1 +- 1.4 +- 2.0) MeV/c^2, Gamma(eta_c) = (43.5 +- 5.4 +- 15.8) MeV, B(J/psi->eta_c gamma) = (2.59 +- 0.16 +- 0.31)%$.Comment: 6 pages, 1 figure. To be published in the proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Charm Physics (Charm2010), October 21-24, 2010, IHEP, Beijin

Measurement of J/psi to eta_c gamma at KEDR

We present a study of the inclusive photon spectra from 5.9 million J/psi decays collected with the KEDR detector at the VEPP-4M e+e- collider. We measure the branching fraction of radiative decay J/psi to eta_c gamma, eta_c width and mass. Our preliminary results are: M(eta_c) = 2979.4+-1.5+-1.9 MeV, G(eta_c) = 27.8+-5.1+-3.3 MeV, B(J/psi to eta_c gamma) = (2.34+-0.15+-0.40)%.Comment: To be published in Proceedings of the PhiPsi09, Oct. 13-16, 2009, Beijing, Chin