Lexical acquisition in elementary science classes

The purpose of this study was to further researchers' understanding of lexical acquisition in the beginning primary schoolchild by investigating word learning in small-group elementary science classes. Two experiments were conducted to examine the role of semantic scaffolding (e.g., use of synonymous terms) and physical scaffolding (e.g., pointing to referents) in children's acquisition of novel property terms. Children's lexical knowledge was assessed using multiple tasks (naming, comprehension, and definitional). Children struggled to acquire meanings of adjectives without semantic or physical scaffolding (Experiment 1), but they were successful in acquiring extensive lexical knowledge when offered semantic scaffolding (Experiment 2). Experiment 2 also shows that semantic scaffolding used in combination with physical scaffolding helped children acquire novel adjectives and that children who correctly named pictures of adjectives had acquired definitions

Children's acquisition of science terms: simple exposure is insufficient

The ability of school children (N = 233) to acquire new scientific vocabulary was examined. Children from two age groups (M = 4;8 and M = 6;5) were introduced to previously unknown words in an educational video. Word knowledge was assessed through accuracy and latency for production and comprehension over a nine month period. A draw and write task assessed acquisition of domain knowledge. Word learning was poorer than has previously been reported in the literature, and subject to influences of word type (domain-specificity) and word class. The results indicate that the acquisition of scientific terms is a complex process moderated by lexical, semantic and pragmatic factors

Effects of classification context on categorization in natural categories

The patterns of classification of borderline instances of eight common taxonomic categories were examined under three different instructional conditions to test two predictions: first, that lack of a specified context contributes to vagueness in categorization, and second, that altering the purpose of classification can lead to greater or lesser dependence on similarity in classification. The instructional conditions contrasted purely pragmatic with more technical/quasi-legal contexts as purposes for classification, and these were compared with a no-context control. The measures of category vagueness were between-subjects disagreement and within-subjects consistency, and the measures of similarity based categorization were category breadth and the correlation of instance categorization probability with mean rated typicality, independently measured in a neutral context. Contrary to predictions, none of the measures of vagueness, reliability, category breadth, or correlation with typicality were generally affected by the instructional setting as a function of pragmatic versus technical purposes. Only one subcondition, in which a situational context was implied in addition to a purposive context, produced a significant change in categorization. Further experiments demonstrated that the effect of context was not increased when participants talked their way through the task, and that a technical context did not elicit more all-or-none categorization than did a pragmatic context. These findings place an important boundary condition on the effects of instructional context on conceptual categorization

The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference

In a number of influential papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich have presented a powerful critique of so-called arguments from reference, arguments that assume that a particular theory of reference is correct in order to establish a substantive conclusion. The critique is that, due to cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions supposedly undermining the standard methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption that a theory of reference is correct is unjustified. I argue that the many extant responses to Machery et al.’s critique do little for the proponent of an argument from reference, as they do not show how to justify the problematic assumption. I then argue that it can in principle be justified by an appeal to Carnapian explication. I show how to apply the explication defence to arguments from reference given by Andreasen (for the biological reality of race) and by Churchland (against the existence of beliefs and desires)

Deference and essentialism in the categorization of chemical kinds

Abstract Psychological essentialism has been subject to much debate. Yet a key implication -that people should defer to experts in categorizing natural kinds -has not been widely examined. Three experiments examine deference in the categorization of chemical kinds. The first establishes borderline cases used in the second and third. These latter show limited deference to experts, and some deference to non-experts. These data are consistent with a perspectival framework for concepts in which categorization is sometimes based on micro-structural properties and sometimes on appearance and function