Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually

Distributed Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods

International audienceDistributed mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods are mechanisms lacking central control, in which agents can locally agree on deals to exchange some of the goods in their possession. We study convergence properties for such distributed mechanisms when used as fair division procedures. Specifically, we identify sets of assumptions under which any sequence of deals meeting certain conditions will converge to a proportionally fair allocation and to an envy-free allocation, respectively. We also introduce an extension of the basic framework where agents are vertices of a graph representing a social network that constrains which agents can interact with which other agents, and we prove a similar convergence result for envy-freeness in this context. Finally, when not all assumptions guaranteeing envy-freeness are satisfied, we may want to minimise the degree of envy exhibited by an outcome. To this end, we introduce a generic framework for measuring the degree of envy in a society and establish the computational complexity of checking whether a given scenario allows for a deal that is beneficial to every agent involved and that will reduce overall envy

Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources

Published versio

Reaching Envy-free States in Distributed Negotiation Settings

Mechanisms for dividing a set of goods amongst a number of autonomous agents need to balance ef- ficiency and fairness requirements. A common in- terpretation of fairness is envy-freeness, while ef- ficiency is usually understood as yielding maximal overall utility. We show how to set up a distributed negotiation framework that will allow a group of agents to reach an allocation of goods that is both efficient and envy-free.ou

Rationalisation of Profiles of Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

International audienceDifferent agents may have different points of view. This can be modelled using different abstract argumentation frameworks , each consisting of a set of arguments and a binary attack-relation between them. A question arising in this context is whether the diversity of views observed in such a profile of argumentation frameworks is consistent with the assumption that every individual argumentation framework is induced by a combination of, first, some basic factual attack-relation between the arguments and, second, the personal preferences of the agent concerned. We treat this question of rationalisability of a profile as an algorithmic problem and identify tractable and intractable cases. This is useful for understanding what types of profiles can reasonably be expected to come up in a multiagent system

Algoritmo de identificación de etiquetas en botellas de vino

Los conceptos de visión artificial abarcan simples detecciones de color y forma, hasta complejos algoritmos que detectan e identifican objetos en ambientes adversos. En este trabajo se presentan los resultados concatenar seis algoritmos para detección e identificación de etiquetas de vino en estanterías. Se presentan la especificidad y sensibilidad del algoritimo.Sociedad Argentina de Informática e Investigación Operativa (SADIO