Homicide et enfant à naître : une occasion manquée

The ruling of June 30, 1999 was one of the first significant rulings given by the French Supreme Court with regard to the criminalization of unintentional feticide. The question posed essentially asked whether a physician who committed a fault leading to the death of a fetus could be accused of manslaughter, which is a criminal offense under Article 221-6 of the French Criminal Code? The Court ruled not to describe this as feticide. It upheld this position in several subsequent rulings, considering that the unborn child, even when viable, was not a human being equipped with a legal personality. Early on, the French doctrine displayed shock at the fact that no criminal offense was recognized and, in its majority, it condemned the Supreme Court\u27s position, both on legal arguments and extra-legal arguments. Case law was stable until February 4, 2014, when a criminal court sentenced a motorist for the manslaughter of a six-month old fetus, following its death in utero. On appeal, one year later, the Court ultimately upheld the position of the French Supreme Court

The problem with medical research on tissue and organ samples taken in connection with forensic autopsies in France

Currently, in France, it is legally impossible to conduct scientific research on tissue and organ samples taken from forensic autopsies. In fact, the law schedules the destruction of such samples at the end of the judicial investigation, and the common law rules governing cadaver research cannot be applied to the forensic context. However, nothing seems in itself to stand in the way of such research since, despite their specific nature, these samples from forensic autopsies could be subject, following legislative amendments, to common law relating to medical research on samples taken from deceased persons. But an essential legislative amendment, firstly to allow the Biomedicine Agency to become authorized to issue a research permit and secondly, to change the research conditions in terms of the non-opposition of the deceased to said research. Such an amendment would be a true breakthrough because it would allow teams to continue to move forward calmly in research, and allow this research to be placed within a legal framework, which would promote international exchanges

Le préjudice moral né du défaut d’information du patient

Le défaut d’information du patient sur les risques d’un acte médical pourrait-il être constitutif d’un préjudice moral dit « préjudice d’impréparation » alors qu’aucune perte de chance ne peut être retenue 

L’immunité indemnitaire du médecin salarié ne profite pas à son assureur. À propos de Civ. 1, 12 juillet 2007

Selon un arrêt du 12 juillet 2007 de la Cour de cassation, l’assureur de responsabilité civile de l’établissement de soins, tenu, en sa qualité de commettant, pour responsable du dommage causé par son préposé, peut exercer un recours subrogatoire contre l’assureur du salarié

Faut-il reconnaître l’« aléa chirurgical » ?

Depuis plusieurs années, la jurisprudence considère de manière distincte la faute de technique opératoire. L’obligation d’exactitude du geste opératoire s’est vue renforcée et depuis 1997, il semblait acquis que la faute technique puisse être retenue dès lors que le praticien « porte atteinte à un organe ou à un tissu qu’il n’était pas nécessaire de toucher pour réaliser l’intervention ». Pourtant, dans certaines situations, le dommage n’est pas en rapport avec un manquement aux règles de l’art, mais lié à une complication inhérente à la technique. La Cour de cassation avait toujours refusé l’idée d’un « aléa chirurgical » et reconnu que toute atteinte d’un organe, autre que ceux visés lors de l’intervention, révélait obligatoirement une imprudence du chirurgien. Pourtant, en reconnaissant comme fautif un chirurgien qui a respecté les règles de l’art, le juge risque de s’éloigner des principes de la responsabilité médicale. Des arrêts rendus ces trois dernières années nous amènent à rediscuter l’opportunité de reconnaître l’existence d’un aléa chirurgical

La recherche juridique sur les prélèvements biologiques réalisés dans le cadre des autopsies et objets de scellés judiciaires. Nécessité d'une adaptation législative

Currently, it is legally impossible to conduct scientific research on tissue and organ samples taken from forensic autopsies. In fact, the law schedules the destruction of such samples at the end of the judicial investigation, and the common law rules governing cadaver research cannot be applied to the forensic context. However, nothing seems in itself to stand in the way of such research since, despite their specific nature, these samples from forensic autopsies could be subject, following legislative amendments, to common law relating to medical research on samples taken from deceased persons. But an essential legislative amendment will have the goal firstly to allow the Biomedicine Agency to become authorized to issue a research permit and secondly, to change the research conditions in terms of the non-opposition of the deceased to the said research. Such an amendment would be a true breakthrough because it would allow teams to continue to move forward calmly in research, and allow this research to be placed within a legal framework, which would promote international exchanges