Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation

Nuclear relations in South Asia

The strategic landscape of South Asia changed dramatically in 1998. With the reciprocal testing of nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan emerged from the world of threshold status to an overt posture which has yet to be fully defined. Each claims the status of a nuclear weapon state, yet the contours of that status are unclear. A number of important strategic issues have been raised by these dramatic events. This paper will attempt to examine the implications of this new posture for each country and for the region. First and foremost, the decisions to test nuclear weapons are a product of each individual state making a sovereign decision about its national security needs. Both have made clear for a number of years that their attitudes toward nuclear weapons-and by default, toward nuclear nonproliferation-will not be directed by outsiders. They have rejected the global norms that oppose the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, embodied in the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and that embrace the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, captured in Article VI of that treaty. The decisions reached in New Delhi and lslamabad have been questioned by many, but the tests cannot be undone and it now falls on both countries to make further decisions about what strategies will best serve them, and what obligations they must now assume. Issues such as strategic planning, weaponization, deployment, and command and control, which heretofore were relegated to the back burner, may no longer be deferred

Escalation of interstate crises of conflictual dyads: Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan

This article examines the causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among two conflictual dyads, namely Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan. It draws from the International Crisis Behaviour dataset to present a new sub-dataset of 12 interstate crises involving the two dyads in the period 1987 to 2002. While crisis behaviour in Greece–Turkey has frequently been analysed within the context of two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian–Pakistani crises have been studied within the perspective of nuclear proliferation. To examine the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. Using Ragin’s (2000) comparative qualitative analysis, it demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary theory explain crisis escalation, although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of error. Moreover, the article demonstrates that Greek–Turkish crises have generally escalated to relatively low levels of conflict (threat of war or show of force), while Indian–Pakistani crises have spiralled to higher levels of confrontation (use of force). In both dyads, nuclear weapons and regional organizations have shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The EU and NATO have contributed to mitigating crisis escalation and the use of force between the Aegean neighbours, while unintentionally encouraging low intensity confrontations; meanwhile, in South Asia, nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic regimes have exacerbated crises, particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare

Escalation of interstate crises of conflictual dyads: Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan

This article examines the causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among two conflictual dyads, namely Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan. It draws from the International Crisis Behaviour dataset to present a new sub-dataset of 12 interstate crises involving the two dyads in the period 1987 to 2002. While crisis behaviour in Greece–Turkey has frequently been analysed within the context of two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian–Pakistani crises have been studied within the perspective of nuclear proliferation. To examine the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. Using Ragin’s (2000) comparative qualitative analysis, it demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary theory explain crisis escalation, although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of error. Moreover, the article demonstrates that Greek–Turkish crises have generally escalated to relatively low levels of conflict (threat of war or show of force), while Indian–Pakistani crises have spiralled to higher levels of confrontation (use of force). In both dyads, nuclear weapons and regional organizations have shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The EU and NATO have contributed to mitigating crisis escalation and the use of force between the Aegean neighbours, while unintentionally encouraging low intensity confrontations; meanwhile, in South Asia, nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic regimes have exacerbated crises, particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare