Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design

In the classical experimental design setting, an experimenter E has access to a population of $n$ potential experiment subjects $i\in \{1,...,n\}$, each associated with a vector of features $x_i\in R^d$. Conducting an experiment with subject $i$ reveals an unknown value $y_i\in R$ to E. E typically assumes some hypothetical relationship between $x_i$'s and $y_i$'s, e.g., $y_i \approx \beta x_i$, and estimates $\beta$ from experiments, e.g., through linear regression. As a proxy for various practical constraints, E may select only a subset of subjects on which to conduct the experiment. We initiate the study of budgeted mechanisms for experimental design. In this setting, E has a budget $B$. Each subject $i$ declares an associated cost $c_i >0$ to be part of the experiment, and must be paid at least her cost. In particular, the Experimental Design Problem (EDP) is to find a set $S$ of subjects for the experiment that maximizes V(S) = \log\det(I_d+\sum_{i\in S}x_i\T{x_i}) under the constraint $\sum_{i\in S}c_i\leq B$; our objective function corresponds to the information gain in parameter $\beta$ that is learned through linear regression methods, and is related to the so-called $D$-optimality criterion. Further, the subjects are strategic and may lie about their costs. We present a deterministic, polynomial time, budget feasible mechanism scheme, that is approximately truthful and yields a constant factor approximation to EDP. In particular, for any small $\delta > 0$ and $\epsilon > 0$, we can construct a (12.98, $\epsilon$)-approximate mechanism that is $\delta$-truthful and runs in polynomial time in both $n$ and $\log\log\frac{B}{\epsilon\delta}$. We also establish that no truthful, budget-feasible algorithms is possible within a factor 2 approximation, and show how to generalize our approach to a wide class of learning problems, beyond linear regression

Quantum Games and Quantum Strategies

We investigate the quantization of non-zero sum games. For the particular case of the Prisoners' Dilemma we show that this game ceases to pose a dilemma if quantum strategies are allowed for. We also construct a particular quantum strategy which always gives reward if played against any classical strategy.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, typographic sign error in the definition of the operator J correcte

Quantum Games

In these lecture notes we investigate the implications of the identification of strategies with quantum operations in game theory beyond the results presented in [J. Eisert, M. Wilkens, and M. Lewenstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. After introducing a general framework, we study quantum games with a classical analogue in order to flesh out the peculiarities of game theoretical settings in the quantum domain. Special emphasis is given to a detailed investigation of different sets of quantum strategies.Comment: 13 pages (LaTeX), 3 figure

The basic approval voting game

We survey results about Approval Voting obtained within the standard framework of game theory. Restricting the set of strategies to undominated and sincere ballots does not help to predict Approval Voting outcomes, which is also the case under strategic equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium and its usual refinements. Strong Nash equilibrium in general does not exist but predicts the election of a Condorcet winner when one exists

Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems

It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments') that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project problem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy with the property that a maximal social welfare is generated when each player follows it. Finally, we show that these strategies can be achieved by an implementation in Nash equilibrium.Comment: 19 pages. The version without the appendix will appear in the Proc. 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 200

On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives

We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to maximize his valuation function, without exceeding a given budget. As the resources are owned by strategic agents however, our overall goal is to design mechanisms that are truthful, budget-feasible, and obtain a good approximation to the optimal value. Budget-feasibility creates additional challenges, making several approaches inapplicable in this setting. Previous results on budget-feasible mechanisms have considered mostly monotone valuation functions. In this work, we mainly focus on symmetric submodular valuations, a prominent class of non-monotone submodular functions that includes cut functions. We begin first with a purely algorithmic result, obtaining a $\frac{2e}{e-1}$-approximation for maximizing symmetric submodular functions under a budget constraint. We view this as a standalone result of independent interest, as it is the best known factor achieved by a deterministic algorithm. We then proceed to propose truthful, budget feasible mechanisms (both deterministic and randomized), paying particular attention on the Budgeted Max Cut problem. Our results significantly improve the known approximation ratios for these objectives, while establishing polynomial running time for cases where only exponential mechanisms were known. At the heart of our approach lies an appropriate combination of local search algorithms with results for monotone submodular valuations, applied to the derived local optima.Comment: A conference version appears in WINE 201

The Ambivalence of Promising Technology

Issues of responsibility in the world of nanotechnology are becoming explicit with the emergence of a discourse on ‘responsible development’ of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. Much of this discourse centres on the ambivalences of nanotechnology and of promising technology in general. Actors must find means of dealing with these ambivalences. Actors’ actions and responses to ambivalence are shaped by their position and context, along with strategic games they are involved in, together with other actors. A number of interviews were conducted with industrial actors with the aim of uncovering their ethical stances towards responsible development of nanotechnology. The data shows that standard repertoires of justification of nanotechnological development were used. Thus, the industrial actors fell back on their position and associated responsibilities. Such responses reinforce a division of moral labour in which industrial actors and scientists can focus on the progress of science and technology, while other actors, such as NGOs, are expected to take care of broader considerations, such as ethical and social issues

Charge Transport in the Dense Two-Dimensional Coulomb Gas

The dynamics of a globally neutral system of diffusing Coulomb charges in two dimensions, driven by an applied electric field, is studied in a wide temperature range around the Berezinskii-Kosterlitz-Thouless transition. I argue that the commonly accepted ``free particle drift'' mechanism of charge transport in this system is limited to relatively low particle densities. For higher densities, I propose a modified picture involving collective ``partner transfer'' between bound pairs. The new picture provides a natural explanation for recent experimental and numerical findings which deviate from standard theory. It also clarifies the origin of dynamical scaling in this context.Comment: 4 pages, RevTeX, 2 eps figures included; some typos corrected, final version to be published in Phys. Rev. Let