Nuclear weapons and national security : far-reaching influence and deterrence dominance

This study advances four propositions on the role of nuclear weapons in national security in the twenty-first century strategic environment. First, the primary role of nuclear weapons now and in the foreseeable future is basic or central deterrence. Nuclear weapons also prevent blackmail, preserve strategic autonomy (freedom to act), and provide insurance to cope with unanticipated developments in a changing strategic environment. Second, although deterrence continues to be the dominant role and strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons, the conception and practice of deterrence is different from the mutual assured destruction condition that characterized the Soviet-American nuclear confrontation during the Cold War and varies across countries. Deterrence in the contemporary era is largely asymmetric in nature with weaker powers relying on nuclear weapons to deter stronger adversaries. Third, the absence of severe confrontations and the limited capabilities of the relatively small Asian nuclear arsenals have resulted in general deterrence postures. The United States seeks capabilities to deal with a wide array of threats, but it does not confront an immediate conflict or crisis situation that warrants actor-specific threats that could result in nuclear retaliation. Finally, extended nuclear deterrence continues to be important to the national security of U.S. allied states in East Asia. China and certainly India and Pakistan do not have the capability or the strategic imperative to provide strategic protection to an ally against a threat from another nuclear power. Russia has the capability and plans to extend the deterrence function of its nuclear arsenal to protect Byelorussia and Armenia

Asia's security environment : from subordinate to region dominant system

To provide the context for investigating the roles of nuclear weapons and their implications for regional security and stability, this chapter maps Asia's present security environment and likely changes in that environment. It advances four propositions. First, contemporary Asia's security environment is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War period when Asia was a subordinate security region penetrated and dominated by the ideological and strategic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, Asia has become a core world region with distinctive economic, normative, and institutional features. The dynamics of security in Asia are increasingly shaped by the interaction of interests and priorities of states in the Asian security region. Conflict formation, management, and resolution are grounded largely in regional and local dynamics. Extraregional actors are involved but their salience derives from their interaction with Asian state and nonstate actors on issues of mutual concern. Second, Asia's security environment is likely to substantially alter over the next two to three decades. Escalation or resolution of regional conflicts (Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir) and regime change in countries like China, Indonesia, and Pakistan could bring about interaction change at a subregional level. They may also trigger broader changes. More fundamental system-level consequences, however, are likely to result from two ongoing trends. One is the rise of Asian powers, their quests for power, status, and wealth, and differing visions of regional order set in a context of the continuing desire of the United States to remain the preeminent power in Asia. The sustained rise of Asian powers is likely to result in gradual structure change and make relative gain considerations and strategic competition more significant. China's rise would pose the most significant challenge to the U.S.-dominated security order in Asia making Sino-American relations the primary security dynamic with regionwide security implications. The continuing dynamism of Asian economies and their increasing integration into regional and global economies is another important driver of change. It creates a dynamic that reinforces as well as counteracts strategic competition. As their economic power increases, Asian countries would be able to devote greater resources to build military capabilities and other capacities to pursue competing foreign policy objectives. This could intensify strategic competition. Growing economic integration and interdependence could, on the other hand, temper competition and modify adversarial relationships by creating alternative lines of interaction and vested interest in peace and stability. The Asian strategic situation is more akin to that of complex interdependence characterized by cooperation, competition, and conflict. Third, the chapter posits that although it will not be free of tension and will be characterized by a significant degree of uncertainty and hedging, the gradual transition from a U.S.-centered system to an informal balance-of-power system is likely to be relatively peaceful. The primary attention of Asian states in the next decade or more would be internally directed toward economic growth, modernization, state and nation building, and addressing domestic challenges. Maintaining a stable international environment that is conducive to the pursuit of these national goals and preventing international interference in their domestic affairs will be a primary foreign policy objective and determinant of security order. Finally, the chapter argues that military force will remain an important instrument of policy in the interaction of major powers, but largely in defense, deterrence, and assurance roles, not in aggression. States will seek to avoid strategic confrontation and full-scale war but at the same time hedge against uncertainty and unanticipated developments. In strategic matters, the behavior of major powers will approximate more closely to defensive realism than offensive realism

Introduction : investigating nuclear weapons in a New Era

Leaders and governments in nuclear weapon states, their allies, and aspirants to the nuclear club believe that their nuclear forces or those of their allies can advance national security by providing a capability to counter specific threats; to achieve certain policy priorities; to demonstrate national power; to preserve freedom of action; or as insurance against uncertainty and risks in a changing international environment. Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and strategic defense have entered or reentered the security thinking of the old, new, and prospective nuclear weapon states and their allies in a fundamentally different strategic environment and in a nuclear era that is substantially different from that of the Cold War. This study investigates the purposes and roles of nuclear weapons in the new security environment, the nature and content of the national nuclear strategies of relevant states, and their implications for international security and stability in the new era with the focus on the Asian security region. The latter is now a core world region and could become the geopolitical center of the world in the twenty-first century

Exploring roles, strategies, and implications : historical and conceptual perspectives

This chapter outlines the transforming logic of nuclear weapons and explores at a conceptual level the roles of nuclear weapons, the strategies for their employment, and their implications for international security to provide a historical and conceptual perspective for the investigation of these issues in the country and concluding chapters that follow

Reinforcing national security and regional stability : the implications of nuclear weapons and strategies

The study advances four other propositions on the implications of nuclear weapons and strategies for security and stability in the Asian security region and for the global nuclear order. First, it argues that nuclear weapons have a modifying effect, but they do not fundamentally alter system structure (distribution of power) or the patterns of amity and enmity. By strengthening weaker powers, nuclear weapons have helped offset imbalances in conventional and nuclear capabilities and mitigated the negative consequences of those imbalances. Second, the impact of nuclear weapons on alliance formation and sustenance is mixed. In the abstract, nuclear weapons should enhance internal balancing and reduce the need for external balancing; this should reduce the significance of alliances. Third, on conflict resolution, the study posits that the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons argues against dispute resolution through the physical use of violence. At the same time, nuclear weapons are not a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution. Finally, the study posits that if it is to continue to be relevant, the nuclear order that emerged during the Cold War must substantially alter to accommodate contemporary strategic realities, including a focus on Asia, which has become a core world region and in which strategic competition is likely to intensify. A "new" nuclear order that is likely to emerge gradually would have to address at least four challenges: (1) sustaining deterrence in a condition of asymmetry and small nuclear forces, (2) accommodating "new" nuclear weapon states, (3) preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and to nonstate actors, and (4) facilitating the safe and secure development of nuclear energy to meet the growing demand for this clean fuel

Community building : ASEAN's millstone?

ASEAN is unlikely to become a single community any time soon. ASEAN integration and community building should remain long-term aspirations for decades to come