Using Human Rights Law to Inform States' Decisions to Deploy AI

States are investing heavily in artificial intelligence (AI) technology, and are actively incorporating AI tools across the full spectrum of their decision-making processes. However, AI tools are currently deployed without a full understanding of their impact on individuals or society, and in the absence of effective domestic or international regulatory frameworks. Although this haste to deploy is understandable given AI's significant potential, it is unsatisfactory. The inappropriate deployment of AI technologies risks litigation, public backlash, and harm to human rights. In turn, this is likely to delay or frustrate beneficial AI deployments. This essay suggests that human rights law offers a solution. It provides an organizing framework that states should draw on to guide their decisions to deploy AI (or not), and can facilitate the clear and transparent justification of those decisions

Open Source Information’s Blind Spot

Digital open source information has been heralded for its democratizing potential, insofar as it allows access to a much broader range of sources and voices than would normally be consulted through traditional methods of information gathering for international criminal investigations. It also helps to overcome some of the physical access barriers that are commonplace in international criminal investigations. At a time when the use of digital open source information is becoming more widespread, this article warns of the cognitive and technical biases that can impact upon two key stages of an investigation: finding relevant information and analysing that information. At the information-gathering stage, there are particular crimes, regions, and groups of people whose experiences are more likely to be overlooked or hidden in digital open source investigations. When it comes to analysing digital open source information, there is a danger that cognitive and technical biases may influence which information is deemed most relevant and useful to an international criminal investigation, and how that information is interpreted. This article proposes some steps that can be taken to mitigate these risks

Machine learning, artificial intelligence, and the use of force by states

Machine learning algorithms have begun to play a critical role in modern society. Governments inevitably will employ machine learning to inform their decisions about whether and how to resort to force internationally. This essay identifies scenarios in which states likely will employ machine learning algorithms to guide their decisions about using force, analyzes legal challenges that will arise from the use of force-related algorithms, and recommends prophylactic measures for states as they begin to employ these tools

International human rights law as a framework for algorithmic accountability

Existing approaches to ‘algorithmic accountability’, such as transparency, provide an important baseline, but are insufficient to address the (potential) harm to human rights caused by the use of algorithms in decision-making. In order to effectively address the impact on human rights, we argue that a framework that sets out a shared understanding and means of assessing harm; is capable of dealing with multiple actors and different forms of responsibility; and applies across the full algorithmic lifecycle, from conception to deployment, is needed. While generally overlooked in debates on algorithmic accountability, in this article, we suggest that international human rights law already provides this framework. We apply this framework to illustrate the effect it has on the choices to employ algorithms in decision-making in the first place and the safeguards required. While our analysis indicates that in some circumstances, the use of algorithms may be restricted, we argue that these findings are not ‘anti-innovation’ but rather appropriate checks and balances to ensure that algorithms contribute to society, while safeguarding against risks

Mapping the Use of Open Source Research in UN Human Rights Investigations

Open source information, particularly digital open source information that is publicly available on the internet, plays an increasingly central role in the landscape of human rights investigations. This article provides a thorough analysis of how open source information is used in practice by UN human rights fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry and other official human rights investigations. Combining data from semi-structured interviews carried out with investigators with specific experience in open source human rights investigations with a review of reports and other primary and secondary sources, it examines the utility of open source information to UN human rights investigative bodies. It posits that open source research can offer tremendous benefits in planning investigations, supplying lead evidence, and providing direct evidence of violations, thereby overcoming some of the access barriers that investigators face, and potentially giving voice to a wider range of perspectives. On the other hand, this article argues that open source investigations should be approached with a clear eye to their challenges and possible pitfalls. These include the gaps of open source information and the potential to silence already-marginalized communities through open source investigations, as well as the resource-intensive nature of these investigations, the danger that open source information can affect witnesses’ perceptions, and the risks posed by online disinformation. As open source research is likely to comprise an important component of the human rights investigator’s toolbox in the future, this article argues in favour of the institutional buy-in, resourcing, and methodological rigour that it deserves

Non-State Armed Groups, Detention Authority in Non-International Armed Conflict, and the Coherence of International Law: Searching for a Way Forward

International humanitarian law establishes explicit safeguards applicable to detention occurring in non-international armed conflict. However, debate exists as to whether these treaty provisions establish an implicit legal basis for detention. This article approaches this debate in light of the application of international humanitarian law to non-State armed groups. It examines the principal arguments against implicit detention authority and then applies the law of treaty interpretation to international humanitarian law’s detention-related provisions. On the basis of current understandings of international law – and the prohibition of arbitrary detention in particular – it is concluded that international humanitarian law must be interpreted as establishing implicit detention authority, in order to ensure the continued regulation of armed groups. Although perhaps problematic from certain States’ perspective this conclusion is reflective of the current state of international law. However, this is not necessarily the end of the story. A number of potential ‘ways forward’ are identified: implicit detention authority may be (a) rejected, (b) accepted, or (c) re-examined in light of the non-State status of armed groups, and what this means for the content of the prohibition of arbitrary detention. These scenarios are examined in light of the desire to ensure: the coherency of international law including recognition of the role of armed groups, the continued effectiveness of international humanitarian law, and State sovereignty. An emphasis is placed on understanding the non-State status of armed groups and what this means for international regulation and the content of imposed obligations

Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups

This book is concerned with the international regulation of non-state armed groups. Specifically, it examines the possibility of subjecting armed groups to international human rights law obligations. First addressed is the means by which armed groups may be bound by international law. Of particular interest is the de facto control theory and the possibility that international law may be applied in the absence of direct treaty regulation. Application of this theory is dependent upon an armed group's establishment of an independent existence, as demonstrated by the displacement of state authority. This means that armed groups are treated as a vertical authority, thereby maintaining the established hierarchy of international regulation. At issue therefore is not a radical approach to the regulation of non-state actors, but rather a modification of the traditional means of application in response to the reality of the situation. The attribution of international human rights law obligations to armed groups is then addressed in light of potential ratione personae restrictions. International human rights law treaties are interpreted in light of the contemporary international context, on the basis that an international instrument has to be applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation. Armed groups' status as vertical authorities facilitates the vertical application of international human rights law in a manner consistent with both the object and purpose of the law and its foundation in human dignity. Finally, if international human rights law is to be applied to armed groups, its application must be effective in practice. A context-dependent division of responsibility between the territorial state and the armed group is proposed. The respect, protect, fulfil framework is adapted to facilitate the application of human rights obligations in a manner consistent with the control exerted by both the state and the armed group. - See more at: http://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/human-rights-obligations-of-non-state-armed-groups-9781509901630/#sthash.TxdNfTUu.dpu