A wind-shift waiting to happen: the haze problem in Southeast Asia

By Malcolm H. Murfett, Associate Professor in the Department of History, National University of Singapore (NUS) and Associate of the Cold War Studies Programme, LSE IDEAS

Anglo-American relations in the period of the Chamberlain premiership May 1937 -May 1940: the relationship between naval strategy and foreign policy

This thesis traces the development of Anglo-American naval relations throughout the Chamberlain premiership and the various attempts that were made during this period to extend and broaden the existing level of cooperation in the hope that it might be used for politico-strategic purposes. It deals in some depth with the background to and course of Eden's various initiatives to the Roosevelt Administration in the six months following the July 7th incident of 1937 and explains why his attempts to construct some form of naval partnership with the United States evoked such opposition from within the ranks of the British Government. In this connection, Chamberlain's rather ambivalent role in Anglo-American relations and the contrast between Eden and himself in their use of different methods, style and policy is closely examined in the first half of the thesis. After Eden's resignation and until appeasement became discredited, Anglo-American naval cooperation continued to be a mainly technical rather than strategic nature. In the last few months of peace, however, the British again looked to the Americans for strategic assistance and tried unsuccessfully to encourage them to deploy their fleet in the Western Pacific in order to counter the threat of the Japanese in the Far East. The thesis goes on to explore the changing naval relationship between Britain and the United States after the outbreak of the Second World War and how it led to greater involvement between them on detailed day-to-day technical matters related to the war in Europe.Although predominantly a study in the formation of British policy, the thesis has also drawn extensively on the official American records in an attempt to establish that a close link existed between naval strategy and foreign policy in Anglo-American relations during this period.</p

Anglo-American relations in the period of the Chamberlain premiership May 1937 -May 1940: the relationship between naval strategy and foreign policy

This thesis traces the development of Anglo-American naval relations throughout the Chamberlain premiership and the various attempts that were made during this period to extend and broaden the existing level of cooperation in the hope that it might be used for politico-strategic purposes. It deals in some depth with the background to and course of Eden's various initiatives to the Roosevelt Administration in the six months following the July 7th incident of 1937 and explains why his attempts to construct some form of naval partnership with the United States evoked such opposition from within the ranks of the British Government. In this connection, Chamberlain's rather ambivalent role in Anglo-American relations and the contrast between Eden and himself in their use of different methods, style and policy is closely examined in the first half of the thesis. After Eden's resignation and until appeasement became discredited, Anglo-American naval cooperation continued to be a mainly technical rather than strategic nature. In the last few months of peace, however, the British again looked to the Americans for strategic assistance and tried unsuccessfully to encourage them to deploy their fleet in the Western Pacific in order to counter the threat of the Japanese in the Far East. The thesis goes on to explore the changing naval relationship between Britain and the United States after the outbreak of the Second World War and how it led to greater involvement between them on detailed day-to-day technical matters related to the war in Europe.Although predominantly a study in the formation of British policy, the thesis has also drawn extensively on the official American records in an attempt to establish that a close link existed between naval strategy and foreign policy in Anglo-American relations during this period.</p

Limiting arms, enforcing limits: International inspections and the challenges of compellance in Germany post-1919, Iraq post-1991

This article compares efforts to curb German military power after 1919 with attempts to limit that of Iraq after 1991. It argues that incomplete defeat in each case, compounded by disputes among the victors (exploited by the Germans and Iraqis) undermined a long-term maintenance of each settlement.UNSCOM’s problems in Iraq in the 1990s replicated much of what had hamstrung the IMCC in Germany in the 1920s. Crucial was the lack of autonomous intelligence and verification capabilities, enabling the targeted regimes to defy inspections, whilst challenging the impartiality and legitimacy of the enforcers. Facing devious and unrepentant adversaries, both inspection regimes survived barely seven years. In both cases a second war would ensue against the non-compliers – Germany in 1939, Iraq in 2003