Hemşirelik Öğrencilerinin Aile İçi Şiddete Maruz Kalma Durumları ve Şiddete Bakış Açıları

Aim The study was performed in order to evaluate the domestic violence that the nursing students exposed and their perspectives on violence. Materials and Methods The sample was consisted of 229 students who were selected by simple random sampling method. Percentage, Pearson's chi-square and Fisher's exact tests were used in order to perform statistical analysis by the SPSS 17.0. Results 26.6% of students were exposed to domestic violence, 34.4% of these students were exposed to psychological violence, 26.2% of them were exposed to physical violence, 39.3% of them were exposed to both psychological and physical violence. Among the students who were exposed to domestic violence, the violence application rate was significantly high (p<0.01). Conclusion Our results has showed, predisposition to violent tendencies of the individuals who are personally exposed to domestic violence or any member of their family is exposed to domestic violence increase in a way that cannot be overlooked.Amaç Araştırma Sağlık Yüksekokulu öğrencilerinin aile içi şiddete maruz kalma durumları ve şiddete bakış açılarını değerlendirmek amacıyla gerçekleştirildi. Materyal ve Metod Örneklemi; Basit rastgele örnekleme yöntemiyle belirlenen 229 öğrenci oluşturdu. İstatistiksel analizler için SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) for Windows 17.0 programında yüzdelik, Pearson Ki-Kare testi ve Fisher exact test kullanıldı. Bulgular Araştırmaya katılan öğrencilerden 61 (% 26,6)’inin aile içi şiddete maruz kaldığı, aile içi şiddete maruz kalan öğrencilerden 21'inin (% 34,4) psikolojik, 16'sının (% 26,2) fiziksel, 24'ünün (% 39,3) hem psikolojik hem de fiziksel şiddete maruz kaldığı saptandı. Şiddete maruz kalan öğrencilerde şiddet uygulama oranı anlamlı olarak yüksek bulundu (p<0,01). Sonuç Bulgularımızda da görüldüğü gibi, kendisi ve ailesinden herhangi birinin şiddete maruz kalmasının, bireylerde şiddet eylemine yatkınlığı arttırdığı göz ardı edilemez bir gerçektir

Epistemological naturalism, skeptical threat and the question of normativity in post-apocalyptic times

My aim in this paper is to critically deal with two issues confronting naturalist philosophers who want to steer a middle course between radical naturalism and total apriorism in epistemology. These issues are (1) the role of a priori in ordinary human knowledge, and (2) who succeeds and who fails in properly dealing with the skeptical challenge. I focus on the views of P. Kitcher and L. BonJour with an aim to display the strengths and weaknesses of the naturalist perspective. My conclusion is that there are prospects for a viable synthesis between a naturalist approach and old-fashioned normativity in epistemology. Moreover, it seems that neither camp is in an inherently advantageous position with regard to skeptical worries or challenges

THE FOUNDATIONALISM-COHERENTISM DEBATE IN LIGHT OF THE POST-WITTGENSTEINIAN ONTOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT

The perennial problem of the exact nature of epistemic justification has recently become even more interesting upon Laurence Bon Jour's openly converting himself to foundationalism following a long and successful career built mainly around a strong defense of coherentism cum internalism. Even though the famous debate between foundationalism and coherentism is often associated with the "technical" issues of epistemic regress, basic beliefs, and so on, in this paper I will approach the debate from the standpoint of the post-Wittgensteinian literature and try to provide some useful insights about the justification of those beliefs alleged by the foundationalist to constitute our ultimate touch with reality. More specifically, I will offer a neo-Kantian interpretation of the subvenient basis of supervenience relations believed to take place between the world and our basic cognitive states, and claim that such an approach has a better chance of combining the strengths of the traditional rivals in epistemology and coming up with a viable synthesis on this matter

Propositional knowledge and the enigma of realism

This article deals with the philosophical problem of how to conceive reality. The dif culty consists in nding a middle way between the claim that reality is unconceptualised reality and the claim that there is no difference between what is real and what we experience as real. In this regard, the pragmatic tradition in philosophy promises to provide us with some fruitful ideas for steering a path between the two. The author applies some of these ideas in developing a pragmatic realist philosophy of religion which is not reductionist and therefore acceptable for religious as well as non-religious philosophers of religion. First, he gives a very short summary of pragmatism as background to his proposal. Second, in contrast to the notion of realism in the pragmatic tradition he sketches the presuppositions of what is labelled religious or theological realism in present analytic philosophy of religion. Third, he distinguishes between ontological commitments that are metaphysical in character and ontological commitments that are not, drawing on Rudolf Carnap's idea of the difference between internal and external questions of existence. Fourth, he presents Hilary Putnam's criticism of a metaphysically realist conception of existence and fth, Putnam's defence of what he calls internal realism. Sixth, he puts forward a pragmatic idea of the difference between observational experiences and existential ones in our lives. Finally, he applies this pragmatic philosophy of religion to the question of whether it is reasonable to claim that belief in God presupposes God's existence

Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to be Learned from Suspicious Externalism

A significant and interesting part of the post-Gettier literature regarding the analysis of propositional knowledge is the attempt to supplement the traditional tripartite analysis by employing a fourth condition regarding the defeasibility of evidence and thus to preclude the counterexamples displayed in Gettier's original article. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the sort of externalism that accompanies the most promising of the proposed fourth conditions, due to Pollock, in order to offer some fresh insights on this old epistemological issue. I argue that Pollock's paradigmatic treatment of the matter gives rise to a critical problem with regard to the exact role of the fourth condition and its relation with the onto-semantic or alethic condition of propositional knowledge, to wit, truth. In the light of this discussion, I draw certain conclusions about epistemic externalism and point out some of its theoretical shortcomings

THE CONTROVERSY OVER RES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE MYSTERIES OF ONTOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY

Clarification of the terms 'realism' and 'antirealism' has always been a challenging task for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and metaphysicians. The first part of my paper offers a certain classification and critical exposition of realisms in philosophy of science. Next, I take up the issue of finding a middle or natural ground between realism and antirealism. Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude is generally considered as a highly interesting and promising attempt at combining the strengths of the two sides of the debate in philosophy of science while avoiding their excessive "philosophical" claims. I argue that while reconciliatory approaches are definitely welcome in this matter, Fine's project fails because of its inability to properly handle and carry certain significant and perhaps even indispensable features of realism and antirealism into the new position. Another indication of NOA's failure is Fine's notable misrepresentation of the main theses of the two camps that he strives to bring together. The resultant picture of NOA leaves a great deal to be desired because of Fine's Procrustean treatment and the inadequate ontological account emerging out of it

Hakikatin Savuşturulması, Ötelenmesi ve Geri Dönüşü Üzerine

Hakikatin veya doğruluğun artık geride bırakıldığının sıkça ve heyecanla ifade edildiği günümüzde, bu ontolojik ve toplumsal görüngünün farklı yönlerinin felsefi açıdan etraflıca irdelenmesinin önemi açıktır. Bu yazımda öncelikle post-truth deyiminin ilham kaynağı olan Amerikan başkanlığına ilişkin güncel bir tablo çizeceğim. İkinci olarak, felsefede hakiki olan – olmayan ayrımı bağlamında üçlü bir betimleme önereceğim. Bunu izleyen bölümde, konunun serimlemesi kapsamında “hakikat”, “doğruluk” ve “gerçeklik” kavramlarına dair açıklamalar getirip, özellikle Doğruluk Konusunda Gerçekçilik görüşünün bir değerlendirmesini sunacağım. Ardından, temel doğruluk kuramlarından söz ederek bunların gerçekçilik ile ilişkisini kısaca tartışacağım. Son olarak, “gerçekçilik-karşıtı” olarak nitelediğim çağdaş pragmacı bir görüşü ele alarak, bu perspektifin Orwell’in Bin Dokuz Yüz Seksen Dört kitabında sergilenen distopik-totaliter senaryo bağlamında takındığı tavrı eleştirel olarak irdeleyeceğim. Temel tezim, hakikatin veya doğruluğun geride bırakılmasını onaylayan gerçekçilik-karşıtı görüşlerin onto-politik olarak önemli bir çıkmazla yüzleştikleridir