Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section by Design

Of the various selection methods that contribute to the underrepresentation of members of racial and ethnic minority groups on juries, peremptory challenges have attracted the most attention in recent years. Yet gains in diversity from regulating, or even eliminating, peremptory challenges are necessarily limited by the composition of the venire from which jurors are chosen. This article describes methods of constructing lists of veniremembers and qualified jurors used by some courts to restore the racial and ethnic diversity that is missing from the primary source lists or is eroded in the process of summoning and qualification. It also evaluates potential legal challenges to these techniques

Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform

A field experiment tested the effect of an Arizona civil jury reform that allows jurors to discuss evidence among themselves during the trial. Judges, jurors, attorneys, and litigants completed questionnaires in trials randomly assigned to either a Trial Discussions condition, in which jurors were permitted to discuss the evidence during trial, or a No Discussions condition, in which jurors were prohibited from discussing evidence during trial according to traditional admonitions. Judicial agreement with jury verdicts did not differ between conditions. Permitting jurors to discuss the evidence did affect the degree of certainty that jurors reported about their preferences at the start of jury deliberations, the level of conflict on the jury, and the likelihood of reaching unanimity

Speaking Rights : Evaluating Juror Discussions During Civil Trials

Permitting jurors to discuss evidence during civil trials may facilitate understanding and provide an outlet for their thoughts and questions, and does not appear to lead to prejudgment or prejudice

How Much Justice Hangs in the Balance? A New Look at Hung Jury Rates

Reports of apparent increases in the number of hung juries in some jurisdictions have caused concern among policy makers. A 1995 report by the California District Attorneys Association cited hung jury rates in 1994 that exceeded 15 percent in some jurisdictions (the rates varied from 3 to 23 percent across the nine counties for which data were available). In 1996, the District of Columbia Superior Court reported a higher-than-expected hung jury rate of 11 percent. Why juries hang at these rates isn\u27t clear, but some commentators have claimed that hung juries are the product of eccentric or nullifying holdout jurors and that reforms are in order. Most commentary focuses rather narrowly on the supposed failings of individual jury members. Jury deadlock is blamed on jurors\u27 inability to comprehend the evidence and the law, on their unwillingness to follow the law, and on their illegitimate refusal to reach a verdict. Policy makers have responded to the reports of a hung jury problem with proposals to implement such procedures as non-unanimous verdicts, disqualification of nullifying jurors, and a host of less radical jury modifications. Yet very little information about actual hung juries exists, and most of what does is based on 40-year-old data from the classic jury study by Kalven and Zeisel. This article discusses what is currently known about hung juries based on existing empirical research and examines some preliminary data about the contemporary incidence of hung juries in the federal courts and several state courts. The paucity of information on hung jury rates highlights the need for a rigorous and system-wide examination that extends beyond the scope of the jury itself and encompasses the institutional characteristics of each jurisdiction and how those characteristics affect the types of cases that are presented to juries

The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial Discussions: The View of Trial Participants, Judges, and Jurors

In 1995, the Arizona Supreme Court reformed the jury trial process by allowing civil jurors to discuss the evidence presented during trial prior to their formal deliberations. This Article examines the theoretical, legal, and policy issues raised by this reform and presents the early results of a field experiment that tested the impact of trial discussions. Jurors, judges, attorneys, and litigants in civil jury trials in Arizona were questioned regarding their observations, experiences, and reactions during trial as well as what they perceived to be the benefits and drawback of juror discussions. The data revealed that the majority of judges and jurors support juror discussions during trial while attorneys and litigants are divided in their views of this reform. The study also revealed that experience with the reform appears to increase support for it. Although the impact of the reform on the jury decision making process remains unclear, these early findings provide some insight into the effects of reforming the juror deliberation process

The Timing of Opinion Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases: An Empirical Examination

The question of when and how jurors form opinions about evidence presented at trial has been the focus of seemingly endless speculation. For lawyers, the question is how to capture the attention and approval of the jury at the earliest possible point in the trial. Their goal is to maximize the persuasiveness of their arguments--or at least to minimize the persuasiveness of those of the opposing side. Judges, in contrast, are more concerned about prejudgment. They regularly admonish jurors to suspend judgment until after all the evidence has been presented and after the jurors have been instructed on the law. Yet in the vast majority of jury trials, lawyers and judges have little opportunity to discern how jurors are reacting to trial evidence or whether they are abiding by judicial admonitions. Although researchers have thoroughly examined juror decision making in laboratory experiments, the point at which jurors form opinions in actual jury trials remains cloaked in mystery. Recently, however, that cloak was lifted enough to provide a glimpse at the timing of juror opinion formation. The opportunity to do so came in conjunction with an evaluation of a jury reform procedure implemented in Arizona civil trials in 1995. Data collected for the evaluation included the responses of 1,385 jurors from 172 civil trials concerning when they began to form opinions about the case, whether and when they changed their minds about those opinions, and when they made up their minds about the final outcome. This Article presents three competing models of juror decision making as they pertain to the timing of opinion formation. Using these models as an analytical guide, this Article examines the data from the Arizona study to assess convergence with these models and to identify factors that affect the timing of juror opinion formation in civil trials

Judges, Juries, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data

We analyze thousands of trials from a substantial fraction of the nation\u27s most populous counties. Evidence across ten years and three major datasets suggests that: (1) juries and judges award punitive damages in approximately the same ratio to compensatory damages, (2) the level of punitive damages awards has not increased, and (3) juries\u27 and judges\u27 tendencies to award punitive damages differ in bodily injury and no-bodily-injury cases. Jury trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in financial injury cases. Judge trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in bodily injury cases

Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials

Our analysis of the voting behavior of over 3,000 jurors in felony cases tried in Los Angeles, Maricopa County, the District of Columbia, and the Bronx reveals that only in D.C. does a juror\u27s race appear to relate to how he or she votes. African-American jurors in D.C. appear more apt to vote not guilty on the jury\u27s first ballot in cases involving minority defendants charged with drug offenses. We find no evidence, however, that this effect survives into the jury\u27s final verdict