ACUPUNCTURE AND BEE VENOM THERAPY IN THE CHRONIC LOW BACK PAIN: A SHORT REVIEW

Background: Many pharmacological and nonpharmacologic therapies are available for the treatment of the low back pain (LBP). Despite medications are the most frequently prescribed therapy for LBP, the use of various complementary medicine techniques is increasing. The paper summarizes the latest evidence on the treatment of musculoskeletal conditions (with special focus on chronic LBP) by using acupuncture and bee venom therapy (BVT). Methodology: The overview is based on English-language studies and articles found by searches of Medline over more than last 10 years. All the paper found that refer to LBP and at least one of the analyzed therapies have been taken into account. Results: The mechanism of action, efficiency, harms, toxicity and contraindications are highlighted for the two therapies. The literature on these topics is extensive and controversial. There are trials in favour of using the two complementary therapies for rheumatic diseases, as well trials arguing that the observed analgesic effects are related to a strong placebo response. Conclusions: The choice of using acupuncture and BVT for chronic LBP depends on various factors related to patient features and preferences, but nowadays an increased attention and support has to be noted

Synthesis of New Methionine Derivatives for the Treatment of Paracetamol - Induced Hepatic Injury

The direct pharmacological properties of amino acids and the possibility of using them as carriers for other active pharmacological substances are well known. Methionine, being able to yield the methyl group, is very important in the treatment of hepatic diseases. Paracetamol acute poisoning causes liver injury in both humans and animals. The study is designed to synthesize some new methionine derivatives and to establish a possible correlation between the new structure and the pharmacological properties. To this end, acute experimental poisoning with PanadolВ® (paracetamol) was performed while, for the treatment of liver injury caused by this compound, two original synthesis derivatives of methionine, namely N-(m-nitrobenzoyl)- L-methionine and N-(m-aminobenzoyl)-L-methionine, were used. Male Wistar rats were administered PanadolВ® (paracetamol) per oral (7500 mg/kg). N-(m-nitrobenzoyl)-L-methionine (m-NBM) 50 mg/kg and N-(m-aminobenzoyl)-L-methionine (m-ABM) 50 mg/kg were given intraperitoneally, 30 minutes after PanadolВ® administration. Biochemical parameters such as SGOT, SGPT, serum bilirubin and glycemia were estimated to assess the liver function. PanadolВ® (paracetamol) poisoning produced an increase in serum transaminases, bilirubin and glicemia. These effects were reduced by treatment with m-NBM and especially m-ABM. These biochemical observations were supplemented by histopathological examination of liver sections. The results obtained with m-ABM were comparable with those reported on methionine, which is a recognised antidote in paracetamol poisoning

Integrating institutional and behavioural measures of bribery

Bribery involves individuals exchanging material benefits for a service of a public institution. To understand the process of bribery we need to integrate measures of individual behaviour and institutional attributes rather than rely exclusively on surveys of individual perceptions and experience or macro-level corruption indexes national institutions. This paper integrates institutional and behavioural measures to show that where you live and who you are have independent influence on whether a person pays a bribe. The analysis of 76 nationwide Global Corruption Barometer surveys from six continents provides a date set in which both institutional and individual differences vary greatly. Multi-level multivariate logit analysis is used to test hypotheses about the influence of institutional context and individual contact with public services, socio-economic inequalities and roles, and conflicting behavioural and ethical norms. It finds that path-determined histories of early bureaucratization or colonialism have a major impact after controlling for individual differences. At the individual level, people who frequently make use of public services and perceive government as corrupt are more likely to pay bribes, while socio-economic inequality has no significant influence. While institutional history cannot be changed, changing the design of public services offers is something that contemporary governors could do to reduce the vulnerability of their citizens to bribery

Rethinking “democratic backsliding” in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland

This essay introduces contributions to a special issue of East European Politics on “Rethinking democratic backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe”, which seeks to expand the study of democratic regression in CEE beyond the paradigmatic cases of Hungary and Poland. Reviewing these contributions, we identify several directions for research: 1) the need to critique “democratic backsliding”, not simply as a label, but also as an assumed regional trend; 2) a need to better integrate the role of illiberal socio-economic structures such as oligarchical structures or corrupt networks; and 3) a need to (re-)examine the trade-offs between democratic stability and democratic quality. We also note how insights developed researching post-communist regions such as Western Balkans or the post-Soviet space could usefully inform work on CEE backsliding. We conclude by calling for the study of CEE democracy to become more genuinely interdisciplinary, moving beyond some narrowly institutionalist comparative political science assumptions

Business unusual: collective action against bribery in international business

Collective action initiatives in which governments and companies make anti-corruption commitments have proliferated in recent years. This apparently prosocial behavior defies the logic of collective action and, given that bribery often goes undetected and unpunished, is not easily explained by principal-agent theory. Club theory suggests that the answer lies in the institutional design of anti-corruption clubs: collective action can work as long as membership has high entry costs, members receive selective benefits, and compliance is adequately policed. This article contributes to the debate by examining how these conditions manifest in the case of anti-corruption clubs in the realm of international business, with particular focus on the international dimension of many initiatives. This vertical aspect of institutional design creates a richer, more complex set of reputational and material benefits for members, as well as allowing for more credible and consistent monitoring and enforcement