How does poverty decline? Evidence from India, 1983-1999

This paper attempts to assess the relative contributions of the farm and non-farm sectors to the increase in agricultural wage earnings in India between 1983-1999. Cross-section analysis of NSS data for 1983 and 1993 confirm the importance of farm productivity growth, consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. A counterfactual exercise that attempts to estimate the relative contribution of the non-farm sector to the increase in the agricultural wage earnings during the period 1983-1999 suggests that this figure is no more than 25 at the all-India level, though it is higher in some states. Thus the bulk of the growth in wage earnings and the attendant decline in poverty during this period appears to be due to the farm sector.Farm and non-farm productivity growth, non-farm employment, poverty, wage earnings

Collusive behaviour in finite repeated games with bonding

In finite repeated games, it is not possible to enforce collusive behaviour using deterrent strategies because of the "unraveling" of cooperative behaviour in the last period. This paper demonstrates that under certain conditions collusion among the players can be maintained if they can post a bond which they must forfeit if they defect from the cooperative mode. We show that the incentives to cooperate increase as the period of interaction grows in that the size of the bond required to deter defection becomes arbitrarily small as the number of periods in the game increases

What determines female autonomy? Evidence from Bangladesh

Abstract This paper examines the determinants of female autonomy within households in a developing country. In particular, we investigate the relative contributions of earned versus unearned income in enhancing women's autonomy and the role of employment outside of their husband's farm. In a simple theoretical model, it is demonstrated that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women. Using data from rural Bangladesh, empirical estimations confirm this prediction and also reveal the surprising fact that it is not employment per se but employment outside their husbands' farms that contributes to women's autonomy. The data also point to the importance of choosing the correct threat point in theoretical analyses of female autonomy. JEL Classification Number: D13, J1

Collusive behaviour in finite repeated games with bonding

In finite repeated games, it is not possible to enforce collusive behaviour using deterrent strategies because of the "unraveling" of cooperative behaviour in the last period. This paper demonstrates that under certain conditions collusion among the players can be maintained if they can post a bond which they must forfeit if they defect from the cooperative mode. We show that the incentives to cooperate increase as the period of interaction grows in that the size of the bond required to deter defection becomes arbitrarily small as the number of periods in the game increases

Resource utilization in oligopolistic markets : the case of exhaustible resources

This thesis considers the utilization of an exhaustible resource in an oligopolistic market in which producers are assumed to behave noncooperatively. Within a game-theoretic framework, the amount of resource recovered by the industry is endogenized by allowing producers to undertake, prior to extraction, investment activities which alter the variable cost of resource recovery. The open-loop Cournot-Nash equilibrium is characterized in considerable detail, especially in the symmetric case in which property rights are identical across producers. In this case, it is shown that an increase in the number of producers in the industry (a) increases the ultimate amount: of resource recovered by the industry (b) increases the initial investment undertaken on each deposit (c) lowers the resource price, at least initially (d) raises the shadow price of the resource, initially (e) decreases the present value of industry profits, and (f) increases the present value of the total surplus generated in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. When the property rights are asymmetric, it is shown that the output profile of the industry is inefficient from society's point of view: the same stream of resource output can be provided, in general, at lower investment cost and present value variable cost.Arts, Faculty ofVancouver School of EconomicsGraduat

The empowerment of women, fertility, and child mortality: Towards a theoretical analysis

This paper examines one avenue through which female autonomy impinges on fertility and child mortality in developing countries. A simple model is set out in which couples are motivated to have children for old age security purposes. The decisions of a couple regarding fertility and allocation of resources for the healthcare of their children are made within a bargaining framework. An increase in female autonomy translating into an increase in the relative bargaining power or the threat point utility of mothers is shown to reduce fertility and also to reduce child mortality rates. Paradoxically, the increase in female autonomy within a household may increase the disadvantage suffered by female children in that household with respect to survival.Child mortality · fertility · empowerment of women